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ABSTRACT 
Thailand and the United States have mutually benefited from 200 years of 
relations (since 1818) that strengthened during the Cold War and Vietnam War eras 
through their long-term alliance, security cooperation and economic engagement, and 
eventual U.S. assistance to Thailand’s democratization. Though the United States was 
once tolerant of Thailand’s frequent coups d’état, there is a common perception that 
relations were significantly damaged after the military-led coups in September 2006 and 
May 2014. U.S. criticism led Thai state leaders to rebuke U.S. interference in Thai 
politics and question whether the U.S. remains a true ally and friend. This thesis 
questions these assumptions by systemically assessing and analyzing military, 
economic, and diplomatic sectors of the relationship from 2001 to 2019. It examines 
the effects of the coups through systematic analysis of qualitative and quantitative data 
to understand how these coups and other events impacted the relationship. The 
main findings are that despite U.S. criticism and sanctions following the coups, the 
countries still maintained significant cooperation—particularly in the strategic and 
economic realms. But, since U.S. sanctions and criticism led Thai leaders to question 
U.S. commitments, Thailand hedged by deepening economic and strategic relations 
with China. Thailand’s actions support theoretical arguments that Southeast Asian 
countries tend to hedge between great powers rather than balance or bandwagon. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Kingdom of Thailand is America’s oldest treaty ally in Asia, and the two 
nations have had diplomatic relations for more than 200 years.1 Thailand and the United 
States established relations in 1818 but did not formalize diplomatic relations until the 
signing of the 1833 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, officially making the Kingdom, then 
called Siam, the United States’ first ally in Asia. Thailand-U.S. relations deepened in the 
20th century when both were signatories to the 1954 Manila Pact that created the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which sought to prevent and fight against communism 
in Southeast Asia.2 Despite the pact’s dissolution in 1977, Thailand and the United States 
remain officially committed to one another through the signing of the 1962 Thanat-Rusk 
communiqué that outlined U.S. security commitments to Thailand against communist 
threats.3  
Thailand-U.S. relations strengthened in the Cold War period during which 
American security and economic contributions to Thailand earned the United States the 
title, “America, the Great Friend,” or “Amerika, maha-mit” (อเมรกิามหามติร) in Thai.4 Yet, 
this epithet no longer conveys the same cordial and earnest connotation. Strains on 
Thailand-U.S. relations emerged in the early 1990s, starting in 1994 with Thailand denying 
a U.S. request to pre-position military equipment in Thai territorial waters and escalating 
                                                 
1 “History of the U.S. and Thailand,” U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Thailand, accessed February 17, 
2019, https://th.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/io/. 
2 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “The Thailand-U.S. Defense Alliance in U.S.-Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Asian 
Pacific, no. 137 (2019): 1–12, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/ewc_api-
n137_final.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=37062; “Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact); 
September 8, 1954,” Yale Law School: The Avalon Project, accessed June 7, 2019, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp. 
3 Chongkittavorn, “The Thailand-U.S. Defense Alliance in U.S.-Indo-Pacific Strategy,” 2. 
4 Pongphisoot Busbarat, “Choosing Between ‘Family’ and ‘Friend’: A Preliminary Examination of 
Identities in Thai Foreign Policymaking toward China and the United States” (paper presented at ISA 
Conference, Hong Kong, June 2017). http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/HKU2017-s/Archive/
82ce691b-e406-4286-958c-81a04806071b.pdf. 
2 
with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that pummeled the Thai economy.5 Rather than 
coming to Thailand’s aid, the United States remained largely absent, which led Thai 
nationals to soon ponder “why does a great friend treat us like this?”6  
Thailand’s disappointment with its seemingly ambivalent American ally became a 
reoccurring theme in the 21st century, especially after the United States imposed sanctions 
on the Kingdom following the September 19, 2006, coup d’état that ousted former Thai 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra who had been elected in 2001 and re-elected in 2005. 
Interviews conducted by Australian National University with Thai youth, military officers, 
and officials reveal negative perceptions toward the United States for interfering in 
Thailand business and unjustly criticizing Thai politics.7 In essence, Thailand-U.S. 
relations no longer enjoy the “special relationship” they had during the Cold War, where 
the United States was undoubtedly Thailand’s primary security and economic partner of 
choice.8 
Yet, during incumbent Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha’s visit to the White 
House on October 2, 2017, President Donald Trump proclaimed, “we have a very strong 
relation [sic] right now … and it’s getting stronger in the last nine months.”9 Prayut 
concurred, stating: 
                                                 
5 Kitti Prasirtsuk, “An Ally at the Crossroads: Thailand in the U.S. Alliance System,” in Global Allies: 
Comparing U.S. Alliances in the 21st Century, ed. Michael Wesley (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, The 
Australian National University, 2017), 18.  
6 Prasirtsuk, “An Ally at the Crossroads: Thailand in the U.S. Alliance System,” 118. 
7 John Blaxland and Greg Raymond, Tipping the Balance in Southeast Asia? Thailand, the United 
States and China, vol. 37 (Australia: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2017), https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
171102_Blaxland_TippingBalanceSoutheastAsia_Web.pdf?.IITpZJo0BPEYvMo7SWKIdQSByVu.lyp. 
8 Pongphisoot Busbarat, “Thai-US Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Untying the Special 
Relationship,” Asian Security 13, no. 3 (2017): 256–274; Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “An Unaligned Alliance: 
Thailand-U.S. Relations in the Early 21st Century,” Asian Politics & Policy 8, no. 1 (2016): 63–74. 
9 “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha of Thailand Before Bilateral 
Meeting,” White House, accessed May 24, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-prayut-chan-o-cha-thailand-bilateral-meeting/. 
3 
I am confident that, with [the] President’s leadership, we will be able to 
tackle all the problems and work together in order to further strengthen the 
cooperation between our two countries….10 
The leaders’ remarks evoked conflicting responses. Some analysts praised Trump 
for normalizing ties with Thailand after years of diplomatic stalemate, but cautioned 
against hope that the two states will actually execute their security and trade agreements as 
discussed during the meeting.11 Others are optimistic that the meeting will prompt more 
opportunities for strategic and economic engagements between the two allies despite U.S. 
criticism of Thailand’s domestic politics.12 Given these incongruences, this thesis 
examines the evolution of Thailand-U.S. relations in the wake of the 2006 and 2014 coups 
and concludes that Thailand-U.S. relations have declined relative to the state of the alliance 
under the Thaksin Administration (2001–06) due to multiple, interrelated influences.  
This conclusion was reached after a three-part analysis—covering military, 
economic, and diplomatic relations—over three time periods. First, it identified the state 
of Thailand-U.S. relations and contributing factors prior to the 2006 coup to establish a 
baseline understanding of the bilateral ties. Second, it analyzed developments in the same 
three sectors and influential factors explaining the reasons for the changes to Thailand-U.S. 
relations after the 2006 coup but before the 2014 coup. Third, it analyzed the same set of 
indicators as well as contributing factors to explain the reasons for the relationship’s 
evolution after the 2014 coup. The data and analysis suggest that the most influential 
                                                 
10 It is customary in Southeast Asian literatures and scholarly works to refer to people by their first 
name instead of their surname. Hence, this thesis will follow suit and refer to all Thai actors by their first 
name. White House, “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha of Thailand 
Before Bilateral Meeting.” 
11 One of Trump’s talking points in meeting with Prayut is for Thailand to reduce its trade deficit with 
the United States. Trump and Prayut also called for “full respect for all legal and diplomatic processes” 
regarding the South China Sea crisis, which Thailand’s position on the issue still remains “impartial and 
succinct.” Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Reading Between the Lines of Prayut’s U.S. Trip,” Bangkok Post, 
October 10, 2017, https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1339887/reading-between-the-lines-of-
prayuts-us-trip; Aukkarapon Niyomyat, “Thai Junta Leader Says Trump Sees Ties ‘Closer than Ever,’” 
Reuters, May 2, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-thailand/thai-junta-leader-says-
trump-sees-ties-closer-than-ever-idUSKBN17Y0TS; Busbarat, “Thai-US Relations in the Post-Cold War 
Era: Untying the Special Relationship,” 270. 
12 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Strengthening the US-Thailand Alliance for an Indo-Pacific Future,” 
Diplomat, December 7, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/strengthening-the-us-thailand-alliance-for-
an-indo-pacific-future/. 
4 
factors were Thailand’s prospective bandwagoning role in the current era of great power 
competition, the ramifications of the 2006 and 2014 coups in Thailand, the impact of Thai 
foreign policies and Thai political actors who adopted them, and the influence of U.S. 
sanctions and administrations.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH  
On June 1, 2008, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates visited Thai Prime Minister 
and Defense Minister Samak Sundaravej, prompting the visit to be hailed as a reaffirmation 
that “the military-to-military relationship between the U.S. and Thailand is based on shared 
democratic principles.”13 Secretary Gates was praising Thailand’s quick return to 
democratic principles and civilian control following the 2006 coup. In the decade following 
Secretary Gates’ remarks, Thailand witnessed yet another coup in 2014, making it the 
nineteenth successful coup in a long line of coup and coup attempts since the 1932 
revolution that ended absolute monarchy in Thailand.14  
Unlike the 2006 coup, the May 22, 2014, coup that overthrew Prime Minister 
Yingluck Shinawatra’s elected government brought stricter and longer-term consolidation 
of power by Prayut, who, at the time, was the Chief General of the Royal Thai Army 
(RTA). Since leading the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) during the coup, 
Prayut eventually returned Thailand to a “Thai-style democracy” governed by a royal-
military alliance with a heavily conservative political agenda.15 Five years later, Thailand 
finally held an election on March 24, 2019, and after three more months of debates and 
vote recounts, Thailand saw Prayut retain his premiership for an additional term.16 
                                                 
13 Donna Miles, “Gates Affirms Democratic Principles During Bangkok Visit,” American Forces 
Press Service, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50064. 
14 Nicholas Farrelly, “Why Democracy Struggles: Thailand’s Elite Coup Culture,” Australian Journal 
of International Affairs 67, no. 3 (2013): 281–296. 
15 Prajak Kongkirati, “Haunted Past, Uncertain Future: The Fragile Transition to Military-Guided 
Semi-Authoritarianism in Thailand,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2018): 363–376. 
16 Muktita Suhartono and Austin Ramzy, “Thailand Election Results Signal Military’s Continued Grip 
on Power,” New York Times, May 9, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/world/asia/thailand-




Examining, again, Secretary Gates’ comments, and the foundation underscoring the 
Thailand-U.S. relationship, and how it has evolved in the 21st century, the state of Thailand-
U.S. relations since the 2006 coup needs revisiting.   
The pillar of Thailand-U.S. relations resides in their security cooperation. Indeed, 
it was during the Cold War that Thailand aligned with the United States and permitted the 
latter to base its troops off of Thai soil to fight communist insurgencies in Cambodia, Lao 
PDR, and Vietnam.17 Thailand was also the first Asian nation to send troops to fight in the 
Korean War under the United Nations flag, which saw Thai military forces fighting 
alongside American forces.18 During the Vietnam War, Thailand allowed U.S. covert 
operations to be staged in its country with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—then, 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—training Thai forces in counter-guerrilla warfare.19 
Their unequivocal security alliance continued into the 1990s after the fall of the Communist 
Block. 
This united and strong alliance was also not confined to the 1990s. Despite Thai 
elites’ mistrust of the United States following the Asian Financial Crisis, Thailand-U.S. 
security cooperation continued without major friction.20 This was largely due to Thaksin’s 
foreign policy of aligning with President George W. Bush’s administration in the U.S.-led 
global war on terrorism campaign.21 Still, Thaksin did not make this decision lightly or 
immediately. Thaksin struggled between appeasing a historically key ally’s requests for 
Thailand’s willing support and the risk of backlash from Thai-Muslim voters who 
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constituted a substantial body of his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) political party and opposed U.S. 
military campaigns against Muslim countries.22  
Thaksin, in support of U.S. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, 
ultimately authorized U.S. ships to visit Thai ports and granted the United States over-
flight rights and refueling aircraft capabilities at U-tapao airbase in early October 2001.23 
In late May and early June 2003, after Thaksin admitted that the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group was operating in Thailand, Thai police arrested Thai nationals 
accused of planning embassy bombings and illegally selling highly radioactive isotopes.24 
Eventually, Thailand joined the United States’ “coalition of the willing in Iraq” by 
deploying 443 Thai troops to Iraq for a year, starting in September 2003, to assist in the 
country’s rebuilding efforts.25 As a result of Thailand’s support in the war on terrorism, 
President Bush officially designated Thailand as a Major Non-NATO Ally at the annual 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bangkok on October 2003. Thus, 
similar to Thailand’s actions during the 20th century, the Kingdom’s alignment with the 
United States in the war on terrorism at the onset of the 21st century left little doubt as to 
Thailand’s security allegiance.     
Presently, Thailand-U.S. relations are important for more than being the oldest 
treaty alliance in the Indo-Pacific or Thailand being designated a Major Non-NATO Ally. 
It is important because of Thailand’s relationship vis-à-vis the United States and a rising 
China in this new era of great power competition.26 To counter China’s rise, the United 
States must devote resources to maintaining and even building the relationship with its 
oldest friend in Asia. The United States must also not forget or neglect the history between 
Thailand and China, lest America risk losing a formidable ally to the region’s dragon. To 
Thailand, China still remains the unexpected ally that came to the Kingdom’s aid in 
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February and March of 1979 by sending troops to fight against the Vietnamese invasion on 
Thai borders during the latter’s attempt to take Cambodia.27 Moreover, China, not the 
United States, was one of the key countries that assisted Thailand during the Asian 
Financial Crisis by providing an additional $1 billion rescue package.28 Thus, China’s 
actions have earned it the title of a “reliable economic friend” and “an exemplar for what 
a true friend would do.”29 Thai-Sino relations—strategically, economically, and 
diplomatically—then, too, have grown considerably.30    
Still, Thailand regards its American ally as a “critical economic partner and its 
security partner of choice,”31 notwithstanding the Kingdom’s perception of China and 
Thailand’s current lack of shared democratic principles with the United States. Acting 
Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan stressed the alliance’s and Thailand’s strategic 
importance in the 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: 
These alliances are indispensable to peace and security in the [Indo-Pacific] 
region and our investments in them will continue to pay dividends for the 
United States and the world, far into the future…. As a U.S. ally that is both 
central to ASEAN and positioned between South Asia and Southeast Asia, 
Thailand plays a key geostrategic role in the Indo-Pacific region.32  
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The co-sponsored Thailand-U.S. COBRA GOLD military exercise, moreover, 
remains, for example, the largest multilateral military exercise in the Indo-Pacific that 
includes annual U.S. participation.33 Thailand also provided the U.S. military access to the 
geostrategic U-tapao airbase for multinational humanitarian efforts and the global war on 
terrorism in the 2000s.34 It stands to reason that Thailand-U.S. relations are built upon a 
historical legacy that, should they decline, may prove damaging to U.S. strategic interests 
in the Indo-Pacific region. Most importantly, understanding how strong the relationship 
has been and examining the factors that might have weakened Thailand-U.S. relations 
provides much-needed knowledge about its likely future trajectory. Analyzing how the 
relationship has changed will also provide suggestions for how to strengthen it and avoid 
conflict.  
Finally, it is crucial to study the evolution of Thailand-U.S. relations because 
Thailand “stands out as being comfortable with China’s rise and its intentions,” unlike its 
regional neighbors in Southeast Asia—for example, Singapore and Vietnam—that actively 
seek a U.S. presence to counter rising Chinese influences.35 Yet, Thailand’s acceptance of 
China is perplexing considering that Thailand is a U.S. treaty ally, and the Kingdom’s 
behavior is not consistent with Kenneth M. Waltz’s balance of power or Stephen M. Walt’s 
balance of threat theories. Examining Thailand’s actions can advance the study of these 
two fundamental international relations’ realist theories. Understanding Thailand’s foreign 
policies and actions toward the United States in the context of the Kingdom’s foreign 
policies toward China will contribute to the discourse concerning small states’ roles in an 
anarchical world.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review analyzes existing scholarly arguments that might account for 
how Thailand-U.S. relations have evolved in the 21st century. It is structured into three 
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sections, each focused on a specific explanation for that evolution: bandwagoning theory, 
U.S. foreign policy and Thai domestic politics, and hedging theory. It highlights the 
possible contributing factors that may account for changes to or continuity in Thailand-
U.S. relations and explain their evolution since the 2006 coup. First, Randall L. Schweller’s 
bandwagoning theory is considered in relation to Waltz’s and Walt’s theories of 
bandwagoning.36 Second, U.S. foreign policy and events in Thai domestic politics are 
discussed. Third, Thailand’s ambiguous hedging policy is assessed per the application of 
Van Jackson’s and Ann Murphy’s hedging theories toward the United States and China 
that may challenge the Thailand-U.S. alliance. Finally, the literature review concludes by 
identifying the prevalent factors that connect the three literatures to form potential 
explanations for the evolution of Thailand-U.S. relations since the 2006 coup. 
1. Bandwagoning with Revisionist States 
Randall Schweller’s bandwagoning theory submits that states bandwagon with 
revisionist actors (states) for profit.37 Schweller’s bandwagoning, unlike other scholars’ 
depiction, is a voluntary state action chosen during times of change based on three factors: 
terminology, relation to the status-quo bias, and interplay with revisionist states. First, 
bandwagoning must be understood at its rudimentary level and not as a concept in 
opposition to “balancing” theory. Schweller explains:  
The phrase “to climb aboard the bandwagon” implies following a current or 
fashionable trend or joining the side that appears likely to win. 
Bandwagoning may be freely chosen, or it can be the result of resignation 
to an inexorable force.38  
Therefore, states not do solely or mostly bandwagon in response to a threat, since that is 
not the most accurate usage of the term nor always the case. States may simply bandwagon 
with a powerful actor (state) in order to share in the victors’ profits. 
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Second, Schweller warns against upholding the status-quo bias for balancing, 
which will appear more dominant than bandwagoning if that bias is maintained. He 
criticizes neorealists such as Waltz and Walt for their bias in viewing the world through 
the perspective of a satisfied, status-quo state. This balancing bias, as described by 
Schweller, assumes that states will sacrifice little to improve their position in an anarchical 
world order but willingly take great risks to protect their values and assets. Additionally, 
he argues this bias is predicated on the false belief that all states’ first concern is security, 
which, again, he believes is only the case for status-quo states content with their great 
power position in an anarchical world. Sustaining this balancing bias would woefully 
neglect revisionist states that seek to not just preserve, but also improve, their position in 
the anarchical international structure.   
Revisionist states provide important context for why other states might choose to 
bandwagon with them. In Schweller’s argument, it is with revisionist states that other 
countries bandwagon most often. He posits that revisionist states, unlike status-quo states, 
do not predominantly care about their security, since they must risk security to achieve 
goals by making gains relative to others, which may lead to power struggles. Considering 
that bandwagoning tends to occur most often when the status-quo order starts to come 
apart, other states that seek to share in conquered spoils or escape the victors’ wrath may 
bandwagon with revisionist states.39 Hence, Schweller asserts that “bandwagoning is 
commonly done in the expectation of making gains; balancing is done for security and it 
always entails costs.”40 Simply put, states that bandwagon with revisionist states against 
the status-quo power perceive their alliances as a “positive-sum game” and anticipate the 
profits of aligning with the winning side.41 Some foreign policy autonomy, moreover, is 
sacrificed in military alliances and, so, argues Schweller, the imbalances of threat or power 
are not determinant factors of alignment decisions; those factors are the compatibilities of 
political goals between states. Thus, he concludes that dissatisfied powers, driven by profit 
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over security, will bandwagon with an ascending revisionist state; satisfied powers, despite 
being on the stronger side, will join the status-quo force. 
In this contemporary era of great power competition between the United States and 
a rising China, Thailand’s position vis-à-vis the two countries is being tested. To the west 
and an ocean away sits an ally with a shared history of strategic cooperation and trade; to 
the north sits another partner with a similar, albeit not as deep or formal, history of strategic 
cooperation and trade. Thus, if Thailand-U.S. relations have declined, bandwagoning is a 
possible explanation for why Thailand has begun to side more frequently with China. 
2. U.S. Foreign Policy and Thai Domestic Politics 
Various scholars and journalists have insisted for different reasons that Thai U.S. 
relations are in decline. Two main camps emerge from this debate: those who claim the 
decline is a result of U.S. foreign policy toward Thailand and those who cite Thai domestic 
politics as the driving force. However, one of the first questions that must be answered is 
whether there has truly been a significant decline in activities, or whether the alleged 
changes are more rhetorical than reality. This thesis takes on this task.  
Some scholars who name U.S. foreign policy as the primary source for the possible 
decline in Thailand-U.S. relations blame U.S. political leaders’ actions and U.S. sanctions. 
For instance, Thai political scientist Chookiat asserts that President Trump’s “election 
victory in 2016 has thrown [former] President [Barack H.] Obama’s ‘pivot’ towards Asia 
into jeopardy, with an uncertain impact on U.S.-Thai relations.”42 While tangible results 
following President Trump and Prayut’s meeting in 2017 on strategic cooperation and trade 
continue to evolve, Acting Secretary Shanahan’s report suggests some progress among 
state officials with regard to strengthening Thailand-U.S. relations.43  
Other scholars contend that one the primary reasons for a perceived decline in 
Thailand-U.S. relations is U.S. statements about and treatment of Thailand following the 
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2006 and 2014 coups, specifically, public scolding and imposed sanctions.44 For instance, 
in response to the 2006 coup, former U.S. State Department Deputy Spokesman Tom 
Casey announced: 
There’s no justification for a military coup in Thailand or in anyplace 
else…. We certainly are extremely disappointed by this action. It’s a step 
backward for democracy in Thailand. There are also consequences when 
these kinds of actions take place…and obviously, in light of what’s 
happened, in light of this coup, there are aspects of our relationship that 
we’re going to have to review.45 
Yet, we must step back. The 2006 coup, in practice, may not have critically 
impacted Thailand-U.S. relations as claimed, given that events such as the 2007 COBRA 
GOLD exercise, as one example, proceeded as scheduled, and it might stand to reason the 
same after the 2014 coup.46 In 2014, the United States outright criticized the military junta 
and downgraded its engagement by suspending military arms sales and assistance to 
Thailand.47 These reactions, one rhetorical and the other substantive, fed into Thais’ 
mistrust of the United States as not only prying into Thailand politics, but also 
unreasonably hurting Thailand-U.S. military relations.48 U.S. Secretary of State John 
Kerry’s criticism exacerbated Thailand’s poor view of the United States when he declared 
that “there is no justification for this coup... This act will have negative implications for 
the Thailand-U.S. relationship, [and] especially our relationship with the Thai military.”49  
But even then, in early 2018, Stars and Stripes published a headline announcing 
that “Thai-U.S. military relations flourish even as ruling junta postpones elections.”50 The 
article reported that despite Thailand inviting the Myanmar military, whose government is 
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accused by the United Nations of ethnically cleansing Rohingya Muslims, to COBRA 
GOLD 2018, the United States, nonetheless, sent approximately 6,800 personnel to attend 
the exercise. It also reported that this number nearly doubled the number of U.S. troops 
who had participated in COBRA GOLD 2017. In this case, U.S. foreign policy had only 
minimally affected Thailand-U.S. military relations.  
Secondly, another possible factor that shapes Thailand-U.S. relations is that of Thai 
domestic politics—namely, Thai prime ministers’ decision-making processes and foreign 
policies. Consider again Thaksin’s foreign policy toward the United States during the early 
2000s: despite concerns of upsetting the Thai-Muslim lobby in his TRT political party, 
Thaksin still supported the U.S.-led war on terrorism campaign, even military action in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.51 Thaksin’s actions are significant, since, early in his term, he 
prioritized relations with China, the European Union, India, and Japan over the United 
States, leading several scholars to describe him as the 21st century’s Mahathir bin 
Mohamad of Malaysia or Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, two semi-authoritarian leaders 
known for their independent thinking.52  
How Prayut prioritizes the Thailand-U.S. relationship is equally impactful, 
although history evinces concerns. Prayut was unabashed in criticizing the United States’ 
condemnation of the 2014 coup.53 In asserting that martial law and military coups restore 
political stability and help protect Thai democracy, he rebutted U.S. censure and 
maintained that there is no one single type of democracy, that Thailand must follow its own 
path.54 Prayut also cultivated more secure Sino-Thai relations by signing two 
memorandums of understanding, one regarding a key rail project and the other regarding 
purchasing agricultural products.55 In 2015, Thailand, under Prayut’s rule, went so far as 
                                                 
51 Chambers, “Thailand-U.S. Relations after 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” 467-69. 
52 Chambers, “Thailand-U.S. Relations after 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” 476; Duncan 
McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of a Thailand (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic 
Institute of Asian Studies, 2005).   
53 Busbarat, “Thai-US Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Untying the Special Relationship,” 268. 
54 Busbarat, “Thai-US Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Untying the Special Relationship,” 268. 
55 Hewison, “Thailand: An Old Relationship Renewed,” 121-22. 
14 
to order 28 military VT-4 tanks from China and 10 additional tanks in 2017.56 The Nikkei 
Asian Review further reports that in 2017, Thailand ordered a Yuan Class S26T submarine 
at 13.5 billion baht ($400 million) and forecasted two additional purchases projected at a 
total procurement cost of 36 billion baht ($1.1 billion).  
Arguably, under Prayut’s rule, and as this thesis later demonstrates, Sino-Thai 
relations have strengthened while Thailand-U.S. relations have declined in some areas but 
not as significantly and widely as some have claimed. Importantly, there is little evidence 
that Thailand cultivated Sino-Thai relations to diminish Thailand-U.S. relations. Rather, 
Prayut since his 2014 coup appears to have courted closer ties with Beijing because the 
United States had suspended much-needed foreign assistance. Moreover, bringing 
economic growth to Thailand helped shore up the Prayut regime’s legitimacy.  
3. Hedging as a Form of Ambiguous Thai Foreign Policies 
Finally, it would be negligent to conduct a study on any Southeast Asian country 
without addressing hedging, the theory commonly used to assess Southeast Asian states’ 
foreign policies. This thesis draws upon Van Jackson’s hedging theory as a state’s 
mechanism for coping with uncertainty by employing a strategy that permits it to mitigate 
alignment-associated risks by pursuing contradicting or opposing actions.57 He argues that 
in Southeast Asia hedging has taken two predominant forms. The first is to increase 
military investments from and engagement with China and other states in the region along 
with deeper security cooperation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The second is to increase diplomatic and economic engagement within ASEAN countries 
and China, while pursuing “increased military cooperation with the United States.”58  
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Jackson’s hedging theory is predicated on the complementary relationship between 
power transition theory, mistrust under multipolarity, and complex networks.59 As Jackson 
explains, power transition theory maintains that the uncertainty of a power transition 
between the United States and China gives rise to hedging and that multipolarity explains 
a state’s uncertainty about the intentions of various other states. He contends that complex 
networks—and their structure of sensitivity, fluidity, and heterarchy—play a significant 
role in understanding the make-up of Asian states and why they are inclined to hedge as 
opposed to balance or bandwagon.60 These complex networks represent relationships 
among actors and define structure in foreign affairs based off said relationships. Simply 
put, states are sensitive to how other states’ actions may affect them, and, given how fluid 
alignment structures are (today’s ally could be tomorrow’s enemy), states are less inclined 
to align with one great power over another to avoid being dominated by that power and 
lose state autonomy.  
This thesis also considers Ann Murphy’s interpretation of balancing and 
bandwagoning.61 She argues that Thailand will be balancing against a rising China if 
Thailand starts to restructure its armed forces, acquiesces to U.S. demands, and increases 
its procurement of American weapons. Conversely, Thailand will be bandwagoning with 
China if Thailand begins to tolerate China’s illegitimate actions while still viewing it as a 
threat. Finally, Thailand will be hedging with the United States and China if Thailand’s 
balancing behavior is present while it continues engaging with China. What is notable 
about Murphy’s assertions is that she bases her definition of bandwagoning on Walt’s 
bandwagoning theory, which claims states bandwagon in responses to threats.62 She posits 
that Thailand does not view China as a threat. But this viewpoint undermines her point, 
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since, as Schweller rightly articulates, determining whether states will bandwagon based 
on Walt’s threat factor will narrow the reasons why states might choose to bandwagon. 
Ultimately, Jackson’s and Murphy’s hedging theories are best understood as 
explanations for ambiguous foreign policy decisions, given that it is in the interest of every 
state to adopt policies that will best serve its interests. This foreign policy is best understood 
as follows: 
A vision of a desired outcome or set of interests in interacting with another 
state/actor, the strategies and ideas used in achieving these goals, and the 
available resources at a state’s disposable, in guiding her interaction with 
other states.63  
It should, therefore, be recognized that the extent to which Thailand courts a 
relationship with China is a mere matter of ambiguous Thai foreign policies. After all, 
scholars disagree as to whether an improvement in Sino-Thai relations is due to China 
filling the U.S. void in strategic, economic, and diplomatic engagement since the 2006 
coup, thereby becoming “Thailand’s preferred major power partner,” or, rather, the Sino-
Thai relation is simply building upon a preexisting partnership.64  
Thai-Sino relations, while made stronger in part because of U.S. sanctions and 
criticism, displayed signs of strengthening prior to the 2006 and 2014 coups.65 Hewison 
makes a cultural argument by attributing recent strengthening to the deep history of Sino-
Thai relations, as well as Thailand’s ability to successfully integrate ethnic Chinese into 
the Thai community and ethnic Chinese heritage now being celebrated openly among Thai 
elites. If Hewison is correct, Thailand sought to foster a stronger Sino-Thai relationship as 
part of their interwoven history while also maintaining or pursuing a greater Thailand-U.S. 
relationship. Yet, given Sino-Thai hostility during the Cold War, it seems realism and 
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political ideology are more influential than culturalism. Regardless, Thailand’s ambiguous 
foreign policy could be, in itself, another explanation for how Thailand-U.S. relations have 
evolved since the 2006 coup if this ambiguity contributed to increased acrimony in the 
Thailand-U.S. relationship.  
4. Conclusion 
Three consistent explanations are extrapolated from these literatures: Thailand’s 
role vis-à-vis the United States and China in their great power competition, the impacts of 
the 2006 and 2014 coups on U.S. foreign policy and Thai domestic politics, and Thailand’s 
ambiguous foreign policies toward the United States and China. As this thesis later shows, 
Thailand’s role in the great power competition—an unraveling of the status-quo—does not 
appear to be the result of bandwagoning with China out of a desire to share in the victor’s 
profits, since Thailand did not outright align with China over the United States. Instead, 
the 2006 and 2014 coups, together with Section 7008 of the H.R.2855, Department of State, 
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, compelled the United 
States to cut foreign aid to Thailand, because it “prohibits the use of funds… for assistance 
to any country whose elected head of government is deposed by military or military-
supported coup or decree.66 Coupled with U.S. political leaders’ criticisms of the coup and 
Thailand’s domestic politics engendering its leader’s rebuttal of U.S. censure, some aspects 
of Thailand-U.S. relations have been negatively affected.67 Finally, various Thai prime 
ministers who came into power since the 2006 coup aggravated Thailand-U.S. relations by 
adopting ambiguous—or in some instances, arguably none at all—foreign policies.  
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D. EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Drawing from the literature review, this thesis posited three potential factors that 
may have influenced the evolution of Thailand-U.S. relations since the 2006 coup: 
Thailand’s prospective bandwagoning role in this great power competition, the 
ramifications of the 2006 and 2014 coups in Thailand, and Thai foreign policies and the 
Thai political actors who adopt them. These factors led to three hypotheses: bandwagoning, 
U.S. foreign policies and Thai domestic politics, and ambiguous Thai foreign policies.   
The first hypothesis, which did not hold up, was that Thailand is bandwagoning 
with a rising China in the hope of sharing conquered spoils. It was based on a consideration 
of China as a revisionist state and Thailand’s desire to advance its strategic capabilities and 
grow its economy further after becoming an upper-middle-income economy in 2011 
through greater engagements with China.68 This hypothesis speculated that while Thailand 
may not yet outright align with China over the United States, or the United States over 
China, its trajectory is likely heading toward bandwagoning with China. Thailand’s 
growing strategic engagements, economic dependence, and improving diplomacy with 
China would have contributed to closer Sino-Thai relations and, possibly, declining 
Thailand-U.S. relations.  
This thesis demonstrates that Thailand has not bandwagoned with China against the 
United States but, rather, the Kingdom has hedged between China and the United States. 
Although Sino-Thai strategic, economic, and military relations have grown substantially 
with Sino-Thai total trade, for instance, overtaking Thailand-U.S. total trade, such growth 
is reasonably expected since China is the regional economic powerhouse. Trade, then, is 
considered necessary to expand the Thai economy, not as a vehicle to strengthen Sino-Thai 
relations for political reasons. As for Sino-Thai military relations, their strengthening was 
not deliberately pursued by Thai state leaders with the intent to decrease Thailand-U.S. 
military relations in a relative sense. COBRA GOLD remains the apex of the Thailand-
U.S. alliance, as well as the hallmarked multinational, multiservice military exercise in the 
                                                 




Indo-Pacific—above that of any Sino-Thai military exercises. Finally, Sino-Thai 
diplomatic ties did grow, and, in some respects, may seem stronger than Thailand-U.S. 
diplomatic ties, but that is due to Thai state leaders needing to cultivate legitimacy through 
countries that, unlike the United States, do not criticize their restraints on democracy. 
The second hypothesis posited that the United States’ relatively harsh 
condemnations of Thailand and its imposed sanctions following the 2006 and 2014 coups, 
and Thai domestic politics (namely, the political leaders’ actions), did not lead to a decline 
in Thailand-U.S. relations since the 2006 coup. This hypothesis is also proven false. It 
proposed that military relations and engagements continued largely unabated, regardless 
of U.S. sanctions, due to the longstanding Thailand-U.S. relations whose cornerstone was 
built on a formidable strategic cooperation evident in Thailand’s support of U.S. military 
campaigns in the Cold War and global war on terrorism. It argued that the military and 
security aspects of Thailand-U.S. relations are enduring pillars that helped maintain a stable 
Thailand-U.S. relationship.  
The opposite of the second hypothesis emerged: U.S. criticism of Thailand’s coups 
partly contributed to declining ties. U.S. sanctions mandated by law further deteriorated 
the alliance as Thailand’s access to U.S. military financing, foreign assistance, and military 
education and training was suspended. This suspension was prolonged after the 2014 coup 
compared to the 2006 coup and, in both instances, the sanctions were pronounced enough 
to negatively affect Thailand-U.S. ties. Therefore, although the hypothesis was partly 
correct in that Thailand-U.S. military relations and engagements continued somewhat 
unabated through COBRA GOLD exercises, the alliance was not strong enough to fully 
overcome U.S. law and criticisms and, as a result, Thailand-U.S. relations became 
destabilized after the 2006 coup and largely remained so until normalization took hold in 
2017. Moreover, U.S. efforts to normalize relations between the two coups when Thailand 
resumed civilian control were largely ineffective due to the inability of Thai leaders to 
project unambiguous foreign policy.      
The third hypothesis postulated that a shift toward more ambiguous Thai foreign 
policies since the 2006 coup contributed to a decline in Thailand-U.S. relations across the 
board. This ambiguity was presumed to reflect Thai policymakers’ willingness to court 
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both a democratic United States and an authoritarian China, despite Thailand being a U.S. 
treaty ally. The hypothesis also submitted that Thai political leaders’ negative perceptions 
toward the United States interfering in Thai politics led to a decline in Thailand-U.S. 
relations. This would coincide with a growing, positive perception toward China among 
Thailand’s political leaders, as noted in the phrase, “the Chinese and Thai are not remote 
but of the same family” and “the Chinese and Thais are brothers” (ไทย-จนี 
ใชอ่ืน่ไกลพีน่อ้งกนั, Thai chin chai uen klai phi nong kan in Thai; or 中泰 一家親, zhong tai 
yi jia qin in Chinese).69 The latter suggests a culturalist explanation. 
This third hypothesis did not hold true.  Despite Thai leaders cultivating stronger 
Sino-Thai security, economic, and diplomatic relations, Thailand-U.S. relations did not 
suffer to any large or permanent degree as a result of strengthening Sino-Thai relations. 
Instead, COBRA GOLD—the bedrock of military relations—grew in sophistication and 
continued every year, economic relations grew, and diplomatic relations returned to near-
normal in 2017 before Thailand resumed elections, thanks to a new foreign policy approach 
used by the Trump Administration.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
Analysis was divided into three periods: a 2001–05 baseline of Thailand-U.S. 
relations prior to the 2006 coup under the Thaksin Administration, followed by the post-
2006 coup period from 2006–14, and concluding with the post-2014 coup period from 
2014–19. To understand and explain how Thailand-U.S. relations have evolved from 
2001–19, data was compiled on Thailand-U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic 
relations.  
For the military sector, this thesis analyzed military exercises, U.S. foreign military 
financing (FMF), foreign military sales (FMS), U.S. funding for excess defense articles 
(EDA), and U.S. funding to the International Military and Education Training (IMET) 
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program. For economic relations, it dissected Thailand-U.S. trade, foreign direct 
investments (FDI) by the United States, and development assistance to Thailand. For 
diplomacy, it focused on the number and nature of high-level official visits between 
Thailand-U.S. state leaders using official press statements. These metrics provided a 
rigorous and consistent framework for assessing bilateral relations.  
In order to obtain statistical data on Thailand-U.S. military exercises, FMF, FMS, 
EDA, and military personnel exchanges, data were compiled from the following: Thai and 
U.S. civic and military press releases, foreign military sales and financing and Department 
of Defense (DOD) databases, IMET, U.S. Department of State, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs; Congressional Research Services, U.S. embassies in Thailand and China, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, the Asia Foundation in San 
Francisco and Bangkok, and the Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). 
These sources provided quantitative data and qualitative information on military exercises 
such as COBRA GOLD, along with the duration and nature of Thailand-U.S. military 
exchanges, and the types and number of military weapons sold to Thailand.  
Considering Sino-Thai relations in this era of great power competition, this thesis 
briefly drew on similar Chinese databases, as well as China’s defense white papers. Data 
were gathered from open sources, including news articles, as well as Chinese and Thai 
embassies, to understand what types of exercises and foreign military sales and financings 
have been and are being conducted between the two countries.   
To conduct a thorough analysis of Thailand-U.S. economic relations, and, briefly, 
Thai-Sino economic relations, the thesis obtained data from the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, RAND Corporation, 
UN Comtrade Database, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Trade 
Numbers, Global EDGE, The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), and the Royal 
Thai Embassies in the United States and China. These databases and webpages contain 
archived and updated data on Thailand’s trade and investments with foreign countries. 
They also provided context for Thailand’s trade agreements and economic relations with 
foreign partners.  
22 
Data on Thailand-U.S. and Thai-Sino diplomatic relations was obtained from the 
following sources: White House briefing statements and foreign policies, U.S. State 
Department, DOD, U.S. Office of the Historian, Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 
Royal Thai Embassies in the United States and China. Their webpages confer information 
on Thai and U.S. foreign policies regarding each other, as well as Thai foreign policies 
toward China. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Subsequent chapters are organized as follows: The second focuses on Thailand-
U.S. military relations by analyzing the COBRA GOLD military exercise and funding to 
FMF, FMS, EDA, and the IMET programs. The third addresses Thailand-U.S. economic 
relations, analyzing total bilateral trade, U.S. FDI to Thailand, and U.S. development 
assistance to Thailand. The fourth explores Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations by 
examining the frequency and nature of high-level official visits between Thailand and U.S. 
state leaders, press releases, leaders’ statements, and official documents. The fifth chapter 
presents and analyzes the findings, discusses which of the three hypotheses held up, and 
provides policy recommendations and further avenues for studying Thailand-U.S. 
relations.  
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II. THAILAND-U.S. MILITARY RELATIONS 
After analyzing the evolution of Thailand-U.S. military relations from 2001 to 
2019, this chapter concludes that, on balance, security relations remained strong between 
these long-term partners. It first covers Thailand-U.S. relations in the years before the 2006 
coup—the Thaksin years—(2001–2006) before moving to the years after the 2006 coup 
(2007–2014), and finally to the years after the 2014 coup (2015–2019). It found that a 
reduction in U.S. economic assistance via the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs was the primary negative 
impact on bilateral relations as a result of the 2006 and 2014 coups, as well as on Excess 
Defense Articles (EDA) grants—barring the lack of EDA data for 2005. COBRA GOLD 
exercises and Foreign Military Sales (FMS), on the other hand, continued to thrive, albeit 
with some significant changes to the exercises, which were not necessarily the result of the 
coups.  
The strongest pillar of Thailand-U.S. relations is security cooperation, which is 
underscored throughout Thailand-U.S. strategic cooperation from 2001 to 2006.70 But 
because U.S. law mandated that Washington impose sanctions on U.S. funding to Thailand 
due to the 2006 and 2014 coups, some negative implications manifested.71 The impact of 
U.S. sanctions related to these two coups varied considerably. While the post-2006 
sanctions minimally affected Thailand-U.S. military ties, the lingering effects of those 
imposed post-2014 remain. 
The U.S. response to the 2006 coup brought minimal impact to COBRA GOLD 
and only briefly affected funding to the FMS, FMF, EDA, and IMET programs. The same 
cannot be said about the 2014 coup where COBRA GOLD and FMS remain largely 
unaffected, but funding to FMF, EDA, and IMET are still gravely impacted. Paradoxically, 
in spite of sanctions, COBRA GOLD continued to evolve into a robust multinational and 
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multiservice exercise with 29 observers in 2019. But the same positive outcomes cannot 
be seen with regard to FMF, EDA, and IMET programs. Since the 2014 coup, the United 
States has suspended $3.5 million in FMF and $85,000 in IMET funding to Thailand.72 
Based on a 2008 to 2018 Defense Security Cooperation Agency report on EDA, the United 
States also stopped EDA grants to Thailand, albeit with no explanation as to why.73 
A. THAILAND-U.S. MILITARY RELATIONS: THE THAKSIN YEARS 
(2001–2006) 
The immediate period leading up to the 2006 coup is best categorized as the 
Thaksin years (2001–2006) where Thailand-U.S. military relations strengthened 
significantly with respect to military exercises (COBRA GOLD) with strong regional 
engagements. Thailand-U.S. military relations expanded with Thailand’s contributions to 
the U.S. global war on terrorism, and, following the 2006 coup, declined temporarily in the 
areas of military assistance (FMS, FMF, EDA, and IMET).74 The strengthening of ties 
through COBRA GOLD still comes as a surprise, considering that analysts were initially 
concerned about the strength of the Thailand-U.S. alliance under the leadership of Thai 
nationalist Thaksin Shinawatra.75 Upon taking office in February 2001, Thaksin gave less 
priority to external security affairs compared to his predecessors and initially continued 
this approach after the United States called upon its allies to support the U.S. global war 
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on terrorism campaign after 9/11.76 Thaksin sought instead to adopt a business-oriented 
approach toward Thailand foreign policy. Nevertheless, within weeks following the 9/11 
attack and former President Bush calling upon American allies for support, Thaksin 
adapted his foreign policy to include more strategic considerations.  
In early October 2001, Thaksin authorized U.S. ships to visit Thai ports and 
permitted the United States over-flight rights and refueling aircraft capabilities at U-tapao 
airbase, thereby signaling Thailand’s overt support of the U.S. global war on terrorism.77 
Two months later on December 14, 2001, Thaksin met Bush at the White House to discuss 
strategic and economic partnership goals.78 The meeting concluded with Bush boasting 
that Thaksin’s visit was “further confirmation that our longtime friend will be a steady ally 
in the fight against terror.”79 In September 2003, Thailand deployed 443 of its troops 
alongside U.S. forces in Iraq to assist with the United States’ nation-building efforts in 
Iraq.80 Thailand’s alignment with and support of its American ally led Bush to designate 
the Kingdom as a Major Non-NATO Ally in October 2003. Therefore, notwithstanding 
initial concerns about Thaksin’s nationalistic and business-oriented policies, Thailand-U.S. 
military ties grew significantly stronger during the Thaksin years as measured in terms of 
COBRA GOLD, FMS, FMF, EDA, and IMET engagements between Thailand and the 
United States. 
1. Exercise COBRA GOLD 
COBRA GOLD exercises from 2001 to 2006 reflected growing Thailand-U.S. 
military ties despite periodic fluctuations in the numbers of U.S. troops and Royal Thai 
Armed Forces (RTARF) participating in the exercises, which may initially reflect unstable 
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relations. In reality, the varying numbers of U.S. participants each year, as illustrated in 
Figure 1, are attributable to the strength of Thailand-U.S. relations, on the one hand, and a 
significant increase in U.S. military commitments in other parts of the world, such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan, on the other.81 On average, and as shown in Figure 1 with the upper black 
trend line, the number of U.S. military personnel slightly decreased throughout the period. 
As for the fluctuation in numbers of RTARF participants, variations are in response to the 
decrease in size and scope of COBRA GOLD exercises in any given year.82 On average, 
shown with the lower black trend line, the number of Thailand military-personnel also 
decreased during the Thaksin years. 
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Figure 1. Number of Participants in Exercise COBRA GOLD under the 
Thaksin Administration: 2001–200683 
 
 
Two further points must be considered before analyzing the data in Figure 1, which 
presents the numbers of U.S. and RTARF forces participating in COBRA GOLD during 
the Thaksin years: the history and significance of COBRA GOLD in relation to Thailand-
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U.S. military relations and the data sources. First, COBRA GOLD’s developments 
throughout the Thaksin years—and to the present—have transformed the exercises into the 
United States’ largest multinational and multiservice humanitarian-assistance and disaster-
relief military exercise in the Indo-Pacific, as well as the pride of the RTARF.84 This is 
significant, given that at the time of its inception in 1982, COBRA GOLD may have been 
the largest U.S. military exercise in Southeast Asia since the Vietnam War, but it was only 
a bilateral exercise between Thailand and the United States.85 Since then, not only has 
COBRA GOLD evolved into an annual, multinational and multiservice exercise conducted 
in Thailand, the exercise now includes 29 participants and observers from other countries. 
COBRA GOLD is described as a Thailand-U.S. co-sponsored Combined Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) and Joint Theater Security Cooperation (JTSC) exercise that enable Washington to 
showcase its security commitments to the region and the RTARF to strengthen its 
capabilities in responding to regional contingencies and in defending the nation.86 
Second, the data researched, obtained, and assessed in Figure 1 require a caveat. To 
start, information requested and received from the Royal Thai Army (RTA) and 
JUSMAGTHAI on the number of RTARF and U.S. participants does not include the 
Thaksin years. JUSMAGTHAI only had data from 2007 to 2019 whereas the RTA 
provided information on all participants—to include observers—from 2012 to 2019. Even 
then, JUSMAGTHAI’s data from 2007 to 2010 are incomplete, with either parts or all of 
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the number of U.S. troops and RTARF participants missing. A search of military journals 
and databases revealed conflicting data from 2001 to 2006 with the majority of the sources 
failing to report specific numbers. Because the number of COBRA GOLD participants 
could not be obtained from these primary sources, the information collected for COBRA 
GOLD 2001–2006 came from an aggregate of open source information—specifically, 
archived news reporting from the United States and overseas. Data from these articles were 
compared to extract the most consistent and similarly reported data.  
Figure 1 indicates wide fluctuations in the number of U.S. forces and RTARF 
participating in COBRA GOLD from 2001–2006. COBRA GOLD 2001 saw the United 
States and Thailand each contributing an average of 5,126 military personnel to the 
exercise (5,280 RTARF and 4,973 U.S. forces) with the objective of U.S. Special Forces 
training the RTA in border security and to combat illegal narcotics coming from Burma 
into Thailand.87 The number of military personnel grew significantly the following year, 
peaking with 7,700 RTARF and 13,200 U.S. forces participating in the exercise—a 
sizeable 46 percent increase for Thailand but an even more impressive 165 percent increase 
for the United States. COBRA GOLD 2003, however, witnessed a moderate decline in the 
number of participants on the Thai side and a considerable decline on the U.S. side: RTARF 
dropped by 27 percent from 7,700 to 5,600, while U.S. forces fell by 47 percent from 
13,200 to 7,000, albeit still well above their 2001 figures.  
The number of participants from both countries increased again in COBRA GOLD 
2004: RTARF increased 7 percent to 6,000 troops, while U.S. forces rebounded to just over 
their 2002 numbers, increasing sharply by 93 percent to 13,500 troops. In a parallel seesaw 
pattern of increases and decreases, COBRA GOLD 2005 brought decreases in the number 
of participants from the Thailand military, down 56 percent to 2,655 personnel, and the 
U.S. military, down 73 percent to 3,614 personnel. Finally, the figures again increased 
significantly for COBRA GOLD 2006, up 58 percent to 4,200 for Thailand and up 116 
percent to 7,800 troops for the United States. Notably, the US consistently sent more troops 
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than Thailand with an average of 8,347 U.S. military members compared to Thailand’s 
average of 5,239 military members.      
Regional and international affairs during the Thaksin years heavily shaped COBRA 
GOLD. The nature of each COBRA GOLD exercise reflected the perceived threats at the 
time, and the number of participants reflected the state of Thailand-U.S. relations and other 
U.S. military commitments globally. Starting in 2001, the major threat posture in the 
Southeast Asian region—especially in Thailand—was illegal drugs crossing Thailand’s 
borders from Burma,88 whose Chinese drug traffickers were protected by the ethnic Wa 
rebel groups.89 Thus, beginning in May 2001, U.S. Special Forces trained with their Thai 
counterparts in the 2001 COBRA GOLD exercise that focused on noncombatant 
evacuation and U.N. peacekeeping and law enforcement operations.90 One of the 
objectives of COBRA GOLD 2001 was to strengthen U.S. Special Forces and Thai military 
ties and working relations. Specifically, the goal was to create a reference point for both 
forces to draw from when the U.S. Special Forces were scheduled to train their Thai 
counterparts in counter-narcotics operations one month later, in October. However, 
COBRA GOLD 2001 did not contain live-fire exercises, which is markedly different from 
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previous iterations focusing on conventional combat, but, nonetheless, included Singapore 
as another participant for the second year in a row.91  
COBRA GOLD 2002, in comparison, occurred after the 9/11 attack and was 
therefore restructured to focus on anti-terrorism operations for the first time in the history 
of the exercise.92 The number of participants from Thailand and the United States increased 
to match the scale of the anti-terrorism component planned. Conversely, for COBRA 
GOLD 2003, concerns of the SARS disease outbreak and the U.S. military’s preoccupation 
with its global war on terrorism campaign in Iraq led to smaller numbers of U.S. troops 
participating in the exercises, thereby affecting the number of RTARF participants as 
well.93 On the observer side, COBRA GOLD 2003 welcomed Australia, China, India, 
Japan, Indonesia, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and 
Vietnam to the scene. As a result, the 2003 exercises were significant and large, despite 
lower numbers of troops from Thailand and the United States. 
Furthermore, COBRA GOLD 2003 incorporated peacekeeping and evacuation 
operations, as did COBRA GOLD 2004, which had Filipino and Mongolian participants 
and observers from ten Asian-Pacific and European countries, namely Australian, China, 
France, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam as 
observers.94  Despite former U.S. Ambassador Darryl Johnson remarking at the COBRA 
GOLD 2004 opening ceremony that the majority of U.S. Marines who participated in 
COBRA GOLD 2002 and 2003 were now deployed in Iraq, both Thailand and the United 
States contributed greater number of participants to the exercise in 2004.95 This is likely 
attributable to the goal of training COBRA GOLD 2004 participants in exercises aimed at 
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creating a rapid-response peacekeeping force and combatting terrorism, the latter of which 
was the Southeast Asian region’s top priority and important to the United States as well.96  
Finally, as U.S. military commitments grew in the global war on terrorism, along 
with the reinforcements of RTARF in Iraq in 2003, participation in COBRA GOLD 2005 
declined.97 But the nature of the exercise incorporated a new aspect: an HA/DR component 
in response to the tsunami that struck the Indian Ocean in December 2004. COBRA GOLD 
2005 also grew to include participants from Japan at the military and civilian government 
and non-government levels. As for COBRA GOLD 2006, it was the last of its kind under 
the Thaksin administration and contained an anti-terrorism operation for the fifth year in a 
row.98 It likewise expanded in nature to incorporate a computer-simulated staff exercise 
component, thereby increasing the scale of the exercise. But the overall number of 
participants from Thailand, the United States, Singapore, Japan, and, Indonesia (a first-
time participant after being an observer in 2004) at approximately 11,300 was noticeably 
smaller than earlier years—the total was 20,000 in 2004—due to U.S. commitments in Iraq 
preventing it from sending more participants.99 Still, observers to COBRA GOLD 2006 
came from nine Asian-Pacific and European countries: Australia, China, France, Germany, 
Laos, Malaysia, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam.  
In sum, the start of the Thaksin administration saw the 2001 COBRA GOLD as a 
trilateral exercise between Thailand, the United States, and Singapore. By 2006, vastly 
expanded participation and observation meant COBRA GOLD had become a multinational 
and multiservice exercise symbolic of strong Thailand-U.S. military ties and regional 
leadership roles for both states.  
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2. Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, and Excess 
Defense Articles 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Excess 
Defense Articles (EDA) are all markers of stable Thailand-U.S. military relations during 
the Thaksin years despite some degrees of declining U.S. assistance via these programs 
throughout the period (Figure 2). Of note, the fact that Thailand was authorized access to 
these programs is an indicator of the strength of the Thailand-U.S. military ties during this 
time.   
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Figure 2. U.S. Security Assistance to Thailand under the Thaksin 
Administration: 2001–2006100 
 
The United States offered Thailand $13 million in EDA in 2006, but the Kingdom did not accept. 
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 is a form of U.S. security assistance that may 
be provided to foreign countries.101 Under this act, the U.S. government is authorized to 
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finance, sell, or grant defense services and equipment to designated foreign countries that 
may help strengthen U.S. security and international stability. Countries that are unable to 
purchase U.S. military equipment may request FMF from the U.S. government through the 
foreign military financing of direct commercial contracts program.102 The FMS program 
was also enacted through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and allows sales of 
weapons to allies and partner states. Foreign countries may also obtain defense and arms 
transfers through the EDA program, which allows them to acquire excessed defense 
articles—that is, used and new U.S. equipment that is functional—through a grant or at 
reduced prices based on the equipment’s condition.103  
After three years of sharp increases in U.S. FMF to Thailand from 2001 to 2003, 
U.S. FMF to Thailand saw a sharp decline in 2004 to $881,000, which was due to U.S. 
financing commitments to other parts of the world.104 Iraq, specifically, was the largest 
recipient of U.S. financing in 2004 at over $20 billion for reconstruction activities since 
mid-2003.105 Still, because of the war on terrorism since 2001 and the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA) and Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) that commenced in 
2004, the United States considerably raised economic assistance for counterterrorism 
objectives in the Indo-Pacific.106 Thailand was one of the beneficiaries of this increased 
financing with nearly $1.5 million FMF received from its U.S. ally in 2005. Then, due to 
the 2006 coup, the U.S. State Department suspended nearly $24 million in military and 
peacekeeping assistance to Thailand pursuant to Section 508 of the Foreign Operations 
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Appropriations Act and suspended funding for counterterrorism assistance as previously 
authorized under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 
2006.107  The nearly $24 million in military assistance was not reinstated until February 
2008, thus showing early signs of the impact of the 2006 coup on Thailand-U.S. military 
relations.108 
U.S. FMS to Thailand increased steadily from 2001 to 2002, followed by a minor 
drop from $170,598 in 2002 to $152,435 in 2003. Although FMS increased to $179,776 in 
2004, the FMS dropped sharply to $91,182 in 2005 and then more gradually to $82,066 in 
2006. While difficult to ascertain in Figure 2, the data from 2001 to 2004, on the whole, 
indicate stability in U.S. FMS to Thailand. The point of departure is 2005 where U.S. FMS 
declined by the tens of thousands, which is likely attributed to U.S. military assistance 
elsewhere globally and the extent of Thailand requesting purchase of U.S. military 
equipment.109   
Finally, when Bush designated the Kingdom as a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2003, 
Thailand became eligible for greater access to EDA, which included depleted uranium anti-
tank rounds, commercial satellites export licenses, stockpiling of U.S. defense materials, 
military training, and participation in military research and development projects.110 But 
specifically on EDA grants to Thailand from 2001 to 2008, the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency reports no information predating 2008 in its current database. Figures 
on EDA grants from 2001 to 2004 were, instead, obtained from the Security Monitor 
Assistance and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) databases but with 
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no explanation for the decline in the EDA grant amount for 2002.111 The increase in the 
EDA grant amount in 2003 and 2004 was consistent with an overall increase in U.S. aid to 
the Southeast Asian region as a result of the need to grow the economy post-Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997.112 Furthermore, a search of historical archives for EDA grants in 
2005 reveal ambiguous information. While the Congressional Budget Justification for 
Foreign Operations report indicated that Thailand was authorized EDA grants, it did not 
disclose the specific amounts.113 Rather, the report included the EDA grant numbers in sum 
with total FMF and FMS amounts and did not clarify whether the offered EDA grant was 
ultimately delivered, thereby making it difficult to accurately calculate the EDA grant 
based off of the reported FMF and FMS amounts. While the United States awarded $13 
million in EDA to Thailand in 2006, the Kingdom did not accept the grant.114 No 
information could be found as to why Thailand declined the EDA grant in 2006. Given 
these data gaps, it is best to analyze the FMF and FMS data in Figure 2 to understand the 
impact of the 2006 coup on Thailand-U.S. relations. 
3. International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
The IMET program is another component of Thailand-U.S. security cooperation 
whose funding reflected normal fluctuations and world events. The importance of the 
Thailand-U.S. bilateral relationship is reflected in the millions of dollars the United States 
devoted to its IMET program with Thailand from 2001 to 2006, with an overall increase 
realized during the Thaksin Administration (see Figure 3). Funding levels minimally 
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declined from 2001 to 2003 until nearly doubling in 2004, before gradually decreasing 
again in 2005 and 2006.  
Figure 3. U.S. Financing to the IMET Program with Thailand under the 
Thaksin Administration: 2001–2006115 
 
The IMET program was established under the International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and provides military education and training to foreign 
military and civilian personnel through attendance at U.S. facilities.116 The program’s 
objective is to “encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased 
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understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals 
of international peace and security” and foster future U.S. alliances while enhancing 
transnational joint operation interoperability.117 The payoff is considered substantial, given 
that several prominent, high-ranking officials in the RTARF and civilian Thailand agencies 
obtained U.S. education and training through the IMET program.118 However, it is 
necessary to caveat that the impact of the 2006 coup on the IMET program cannot be fully 
appreciated in dollar amounts until 2007 because the coup happened near at the end of 
fiscal year 2006, well after funding had been approved and dispersed.  
Nevertheless, U.S. IMET funding for Thailand from 2001 to 2003 held steady at an 
average of $1.78 million over the first three years of Thaksin’s premiership. In 2004, IMET 
funding increased significantly from $1.76 million in 2003 to $2.57 million in 2004. This 
swift rise was a result of greater investment in IMET development initiatives in Southeast 
Asia, in general, with the goal of creating more professional militaries to contribute to more 
acceptable civil-military relations and human rights records as part of the global war on 
terrorism.119 The United States maintained a higher level of IMET funding to Thailand in 
2005 at $2.52 million and 2006 at $2.36 million compared to 2001–2003. Figures for these 
years reflected slightly less funding due to more funding going to the Philippines, the 
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largest beneficiary of U.S. FMF and IMET in 2005.120 As previously discussed, the 2006 
coup caused Washington to suspend approximately $24 million in U.S. economic 
assistance to Thailand, which negatively affected the Kingdom’s participation in the IMET 
program beginning in late 2006 and continuing until February 2008. 
4. Conclusion: Thailand-U.S. Military Relations under the Thaksin 
Administration 
Thailand-U.S. military relations during the Thaksin Administration were arguably 
strong and served as the foundation of the alliance. COBRA GOLD expanded in scale and 
operations throughout the period to include additional participants from Singapore and 
Japan and observers from nearly a dozen countries that helped foster interoperability with 
Thailand and U.S. forces. In March 2003, former Navy Admiral Thomas B. Fargo went as 
far as to argue that COBRA GOLD was the “centerpiece” of the Thailand-U.S. alliance, 
and the multinational dimension of the exercise provides Thailand an active role in 
promoting regional cooperation.121   
The period brought an uptick in military aid. U.S. FMF and FMS to Thailand were 
generally stable. Despite the lack of available data on U.S. EDA grants to Thailand for 
2005, the years in which they were provided also indicated impressive grant amounts in 
the millions, with exception to the unexplained sharp decline in 2002. IMET funding nearly 
doubled in size in 2004. Together, the United States’ military sales and economic assistance 
helped the RTARF make progress toward modernizing its military. At the start of the 21st 
century, one of the earliest signs of strengthening Thailand-U.S. military relations was 
found in Thailand purchasing an advanced U.S. medium-range air-to-air missiles 
(Amraam) for its F-16 fighter planes in July 2001.122 This purchase distinguished Thailand 
as the first Southeast Asian country to acquire the system from the United States. 
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Therefore, despite the damning effects of the 2006 coup, Thailand-U.S. military relations 
had a strong baseline to build upon once Thailand restored its democracy.  
B. THAILAND-U.S. MILITARY RELATIONS: AFTER THE 2006 COUP 
(2006–2014) 
The years after the 2006 coup and before the 2014 coup highlighted major changes 
in the military exercise and economic-assistance sectors of Thailand-U.S. military relations 
that suggest an improvement in some areas and deterioration in others. What is striking, 
however, about the immediate period following the 2006 coup is that U.S. officials 
criticized the coup and expressed concerns about the situation, but still worked closely with 
the RTARF to combat terrorism.123 U.S. officials argued that the coup was a “special case,” 
a reaction to the unforeseen and sustained mass protests that expanded after perceived 
irregularities during Thaksin’s April 19, 2006, snap parliamentary elections and other 
administrative maneuverings that the opposition believed were severely weakening 
democratic institutions.124 Furthermore, the Bush Administration minimized criticism of 
the coup due to widespread skepticism as to whether Thaksin’s transfer of power to his 
deputy, Chidchai Vanasatidya, during the snap-election voting period was constitutionally 
legal.125  
 Nevertheless, Washington was still mandated by U.S. law to enact sanctions on 
U.S. economic assistance to Thailand’s military, which affected Thailand-U.S. military 
relations. The scale of COBRA GOLD decreased relative to where it had been during 
Thaksin’s Administration with lowered U.S. participation and cancelled combat exercise 
components. Moreover, FMF and FMS did not recover to the same levels they had enjoyed 
during the Thaksin years, instead fluctuating minimally from 2006 to 2014. And, similar 
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to 2001–06, available sources on EDA grant data still reported ambiguous and incomplete 
information for this period although the Defense Security Cooperation Agency reported a 
significant spike in U.S. EDA grants to Thailand in 2011.   
Analyzing U.S.-Thailand relations between the September 19, 2006, coup and May 
22, 2014, coup is complicated by five prime ministers leading Thailand during this period, 
none of whom were able to sustain a cohesive foreign policy plan on Thailand-U.S. military 
relations before the next changeover. General Surayud Chulanont took control of the 
government from October 2006 to January 2007 following Thaksin’s ousting via coup in 
September 2006.126 Elected civilian Samak Sundaravej, who led from January 2007 to 
September 2008 until Thailand’s Constitutional Court forced him to resign through its 
ruling that Samak’s paid appearance on a Thai cooking show violated constitutional law, 
followed Surayud.127 Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother-in-law, was elected through 
parliamentary vote to replace Samak in September 2008.128 However, Somchai, too, was 
forced to step down as prime minister in December 2008 after the Constitutional Court 
found his party and two others guilty of electoral fraud.129 Shortly after, Abhisit Vejjajiva, 
a member of parliament and career politician since 1992, was appointed prime minister 
after winning 235 parliamentary votes against the 198 votes Pracha Promnok, Abhisit’s 
opponent and former national police chief, won in December 2008.130 Abhisit led the 
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government until August 2011 when civilian Yingluck Shinawatra was elected prime 
minster; she ruled until her ousting via coup in May 2014.  
Even so, regardless of Thailand’s frequent changes in prime ministers between 
2006 and 2014, and despite U.S. policymakers’ swift condemnation of the 2006 coup, it 
appears that Thailand-U.S. military relations were not significantly affected by the coup. 
This may be because the country’s coup leaders promptly transferred state control to 
civilian leaders, and some U.S. officials were ambivalent about the coup, given Thaksin’s 
maleficence in office and highly contentious protests, especially in Bangkok. The coup’s 
effects on Thailand-U.S. military relations, then, were not as severe as the initial U.S. 
sanctions on Thailand would lead one to believe. Indeed, it seemed that the United States 
rewarded Thailand’s efforts to return to democracy during this period of ongoing internal 
unrest. 
1. Exercise COBRA GOLD 
Both Thailand and the United States cut back their participation in COBRA GOLD 
during the political unrest of 2005, sought to reinvest in the exercises in 2006 before the 
coup, then felt the negative impact of the coup with a significant drop in COBRA GOLD 
engagement in 2007 (see Figure 4).  The data also reflect increases in the number of U.S. 
participants from 2008 to 2013, a temporary uptick in Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) 
participants in 2008, followed by gradual declines in Thailand’s participation from 2009 to 
2014, a period of deepening and expanding political protests. Nonetheless, the number of 
U.S. forces and RTARF participating in COBRA GOLD, like the pre-2006 coup years, still 
trended downward as indicated by the two black trend lines. Data obtained on the number 
of COBRA GOLD participants from 2007 to 2014 are derived from a combination of 
archived news articles and data from the Royal Thai Army (RTA) and Joint United States 
Military Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI). Data on COBRA GOLD from 2001 
to 2006 is also included in Figure 4 for comparison.    
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Figure 4. Number of Participants in Exercise COBRA GOLD after the 
2006 Coup: 2007–2014131 
 
In the wake of the September 19, 2006, coup, COBRA GOLD 2007 proceeded as 
planned, despite the U.S. State Department announcing on September 28, 2006, that several 
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forms of U.S. economic assistance to Thailand would be suspended per U.S. law.132 During 
COBRA GOLD 2007’s opening ceremony, former U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission of the 
U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, Alexander A. Arvizu, remarked that “for a quarter century, 
Cobra Gold has been the most visible symbol of U.S. and Thai military cooperation… 
[and] makes the militaries of each of our countries better able to operate.”133 Still, 2007 
reflected smaller Thailand and U.S. troop commitments than in 2006 prior to the coup and 
the lowest level of troops between 2001 and 2014 for the United States at just 2,091. 
Thailand sent 3,089 troops to participate in COBRA GOLD 2007, its second-lowest 
number since 2001 after COBRA GOLD 2005, where it sent just 2,622. 
In May 2008, with Washington having restored economic assistance to the 
Kingdom after an election in Thailand, the number of participants from both Thailand and 
the United States doubled from lows of 3,089 and 2,091, respectively, in 2007.134 COBRA 
GOLD 2008 also marked the first year China attended as an observer, although Thailand 
had asked its American ally to allow China to attend as early as 2001. The level of U.S. 
participation then increased by 20 percent from 7,271 troops in 2009 to 8,741 troops in 
2010. Meanwhile, COBRA GOLD 2009 saw a 23 percent decrease in the number of 
RTARF participants, from 5,250 in 2008 to 4,034 in 2009, possibly due to the increase in 
total number of military exercises involving the United States, Thailand, and other regional 
partners—Cope Tiger, Red Flag, and CARAT—from 2001 to 2009. Multiple exercises 
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required the RTARF’s attention at a time when Thailand’s military was focused on 
governance within the state.135   
As for COBRA GOLD exercises from 2010 to 2014, RTARF participation slowly 
declined from 4,685 to 3,010, which may have been a result, in part, of emerging Sino-
Thai military exercises that required greater involvement on Thailand’s side. Likewise, the 
RTARF lacked sufficient capacity to send a greater number of troops to COBRA GOLD 
and faced competing mission requirements, such as a sizeable number of RTARF troops 
deploying to Thailand’s southern provinces to fight an insurgency that resurfaced in 2005 
after being dormant for twenty years.136 Thailand’s COBRA GOLD troop commitment by 
2014 stood at 3,010, nearly half the level of 2001. It is worth noting, too, that South Korea 
joined COBRA GOLD, as a participant, not an observer, for the first time in 2010, and 
Malaysia followed suit in 2011, further contributing to the multination and regional 
strength of the exercise. Finally, U.S. forces in COBRA GOLD held steady from 2010–13 
at around an average of 8,883, before constricting sharply by more than half to 4,556 in 
2014. This unexpected drop followed the U.S. Navy ship Sgt Matej Kocak running aground 
in Japan.137 Nevertheless, by the time COBRA GOLD 2014 ended in February, the exercise 
had evolved into the crown jewel of Thailand-U.S. military relations that allowed both 
countries to showcase their regional interoperability commitments—and, especially, their 
commitment to each other.    
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2. Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, and Excess 
Defense Articles 
Figure 5 illustrates generally steady U.S. FMF and FMS assistance to Thailand in 
the years between the two coups, which points to stable and solid Thailand-U.S. military 
relations. U.S. EDA grants to Thailand, however, present a somewhat ambiguous picture 
due to the lack of explanation as to why EDA grants to Thailand stopped in 2009, 2013, 
and 2014. Nonetheless, it is likely that a sharp decline in EDA grants in 2008 and 2010 
were either in response to the 2006 coup or the 2008 Global Financial Crisis that started in 
the United States, thereby impacting the amount of foreign assistance it would provide. 
Once elections resumed in 2007, U.S. EDA grants to the Kingdom increased sharply, 
although Thailand ultimately did not accept the EDA grants of $10 million in 2011 and 
then only accepted a portion of the $7 million EDA grant in 2012.   
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Figure 5. U.S. Security Assistance to Thailand after the 2006 Coup: 
2007–2014138 
 
Thailand applied for and was awarded $10 million in EDA grants in 2010 but ultimately did not accept 
them. Thailand accepted $5.9 million of the $7 million EDA grants in 2011.  
Figure 5 includes data on FMF, FMS, and EDA from 2001 to 2006 to compare it 
against the data from 2007 to 2014, revealing an even longer stable level of support and 
engagement through these programs with the except of EDA grants. It illustrates that 
Thailand did not regain FMF economic assistance until democracy was restored following 
the 2006 coup.139 Once elections were held in Thailand, the United States reinstated FMF 
assistance at the relatively low level of $800,000 in 2008. However, this reduction, which 
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was also reflected in lowered IMET funding in 2008, was due to the United States 
accommodating an increase in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 
funding to assist Thailand in responding to separatist violence in southern Thailand’s ethnic 
Malay-Muslim provinces.140 Still, with elections proceeding apace, this amount doubled to 
$1.6 million in 2009 and remained relatively stable through 2013, which brought $1.4 
million in FMF to Thailand. While an aggregated search of open source and government 
databases did not find the actual amount of U.S. FMF to Thailand for 2014, the U.S. 
Department of State estimated $1 million in funding, which still exceeded the assistance 
extended in 2008.141 Compared to the U.S. FMF provided to Thailand during the Thaksin 
administration, these increases from 2008–14 are considerably less than the triple digits 
Thailand once saw but are still impressive and indicators of stabilizing bilateral ties.  
While FMS amounts between coups did not reach the highs seen in 2001 to 2004, 
the trends were generally stable from 2007 to 2014 and not much below the 2001–06 
average of $132,433. Particularly, there was an increase of FMS in 2011—the highest 
figure recorded during these years between the two coups—to $89,093. This is arguably a 
reflection of U.S. economic assistance and military equipment sales to Thailand in support 
of the Kingdom’s democratic elections between 2007 and 2014, a telling sign that 
Thailand-U.S. military relations rest, in part, upon Bangkok’s democratic pillars. 
Although clarification regarding EDA grants to Thailand is incomplete, two points 
can be drawn from the available data. First, levels of U.S. EDA grants to Thailand 
fluctuated wildly. EDA grants stood at $2.7 million in 2007 and dropped substantially to 
$400,000 in 2008. This may have been due to U.S. law mandating sanctions on U.S. aid to 
Thailand since the country’s head of government was deposed via coup. However, it could 
also be in response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis that sent several economies, 
including the United States’, into a recession. It seems plausible that the United States was 
not in a position to make substantial grants to Thailand in 2008. Second, the exponential 
increase in EDA grants from a token low of $100,000 in 2010 to $10 million in 2011 and 
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then $7 million in 2012 requires clarification. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
EDA database shows that in 2011 the United States allocated EDA grants to Thailand per 
the Kingdom’s request for used military equipment to the tune of $10 million. However, 
Thailand ultimately did not accept any of the items requested, although neither the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency’s EDA database nor any open sources explains why. In 2012, 
out of the $7 million-worth of used military equipment Thailand requested and was 
awarded, it accepted only $5.9 million. Nevertheless, Thailand’s acceptance of 84 percent 
of the 2012 EDA grants corresponds to not only increased purchase of U.S. military 
equipment, but also—since the United States authorized the grants—a stabilizing of 
Thailand-U.S. military relations after the 2006 coup.     
Finally, U.S. EDA grants to Thailand during the years after the 2006 coup averaged 
$4.1 million, compared to $1.5 million during the Thaksin years. This $4.1 million average 
accounts for the U.S. EDA allocations to Thailand in 2011 at $10 million and in 2012 at 
$7 million. Even though Thailand did not accept these two grants, the allocations represent 
U.S. intent and commitment to its partner. Despite this substantial increase in the average 
grant award in the post-2006 coup period, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
reported that no EDA grants were offered to Thailand for 2009 and 2013–14. In contrast, 
U.S. EDA grants to Thailand were made each year during the Thaksin Administration 
(2001–06), except for 2005, for which there is no available data. Similar to the ambiguity 
of Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations report for EDA grants in 
2005, available data on EDA grants (2008–18) from the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency did not shed light as to why grants were not provided in some years.142  
Regarding U.S. FMF for Thailand, the lack of FMF in 2007 is a clear indicator that 
per U.S. law, FMF cannot be authorized for countries whose elected heads of government 
are deposed via coups.143 U.S. FMF for Thailand during the Thaksin years averaged $1.37 
million, compared to $1.31 million in the years after the 2006 coup. While the latter figure 
is slightly lower, Figure 5 indicates that FMF was more consistently provided in the 
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millions from 2007–14 compared to the sharp fluctuations seen from 2001–06. Lastly, U.S. 
FMS to Thailand during the years after the 2006 coup are lower, at an average of $63,189 
compared to $132,433 during the Thaksin Administration. The increase in U.S. military 
sales to Thailand from 2001–06 is likely due to the Kingdom’s support of the U.S. global 
war on terrorism that necessitated increased military supplies. 
3. International Military and Education Training 
U.S. IMET funding was suspended in 2007 following the 2006 coup and, once 
restored, they remained at comparatively low levels in subsequent years and never reached 
those of the Thaksin era. Figure 6 compares U.S. funding to IMET from 2001–06 and 
2007–14, again with vertical lines indicating the years of the two coups.  
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Figure 6. U.S. Financing to the IMET Program with Thailand after the 
2006 Coup: 2007–2014144 
 
In response to the 2006 coup, the United States suspended IMET funding to 
Thailand for 2007 but restored it in 2008 once elections resumed in the Kingdom. Again, 
the lowered funding in 2008 was due to changes in allocations toward the International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement fund instead.145 Nevertheless, in the post-2006 
period, U.S. funding to the IMET program with Thailand gradually increased from 2008 
to 2011, from $1.2 million to $1.5 million. IMET funding decreased, however, from $1.5 
million in 2011 to $1.3 million in 2012. This decline parallels a decrease in the United 
States’ total IMET budget for its foreign partners, from $105.8 million in 2011 to $103.3 
million in 2012, following President Obama’s fiscal year 2012 budget-cut request that 
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affected IMET funding.146 The following year, U.S. IMET funding to Thailand basically 
held steady.147 The sharp decline in IMET funding in 2014 is due to the United States 
suspending approximately $85,000 in IMET funds in response to the coup. In doing so, 
this action is indicative of the negative ramifications of Thailand’s coup d’état on Thailand-
U.S. military ties.   
IMET funding in the Thaksin’s years averaged $2.1 million, compared to an 
average of $1.2 million during the years between the 2006 and 2014 coups—a 42 percent 
drop. IMET funding during the Thaksin Administration began at $1.85 million in 2001 and 
ended at $2.36 million in 2005, a 28 percent increase, whereas IMET funding during the 
post-2006 years started at $994,131 in 2007 and ended at $713,000 in 2014, a 28 percent 
decrease. Without the 2014 coup, it is likely that IMET funding would have remained near 
the 2008–2013 average of $1.4 million.  
4. Conclusion: Thailand-U.S. Military Relations after the 2006 Coup 
Thailand-U.S. military relations during the years between coups, from 2007 to 
2014, saw two distinct trends: positively, the nature of COBRA GOLD expanded and U.S. 
FMS with Thailand increased, while negatively, U.S. funding for FMF and IMET were 
suspended. Even so, FMF and IMET funding was restored once Thailand became a 
democracy again as measured by holding elections between 2007 and 2014. In several 
ways, this speaks to the importance of Thailand-U.S. strategic cooperation in the overall 
bilateral relations given, too, that U.S. officials struggled to express disapproval toward 
Thailand’s failing democracy after the 2006 coup d’état. In reality, Washington needed 
Bangkok’s support in the global war on terrorism, and Thaksin was seen as eroding 
democracy from within, contributing to extreme social unrest. In sum, the years between 
the 2006 coup and 2014 coup signified a period of relatively stable Thailand-U.S. military 
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relations that started unraveling again in the areas of FMF and IMET funding following 
the 2014 coup.  
C. THAILAND-U.S. MILITARY RELATIONS: AFTER THE 2014 COUP 
(2014–2019) 
Thailand-U.S. military relations have declined significantly since Thailand’s 2014 
coup compared to the years prior to the 2006 coup and even between coups. In response to 
the May 22, 2014, coup, Kristie Kenney, former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, cautioned: 
A coup in Thailand will have a negative implication. There will be high-
level review in Washington by the United States government of our 
assistance and our engagement with Thailand, especially the Thai 
military.148 
Thailand-U.S. military relations may appear to have improved dramatically but only if 
examining the COBRA GOLD exercise. Once the FMS, FMF, EDA, and IMET postures 
are considered, though, Thailand-U.S. military relations have declined in comparison to 
the state of their relations predating the 2014 coup. Several factors may be at play: the role 
of General Prayut as Thailand’s unelected incumbent prime minister from May 2014 until 
March 2019, concerns about the military and the Prayut-supported constitution allowing a 
military appointed “super board” to oversee the government, the March 2019 elections that 
seated Prayut as PM, and lingering effects of the 2014 coup.149  
1. Exercise COBRA GOLD: 2014–2019 
The 2014 coup affected COBRA GOLD 2015–19 in three distinct ways. First, 
COBRA GOLD 2015 was minimally affected in nature since the United States still 
conducted the exercise, but cancelled the large-scale, live-fire amphibious landing 
component and focused on humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, much as it did 
                                                 
148 Steve Herman, “U.S. Urges Return to Democracy in Thailand,” VOA, May 23, 2014, 
https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/us-urges-return-democracy-thailand. 
149 Panarat Thepgumpanat, “Concerns New Thai Constitution Will Stifle Democracy,” Reuters, 
August 21, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-politics/concerns-new-thai-constitution-will-
stifle-democracy-idUSKCN0QQ0QU20150821; Richard C. Paddock, “Thailand Junta Leader Named 
Prime Minister After Contentious Vote,” New York Times, June 5, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
06/05/world/asia/thailand-prayuth-prime-minister.html.  
55 
immediately after the 2006 coup.150 Second, COBRA GOLD 2015–17 saw low levels of 
U.S. military participation until the year-on-year 76 percent increase to 6,215 in 2018, 
although it decline to 4,138 in 2019 (see Figure 7). Third, while the numbers of participants 
were well below the post-2006 coup figures of 2007–14, the nature of the exercises—minus 
that of 2015—continued to evolve in complexity and interoperability. 
Figure 7. Number of Participants in Exercise COBRA GOLD after the 
2014 Coup: 2014–2019151 
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As the above figure indicates, the U.S. 2014–19 figures are well below the post-
2006 coup figures, especially the steady-state of approximately 8,750 realized for four solid 
years (2010–13), and never reached the high participant numbers of the Thaksin years 
(2001–06). However, the 2014–19 figures are similar to the post-006 coup period in that 
the number of participants from the United States and Thailand both trended downward as 
indicated by the two black trend lines. Although U.S. troop commitments were reduced by 
50 percent in 2014 due to the U.S. Navy ship Sgt Matej Kocak running aground in Japan, 
the number of U.S. forces participating in COBRA GOLD did not rebound in 2015. While 
the 2014 decrease was unrelated to the coup, it tends to “hide” the real effect of the coup 
on 2015 U.S. participation figures. Rather, U.S. troop numbers dropped yet again, this time 
in response to the coup, and did not start to recover until 2018. Even then, the number of 
participants only reached half the 2010–13 level, and later dropped significantly again in 
2019. In contrast to other years since 2001, the partners’ participant numbers were quite 
similar to one another from 2015–19. The number of U.S. troops participating in COBRA 
GOLD averaged 4,160 compared to Thailand’s 3,931. This is a 40 percent drop compared 
to the average U.S. forces participants of 6,940 for 2007–14, and a 50 percent drop 
compared to the U.S. average of 8,347 participants in 2001–06.  
Thailand, on the other hand, began increasing its participation in 2015 after a 
downward trend between 2008–14, and its participant numbers grew significantly by 2016. 
Even so, the post-2014 coup, five-year average for Thailand is not much different than the 
post-2006 coup average.  Comparing the number of Thailand participants in COBRA 
GOLD 2015–19 to COBRA GOLD 2007–14, the figures increased by just 3 percent, from 
an average of 3,803 during the post-2006 coup years to 3,931 during the Prayut years. 
However, comparing the average number of RTARF participating in COBRA GOLD from 
2001–06 at 5,239 to the average during 2015–19, the number of participants declined by 
25 percent, from 5,239 during the Thaksin Administration to 3,931 during the Prayut 
Administration. Nevertheless, the nature of the exercise from 2016 onward has only 
evolved in complexity to further enhance military readiness across all participating 
countries and military services.   
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In the wake of the 2014 coup, Washington cancelled the large-scale, live-fire 
amphibious landing portion of COBRA GOLD 2015. The rationale for this decision was 
reaffirmed on April 16, 2015, when USN Admiral Samuel J. Locklear testified before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee that COBRA GOLD 2015 “was significantly limited in 
scope and scale in response to the Thai coup, and heavily focused on humanitarian 
assistance activities.”152 Furthermore, the live-fire, amphibious landing exercise 
component of COBRA GOLD 2015 was also cancelled.153   
As for COBRA GOLD 2016, despite initial concerns of cancellations, the exercise 
was held but also at a reduced scale on the U.S. side at 3,396 personnel but not on the 
RTARF side.154 COBRA GOLD 2016 and 2017 were the only two iterations during the 
Prayut Administrative that brought higher RTARF participation and lower U.S. forces 
engagement—4,391 and 4,350 for the RTARF compared to 3,396 and 3,528 for the United 
States. This is arguably attributable to the lingering effects of the 2014 coup where U.S. 
policymakers decided to emphasize their condemnation of the coup through reduced 
participation. Moreover, COBRA GOLD 2016 was still modified in response to the 2014 
coup by focusing on three primary events that are not combat-focused: a senior leader 
seminar, humanitarian civic assistance projects in local Thai communities, and a field 
training exercise aimed at strengthening regional relations.155 COBRA GOLD 2017 also 
saw a minor decrease in the number of U.S. forces participating in the exercise, but the 
nature of the exercise was similar to that of COBRA GOLD 2016, which both included an 
amphibious assault landing demonstration and no combat component.156  
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In an unforeseen turn of events, the United States in 2018 sent its largest number 
of COBRA GOLD participants since the 2014 coup, along with enhancing the nature of its 
operations.157 COBRA GOLD 2018 marked the year where a standardized humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), field training exercise (FTX), and command post 
exercise (CPX) segment were established. As for the upsurge in the number of U.S. forces 
participating in COBRA GOLD 2018, one possible explanation is President Donald J. 
Trump’s tolerance of and even alleged affinity toward authoritarian leaders.158 It may also 
may have been Washington’s response to ongoing concerns of a rising China in this new 
era of great power competition.  
At Thailand’s urging, the United States and Thailand granted China full 
participatory status in COBRA GOLD 2015. Former COBRA GOLD Deputy Director, 
Major General Wittaya Wachirakul, had made a peculiar statement about China’s first-ever 
role as a partial participant in COBRA GOLD 2014’s HA/DR exercise, doing little to quell 
concerns about the Kingdom courting a major U.S. adversary.159 When asked about the 
decision to include China as a participant, Wittaya disclosed that Beijing and Bangkok held 
talks in 2013 about the possibility of the former becoming a participant, which Wittaya 
stated “would be a good way to reduce tension…in the region.”160 His words created alarm 
in the U.S. government when coupled with reports of Thailand and China strengthening 
military ties.161 Thai policymakers’ actions suggested that Bangkok was potentially 
distancing itself from Washington and cultivating stronger ties with Beijing. Yet, the 
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inclusion of China as a participant in future COBRA GOLD exercises continues with the 
exercise itself becoming what analysts refer to as a barometer of Thailand-U.S. military 
relations.162  
2. Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and Excess 
Defense Articles: 2014–2019 
U.S. FMF to Thailand were estimated at $1 million for 2014 and $900,000 for 2015, 
but, since the 2014 coup, U.S. FMF to Thailand has stopped (see Figure 8).163 Since then, 
no FMF funding to Thailand was recommended to Congress in accordance with U.S law.164 
In contrast, the United States cut $3.5 million in FMF to Thailand in 2007 following the 
2006 coup, but restored it from 2008–14 when Thailand was under civilian control. U.S. 
FMS to Thailand continued relatively unaffected throughout the Prayut Administration, 
just as it had after the 2006 coup. Yet, U.S. EDA grants to Thailand stopped after 2015.165  
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Figure 8. U.S. Security Assistance to Thailand after the 2014 Coup: 
2014–2019166 
 
While the implications of the 2014 coup are evident in the suspension of U.S. FMF 
and EDA to Thailand, FMS continued to flow. The amounts of U.S. FMS with Thailand 
are relatively small, making it seem in Figure 8 that they held steady between 2007–19, yet 
there were some fluctuations. U.S. military equipment purchases increased somewhat from 
$81,546 in 2013 to $99,742 in the year of the coup. In 2015, they decreased back down to 
2013 levels, at $80,017, before rising above the coup-year level, to $105,966 in 2017. The 
overall annual allocations of FMS between 2011 and 2017 were about double the amounts 
seen in 2007–2010. As for data on U.S. FMS with Thailand for 2018 and 2019, an 
unidentified Thai defense ministry source reported in August 2019 that the RTARF plans 
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to acquire 120 U.S. armored vehicles by 2020.167 However, no confirming aggregate data 
is fully available or disclosed yet on Security Assistance Monitor, USAID, and Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency databases. Considering Wittaya’s earlier remarks about 
cultivating Sino-Thai strategic cooperation, it stands to reason that Washington is 
authorizing FMS purchases with the aim that its Thai ally will continue to help strengthen 
U.S. security abroad.168  
3. International Military Education and Training 
IMET funding ended following the 2014 coup, with the immediate U.S. suspension 
of $85,000 in IMET economic assistance to Thailand, making this factor one of the 
components heavily damaged by the 2014 coup, similar to that of U.S. EDA grants, FMF, 
and a relatively small number of U.S. troops participating in COBRA GOLD from 2015–
17.169 Figure 9 illustrates not only the stark negative effects of Thailand’s two 21st century 
coups, but also an overall downward trend for the past two decades.  
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Figure 9. U.S. Financing to the IMET Program with Thailand after the 
2014 Coup: 2014–2019170 
 
Since 2014, no U.S. funding exists to support education and training for members 
of the RTARF seeking to study at U.S. military institutions and affiliated schools. 
Considerations to restore IMET funding to Thailand were predicated on the outcome of the 
2019 Thai democratic election, but since, Thailand has not been added into the FY20 IMET 
funding appropriation.171 This is cause for concern, since Sino-Thai strategic cooperation 
continues to grow, and more RTARF officers obtain military education in China than in 
the United States.172 Therefore, the absence of IMET funding to Thailand is a critical 
indicator of a decline in an important aspect of the Thailand-U.S. military relations.  
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4. Conclusion: Thailand-U.S. Military Relations after the 2014 Coup 
If considering only COBRA GOLD exercises and FMS, Thailand-U.S. military 
relations under the Prayut years (2014–2019) are moderately sustained. While U.S. 
COBRA GOLD participant numbers are well below pre-2014 levels, FMS figures are 
higher on average after the 2014 coup than they were in the period after the 2006 coup. 
However, if measured by FMF, EDA, and IMET funding, Thailand-U.S. military relations 
are in decline. Although the Prayut era commenced with major cuts to U.S. military aid to 
Thailand in FMF and IMET funding, the bilateral ties were nonetheless able to stabilize 
due to the enhanced nature of COBRA GOLD—both in terms of expanding to 29 observers 
by 2019 and new, qualitatively significant types of activities undertaken. These two 
developments may help Thailand and the U.S. ride out their relatively low numbers of troop 
commitments. Chief of Defense Forces of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, General Pornpipat 
Benyasri, said it well: “not only has Cobra Gold served as a platform for understanding 
and working together in the region, but has now become beneficial for our other strategic 
partners.”173 However, unless FMF and IMET funding are restored to Thailand in the near 
future, Sino-Thai strategic cooperation may grow at the expense of Thailand-U.S. military 
ties.       
D. CONCLUSION 
Thailand-U.S. military relations from 2001 to 2019 have evolved and changed 
significantly and, arguably, may be weaker now than at the start of the 21st Century, but 
they appear still strongly valued and robust enough to be relied upon. COBRA GOLD is 
the most important and wide-reaching engagement of the partnership, relative to FMF, 
FMS, EDA grants, and IMET. The 2006 and 2014 coups affected COBRA GOLD, but 
largely in the reduction of U.S. troops temporarily contracting in response to the coups and 
the cancellation of combat component exercises. Over two decades, both countries saw a 
decline in the number of personnel they devoted to this foundational exercise. Nonetheless, 
from 2001 to 2019, the total number of RTARF participating in COBRA GOLD stood at 
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81,521, while the number of U.S. forces totaled 126,414. Throughout this period, RTARF 
averaged 4,290 and U.S. forces averaged 6,653 per year. These are solid indicators of the 
strategic importance Thailand and the United States still place on COBRA GOLD.  
Correspondingly, despite the significantly lower troop contributions on both sides 
for COBRA GOLD 2019, compared to the number of participants in preceding years, the 
nature of the exercise continued to expand in complexity since 2001. Each COBRA GOLD 
iteration has gradually evolved to include more international participants and observers, 
along with expansions in the types of engagements to include senior staff seminars, 
leadership training, humanitarian civic assistance projects, and tabletop exercises. 
Currently, the exercise remains the pride of Thailand’s and the United States’ forces and a 
defining marker of the Thailand-U.S. military alliance, with each party claiming it to be 
the largest and most comprehensive exercise of its kind. 
U.S. military aid to Thailand during the Thaksin years steadily increased and 
projected an optimistic view of the alliance—until the 2006 coup hit. U.S. FMF to Thailand 
was negatively affected by the coups, especially the latter one. FMF to Thailand peaked 
during the Thaksin years, averaging $1.37 million, and basically held steady during the 
years between the coups at $1.31 million. Although the estimated FMF to Thailand was set 
at $900,000 for 2014–15, there remains no confirmed actual amount reported on open 
source and military databases. U.S. FMF remains suspended following the May 22, 2014, 
coup without any indication of possible reinstatement.174 
Comparatively, U.S. FMS to Thailand persisted from 2001 to 2019 despite varying 
degrees of fluctuations. FMS during the Thaksin years steadily increased from $118,543 
in 2001 to $179,776 in 2004—with a slight drop from $170,598 in 2002 to $152,435 in 
2003—before tapering off to $91,182 in 2005 and $82,066 in 2006.175 These numbers 
indicate stability in U.S. FMS to Thailand with no sharp declines or increases that persist 
to date. In fact, FMS amounts between the 2006 and 2014 coups did not reach the high 
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figures noted during the Thaksin Administration. While the trends were stable from 2007–
2014, the period’s annual average was $63,125, more than half the 2001–06 average of 
$132,433. U.S. FMS to Thailand from 2007 to 2010 averaged $43,329 before peaking at 
$89,093 in 2011. This timely increase of FMS to Thailand arguably reflected the United 
States’ support of its ally’s democratic elections. Finally, U.S. FMS values to Thailand rose 
to an average of $93,667 per year during the Prayut Administration. This increase is likely 
attributable to the value Washington and Thailand place on interoperability, especially in 
light of Thailand’s recent military overtures toward China.176 
Finally, U.S. IMET funding to Thailand was significantly affected by the 2006 and 
2014 coups. During the Thaksin years (2001–06), IMET funding averaged $2.1 million 
and declined to $1.2 million in the interim years (2007–14). In the wake of the 2014 coup, 
the U.S. government suspended $85,000 of unspent funding for FY 2014 and cancelled all 
IMET and FMF-funded courses for Thailand with no further ones planned.177 This 
suspension remains in-place, thus, highlighting the negative ramifications of the 2014 coup 
on U.S. IMET funding to Thailand, which is similarly reflected in suspensions of U.S. EDA 
grants to Thailand per reporting from 2008 to 2018. Thus, Thailand-U.S. military relations 
arguably remain damaged as a result of the grants’ cessation after 2015.178 This lack of 
funding, too, underscores the ramifications of the 2006 and 2014 coups on U.S. economic 
assistance to strengthening Thailand’s military and interoperability.  
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III. THAILAND-U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
In examining Thailand-U.S. economic relations to gauge the overall Thailand-U.S. 
relationship, this chapter finds that the two countries’ economic ties have been 
unexpectedly stable for the past two decades. In fact, their economic ties continued with 
significant vitality and actually improved since—and in spite of—the 2006 and 2014 coups. 
This is surprising given Thailand’s coups and social and political instabilities, including 
multiple Thai prime ministers leading the country between 2001 and 2019. Periods of 
decline were largely attributable to factors other than the coup, such as the 2008–2009 
Global Financial Crisis and Thailand’s poor economic reform policies.  
This chapter is organized, as was the previous one, into three periods: The Thaksin 
administration from 2001–06, post-2006 coup from 2007–2014, and post-2014 coup to 
present. In addition, to establish a more robust baseline, it briefly describes the robust 
economic decades prior to the Asian Financial Crisis. On balance, economic relations—as 
assessed through bilateral trade, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) to Thailand, and 
development assistance—strengthened during the Thaksin administration from 2001 to 
2006. The years after the 2006 coup marked a pivot point where total Thailand-U.S. 
bilateral trade and U.S. FDI to Thailand increased, while U.S. development assistance to 
Thailand stopped entirely by 2014. Since the mid-2014 coup, total bilateral trade has 
continued to increase, while the U.S. trade deficit with Thailand continues to grow. U.S. 
FDI and development assistance were marginally less after the 2014 coup.  
A. THAILAND-U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS: THE THAKSIN YEARS 
(2001–2006) 
Thailand-U.S. economic relations under Thaksin were quite strong. Total trade 
increased an impressive 47 percent, FDI into Thailand from the U.S. decreased 46 percent 
but averaged $725 million in Thaksin’s last three years in office (2004–2006), and 
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economic development aid averaged a sizeable $1.9 million.179 These figures are 
impressive when taking into account concerns about Thaksin channeling Mahathir’s 
prioritization of the East over the West, which Thaksin revealed in his “New Asian 
Realism” speech at the East Asia Economic Summit in 2002:   
We are learning that the twin calamities of the 1997 Financial Crisis and the 
events of 9/11 are choking the two main growth engines of the world, the 
United States and Japan, in such a way that they may not be able to restart 
their engines over the short term…. Isn’t it time for Asia to explore the 
setting up of an Asian Bond market as a financial instrument to help in 
maximizing our continent’s potential and prevent exploitation of our 
reserves by others against the interests of ourselves?180 
Critics were concerned that Thaksin’s administration would adopt policies that stood to 
hamper Thailand-U.S. economic relations given his call for Asian states to strategically 
and economically rely on one other, not the West.181  
Thailand-U.S. economic relations did not stagnate or contract during his 
administration, however, since it would have been impractical to curtail economic ties with 
a treaty ally that is also one of Thailand’s largest trading partners. In fact, during Thaksin’s 
meeting with President Bush on December 14, 2001, the two endorsed the Framework for 
Economic Cooperation signed by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Thai Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Surakiart Sathirathai.182 The Framework envisioned the two countries 
strengthening their economic partnership to contribute to regional peace and prosperity by 
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enhancing trade, reducing trade barriers through multilateral forums such as the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
encouraging FDI, and respecting intellectual property rights through protection laws, 
among other issues. Also during their 2001 diplomatic visit, Bush announced that the U.S. 
Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) would open a regional office in Thailand in 
January 2002 to support priority infrastructure project development and financing in the 
Kingdom and the Southeast Asian region.183  
Subsequent meetings between Thaksin and Bush included similar remarks and 
actions promoting and institutionalizing strong bilateral economic relations. In October 
2002, the two leaders signed the 2002 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, which 
prescribes that the two countries engage regularly to discuss trade and investment related 
to the APEC and ASEAN agendas, intellectual property rights and customs issues, and the 
WTO Doha negotiations.184 The following year at the 2003 APEC meeting in Bangkok, 
Bush announced his intention of negotiating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Thailand 
under the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative. In 2005, the two leaders declared that they 
would make vigorous efforts to reach a consensus on the FTA talks by 2006.185 
Considering these transformative events, economic ties were expected to expand and 
deepen. 
Optimism was partially influenced and justified by Thailand’s exceptionally strong 
economic growth in the decades prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, with the United States 
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and Japan both playing significant roles.186 By the 1980s, Thailand was a global 
development success story, with annual GDP from the 1960s to the 1980s increasing on 
average by 7.8 percent per year.187 Thailand was second only to South Korea in terms of 
highest sustained GDP growth for a developing country at the time. This impressive growth 
stemmed from Thailand’s economic reforms, particularly in the agricultural sector, which 
the government taxed to support industrial growth until the mid-1980s.188 The UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization reports that Thailand’s agricultural GDP also grew annually 
during this period at 4 to 5 percent, with land and labor being the main resources fueling 
the growth. From 1987–1995, Thailand had the fastest growing economy in the world with 
an unprecedented average real GDP growth of 10.4 percent.189 Inflation, moreover, 
averaged a low of 5.3 percent. Combined, Thailand’s high GDP and low inflation generated 
high exports of labor-intensive manufactured goods with similar increased in foreign 
capital inflows to include FDI. Despite the Asian Financial Crisis in the late ‘90s, then, it 
was understandable that President Bush wanted to negotiate an FTA, especially one that 
included eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers on agricultural goods to increase U.S. 
exports to Thailand.190 But, again, although FTA negotiations ended because of the 2006 
coup and have yet to be reassumed, Thailand-U.S. economic relations under the Thaksin 
years fared quite well.  
1. Thailand-U.S. Total Bilateral Trade: 2001–2006 
Thailand-U.S. total bilateral trade was the hallmark of the two countries’ economic 
ties during the Thaksin years, given that total trade increased by an astonishing 47 
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percent.191 This trade was essential to aiding Thailand’s post-Crisis economic recovery and 
eventually elevating it from a mid-tiered income bracket into a higher, more lucrative-
income bracket that would attract even more foreign investment and trade. The Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997–98 devastated the Thai economy and led to the Thai baht falling 
from a long-fixed $1USD for 25 baht in June 1997 to $1USD for 54 baht in January 
1998.192 In order to get out of its recession, Thailand needed to rebuild and reshape its 
economy. 
In the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, Thailand sought foreign assistance to 
repair and grow its economy. In addition to receiving a $17-billion loan from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1997, as well as agreeing to 
other economic recovery measures, Thailand emphasized trade with the United States.193 
In 2000, Thailand-U.S. total trade measured approximately $23 billion.194 After Thaksin 
was elected, Thailand-U.S. trade grew from $20.7 billion in 2001 to approximately $30.4 
billion in 2006. This strong, steady growth in bilateral trade was possible because of the 
combination of domestic reforms and Thaksin’s efforts and agreed-upon policies with other 
state leaders, such as President Bush, which paved the way for economic revival in 
Thailand.195  
Data on Thailand-U.S. total bilateral trade during the Thaksin years are illustrated 
in Figure 10.196 Figure 10 represents the total imports and exports between Thailand and 
the United States from 2001 to 2006, including the remaining months of 2006 after Thaksin 
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was ousted from government on September 19, 2006. The dashed vertical line indicates 
Thailand’s 2006 coup and the red line represents the vertical trend. 
Figure 10. Thailand-U.S. Total Bilateral Trade under the Thaksin 
Administration (2001–2006).197   
 
This data warrants three important observations. First, the slight trade decline from 
$20.7 billion in 2001 to $19.7 billion in 2002 was not due to Thaksin’s policies or actions, 
but, rather, to an exogenous 2001 global downturn in world trade and output expansion.198 
Moreover, this global slowdown led to a decline in Thailand’s overall exports by 7.1 
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percent and affected Thailand’s exports to the United States, as well.199 Second, once world 
trade regained momentum and increased by 4.4 percent in 2002, Thailand’s exports grew, 
too.200 Growth in Thailand-U.S. total trade continued steadily, increasing by an impressive 
54.3 percent from $19.7 billion in 2002 to $30.4 in 2006. Lastly, the increase in Thailand-
U.S. total trade had one accompanying downfall, which was an increased trade deficit with 
Thailand.201 From 2001 to 2006, the U.S. trade deficit with Thailand increased by 66.5 
percent, from -$8.7 billion in 2001 to -$14.5 billion in 2006.202 This deficit is salient in 
comparison to Thailand’s economic relations with China, the United States’ current 
adversary in this contemporary great power competition and Thailand’s current major 
trading partner. In the same period, Thailand’s trade deficit with China rose by 116 percent, 
from -$853,107.38 in 2001 to -$1,842,995.72 in 2006—considerably greater than that of 
the U.S. trade deficit with Thailand.203   
While Thaksin courted the United States’ and its economy, he also adopted policies 
to enhance Sino-Thai trade relations. Thaksin saw China as a counterweight to the United 
States well before his election, and he later made China a central force in how he ran his 
foreign policy.204 After taking office in February 2001, Thaksin almost immediately 
proposed an FTA with China, in April 2001, and was quick to pay a diplomatic visit to 
former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji in August 2001.205 Compared to the United States, 
Thaksin did not seek an FTA until two years after assuming office and did not visit Bush 
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until after September 11, 2001. Importantly, a Sino-Thai FTA was successfully executed 
in 2003, while the Thailand-U.S. FTA efforts were aborted after the 2006 coup.  
Sino-Thai trade relations were emphasized under Thaksin’s government. During 
Thaksin’s visit with Zhu Rongji, the two leaders signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) on Establishing a Bilateral Business Council between the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade and the Board of Trade of Thailand and spoke highly of 
their trade relations. The leaders concurred Sino-Thai economic and trade cooperation had 
become “an increasingly powerful engine driving China-Thailand relations” and, therefore, 
both sought to strengthen cultural and trade ties through increased sister-city relations 
between their two countries.206 This driving engine is evident in succeeding Sino-Thai 
diplomatic meetings where both states spoke frequently of deepening their economic 
relationships.207  
Additionally, in April 2003, not only did Premier Wen Jiabao make Thailand his 
first overseas visit upon assuming office, he and Thaksin agreed to develop their trade 
relations further by eliminating tariffs on vegetables and fruit products.208 The two leaders 
signed an agreement to accelerate tariff elimination under the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between China and the ASEAN Early Harvest 
Program, which was enacted in October 2003. Essentially, this was the FTA that Thaksin 
pursued with Zhu Rongji back in 2001, which subsequently led to greater Sino-Thai trade 
relations and continues to serve both states today. When the agreement went into effect, it 
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eliminated duties on 188 fruits and vegetables.209 Thailand also gained a $200 million 
agricultural trade surplus with China from October 2003 through February 2005.  
Once China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002, Sino-Thai total 
trade grew by 23.4 percent from a partner share of 10.41 percent in 2001 to 12.85 percent 
in 2002.210 Sino-Thai total trade continued growing at stunning rates to where Thailand’s 
export growth to China in 2003 increased by 60 percent from $3.5 million in 2002 to $5.7 
million in 2003.211 Finally, China overtook the United States as Thailand’s largest import 
country in 2004 and as Thailand’s largest export destination in 2010.212  In the latter case, 
China not only surpassed the United States but also Japan to become the major destination 
for Thai exports goods. This increase in Thai-Sino economic ties will be exceptionally 
significant in succeeding chapters where Thai-Sino trade relations continue their upward 
trajectory. Nonetheless, Thailand-U.S. bilateral trade in the Thaksin period was still strong 
and indicated deepening ties. 
2. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Thailand: 2001–2006 
During Thaksin’s reign, FDI from the United States increased by 73 percent, from 
$6.1 billion in 2001 to $10.6 billion in 2006, although there were slight declines in FDI in 
2003 and 2004. Figure 11 depicts U.S. investment in Thailand on an uptick from $6.1 
billion in 2001 to $7.7 billion in 2002 before decreasing by 11.7 percent to $6.8 billion in 
2003. U.S. FDI rebounded 8.8 percent the following years to $7.4 billion, surged 37 percent 
to $10.2 billion in 2005, and modestly grew 3.9 percent to 10.6 billion in 2006.213 The 
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dotted vertical line represents the 2006 coup and the slanted red line depicts the vertical 
trend of U.S. FDI to Thailand. 
Figure 11. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment under the Thaksin 
Administration (2001–2006).214 
 
The starting increase in FDI is within normal ranges for long-term trade partners 
and is also in response to Thailand’s double-digit export growth during the early 2000s.215 
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During the time, FDI outflow to Thailand’s export-oriented industries aimed to support its 
growth.216 This is important from Thailand’s perspective since FDI remains a crucial 
source of employment and avenue for new technological developments and processes in 
Thailand.217 In 2003, however, global FDI remained low at $653 billion with FDI flows to 
the Asia-Pacific region increasing only marginally to $99 billion in 2003 compared to $95 
billion in 2002.218 U.S. FDI to Thailand, specifically, decreased by 11.7 percent due to the 
United States diverting its investment to other countries such as China, whose economic 
reforms in 2003 gave rise to increased GDP attracting foreign investors.219 Prior to the 
decline, investment to Thailand’s labor-intensive products did not need to complete with 
China’s since China had yet to join the WTO.220 It was only after China joined the WTO 
in 2002 that U.S. FDI to Thailand gradually diverted to China the succeeding year. 
Furthermore, for instance, once the United States and Vietnam signed a bilateral trade 
agreement (BTA) in 2000, and after U.S. Congress approved it in 2001, U.S. firms became 
the sole largest source of FDI in Vietnam.221 From 2002 to 2004, U.S. FDI in Vietnam 
increased an average 27 percent annually compared to approximately 3 percent annually 
from 1996 to 2001.222 Thus, U.S. FDI to Thailand was similarly diverted to Vietnam as it 
was to China.   
While U.S. FDI to China and Vietnam were high, U.S. FDI to Thailand also 
rebounded to $7.4 billion in 2004 and increased to $10.2 billion in 2005 and $10.6 billion 
in 2006. This increase is likely attributable to foreign investors speculating that President 
Bush’s October 2003 proposal of a FTA with Thailand would come to fruition and benefit 
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U.S. companies in Thailand.223 Foreign investors’ confidence of investing in Thailand’s 
economic growth and reaping the profits of the Kingdom’s announced plans to reform and 
privatize state-owned companies further increased FDI to Thailand.224 By 2004, U.S.-
invested firms in Thailand became major employers of over 200,000 Thai nationals, and 
the United States was the largest foreign direct investor in Thailand, second only to 
Japan.225 Comparatively, China’s FDI in Thailand fell in 2001 and 2004 but increased 
toward the end of 2006.226 
3. U.S. Development Assistance to Projects in Thailand: 2001–2006 
Annual levels of U.S. development assistance to Thailand from 2001 to 2006 as 
depicted in Figure 12 have fluctuated dramatically, but remained relatively high. 
Historically, U.S. development assistance to Thailand has been robust, dating back to the 
Cold War era. When Thailand was a low-income country, it was eligible for funding 
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) but graduated from 
USAID assistance in 1995 and USAID closed its bilateral mission in Thailand the 
following year.227 Even so, the United States continued providing development assistance 
to Thailand commencing again, in 1998, for infrastructure development through the 
USAID.228 USAID later returned to Bangkok in 2003 to open a regional mission serving 
Asia and providing funding, but, as Figure 12 illustrates, this funding is inconsistent.229 
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Although development assistance fluctuated substantially, the development aid amount 
was still an average high of $4.8 million, but with an overall declining trend. The lowest 
level occurred in 2006 at $1.3 million while the highest during the Thaksin years was $13.4 
million in 2002 with the greatest source of U.S. development assistance coming from the 
Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund at $1.8 million in 2005.230 
Figure 12. U.S. Development Assistance to Projects in Thailand under the 
Thaksin Administration (2001–2006)231 
 
U.S. foreign assistance under the Bush Administration was primarily given to 
countries that promoted democracy, which the administration saw as an advancement of 
U.S. strategic interests and global developments.232 Under this guideline, Washington 
restricted foreign assistance to several East and South Asian countries in order to encourage 
democratic transitions within those countries. President Bush also enacted policies such as 
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the Millennium Challenge Account in March 2002 to dramatically increase foreign aid.233 
The Account was a fund aimed at providing $5 billion annually to selected countries that 
are “ruling justly, investing in their people, and establishing economic freedom.”234 It is 
likely, then, that U.S. development funding to Thailand at $13.4 million in 2002—a 509 
percent increase from $2.2 million in 2001—was in response to Thailand’s democratic 
election of Thaksin in 2001.235  
Yet, by 2003, U.S. development assistance significantly declined by nearly 63 
percent to $5 million and continued falling by 70 percent to $1.5 million in 2005. The 
decline in development assistance in 2003 has various contributing factors. First, the Thai 
government announced in 2003 that it will stop accepting foreign development aid and 
proposed the aid be redirected to the Kingdom’s neighboring, poorer countries.236 Second, 
while some scholars argue that U.S. foreign assistance in the early 2000s contributed to the 
rise in Thaksin’s “war on drugs,” extrajudicial campaigns in 2003, it is also likely that 
Washington decrease development aid to Thailand since Thaksin’s campaign was a 
violation of human rights.237 Essentially, Thaksin’s actions challenged the principles of the 
Millennium Challenge Account. during the Thaksin years may have fluctuated drastically 
due to domestic developments in Thailand as well as U.S. policies and mandates.  
Although U.S. development assistance to Thailand continued falling in 2004, by 
2005, it increased 273 percent to $5.6 million as a result of the U.S. government’s pledge 
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to help Thailand rebuild after the December 26, 2004 tsunami that struck the Kingdom.238 
In the wake of the tsunami attack, USAID pledged $15 million in aid to affected Asian 
counties—Thailand included—only to later add $20 million more in aid. This, again, 
accounts for the share of U.S. development assistance to Thailand via the Tsunami 
Recovery and Reconstruction Fund at $1.8 million in 2005.239 Finally, in addition to 
Thailand receiving support from USAID, it also received development assistance from the 
USTDA.  
The USTDA mobilized training, technical assistance, and other capacity-building 
activities to the affected countries, including Thailand, and funded over $9.2 million in 
regional and bilateral development projects.240 Their projects included building clean water 
supply, disaster preparedness planning, early warning systems, energy systems 
reconstruction, emergency communications systems, small- and medium-enterprise 
recovery and financing, and wetlands restoration. Likewise, the USTDA provided over 
$4.9 million in tsunami recovery efforts in Indonesia and Thailand since 2004 with 13 
projects, focused on emergency communications, energy, environment and banking/ICT, 
and transportation sectors, although at lower levels than in 2005.  
China, on the other hand, has provided development assistance to Thailand through 
study visit and research promotions.241 From 2004 to 2005, China sent multiple scientists 
and researchers to promote economic linkages between the two countries and increase 
advancements in the fields of science and technology. Lastly, U.S. development assistance 
to Thailand declined by 76 percent due to U.S. law mandating sanctions on U.S. foreign 
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assistance to Thailand after Thaksin, the elected head of government, was ousted via 
coup.242 
4. Conclusion: Thailand-U.S. Economic Relations Under the Thaksin 
Administration 
Thailand-U.S. economic relations during the Thaksin era as measured through total 
bilateral trade, U.S. FDI to Thailand, and U.S. development assistance through USAID and 
USTDA to Thailand presented a mixed picture of increased total bilateral trade, increased 
FDI, and fluctuating but download trending U.S. development assistance to Thailand. 
Overall, however, the economic relationship between the two countries was relatively 
healthy. In terms of total bilateral trade, minus the one low trading point of $19.7 billion in 
2002, Thailand-U.S. trade concluded on a high note of $30.4 billion in 2006, the highest 
of the entire Thaksin period. U.S. FDI in Thailand, similar to bilateral trading figures, 
started high at approximately $6.1 billion in 2001, increased to $7.7 billion in 2002, but 
dropped to $6.8 billion in 2003 due to the U.S. diversifying its investment portfolios to 
include other economically growing countries. The Thaksin years end at $10.6 billion in 
FDI in 2006. Lastly, U.S. development aid to Thailand from 2001 to 2006 saw the most 
striking changes annually, but this was due to domestic developments respective to both 
countries and not entirely reflective of changes in bilateral ties.      
B. THAILAND-U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS: AFTER THE 2006 COUP 
(2007–2014) 
The years between the 2006 and 2014 coups held increased volatility but also strong 
growth in Thailand-U.S. economic relations. Total bilateral trade increased by 25 percent 
and FDI increased by 77 percent—albeit with some periods of decline. U.S. development 
assistance increased sharply by 460 percent from $1.5 million in 2007 to $8.4 million in 
2014. However, assessing the actions of Thai state leaders from late 2006 to mid-2014 and 
how they—and the coup and its aftermath—may have contributed to a decline or 
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improvement in Thailand’s economic engagement with the United States, and vice versa, 
presents a challenge. Thailand lacked a concrete foreign policy because multiple prime 
ministers from divergent factions, as explained in the previous chapter, led Thailand during 
this period, starting with General Surayud Chulanont from October 2006 to January 
2007.243 Thaksin loyalist Samak Sundaravej followed Surayud from January 2007 to 
September 2008, followed by Thaksin’s brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat from 
September 2008 to December 2008, establishment leader Abhisit Vejjajiva from December 
2008 to August 2011, and, lastly, Thaksin’s younger sister Yingluck Shinawatra from 
August 2011 to her ousting in the May 2014 coup.  
When Surayud took office after the 2006 coup, his economic policies were 
constrained due to his military-backed government’s lack of expertise on economic matters 
and its focus on restoring order.244 Analysts argue that the coup itself and Surayud’s role 
as a military prime minister gave U.S. investors little confidence in the Thai economy, 
thereby affecting how much FDI went to Thailand. More problematically, Thailand-U.S. 
economic relations are not as easily discernable under the Samak and Somchai 
administrations, given the two leaders’ short terms of office, although, bilateral trade seems 
to have continued largely unabated while FDI declined.245 As for the civilian Abhisit 
government, Benjamin Zawacki submits that the United States’ criticism of the Abhisit 
administration for their 2010 violent military crackdown on the Thaksin-affiliated United 
Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) protest, contributed to Abhisit moving 
away from Washington and closer to Beijing.246 Arguably, this may have placed strains on 
Thailand-U.S. economic ties.  
Finally, after Yingluck was elected and assumed office in August 2011, it was 
reasonable to think that a democratically restored Thailand might contribute to stronger 
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Thailand-U.S. economic relations. This expectation is understandable, too, given that when 
Yingluck met with President Obama in 2012—the first diplomatic visit by a U.S. President 
to Thailand since 2003—the two leaders welcomed plans to convene a Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement Joint Council to serve as a foundation for expanding 
Thailand-U.S. economic relations.247 Moreover, their joint press statement highlighted 
Obama welcoming Yingluck’s interest for Thailand to join his efforts to create the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was intended to be a trade agreement to reduce tariffs 
between member states.248 Yet, these seemingly optimistic efforts made to promote 
Thailand-U.S. economic relations were to no avail. The Yingluck administration never 
committed to joining the TPP. The aforementioned events correspond to the volatility we 
see in bilateral trade, investments, and development assistance between the two coups. 
Meanwhile, Sino-Thai economic relations were growing based on Thai leaders engaging 
more with China, as well as Beijing officials offering more assistance to Thailand.  
1. Thailand-U.S. Total Bilateral Trade: 2007–2014 
Despite Thaksin’s ousting from government via a military coup d’état on 
September 19, 2006, the United States, a firm advocate of democracy, continued 
conducting trade at incrementally higher levels with its oldest ally in Asia. In fact, as 
illustrated in Figure 13, from 2007 to 2014, Thailand-U.S. total bilateral trade increased 25 
percent from $31.1 billion in 2007 to $39 billion in 2014 (depicted in dotted red line on 
chart), compared to somewhat weaker trade from 2001 to 2006.249 While some fluctuation 
occurred, none was extreme. The lowest level occurred in 2009 at $26 billion, followed by 
a rapid recovery, while the period’s high was realized in 2013 at $40 billion, just above the 
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period’s ending level of $39 billion. Interestingly, in the years immediately following the 
2006 coup, when one might expect a retraction, Thailand-U.S. bilateral trade increased 
from $31.1 billion in 2007 to $32.6 billion in 2008. Taken together, total bilateral trade 
between Thailand and the United Stated nearly doubled between 2001 and 2014, from $21 
billion to $39 billion. Like the years pre-dating the 2006 coup, Thailand-U.S. total trade 
continued its upward trend, as shown in the slanted red line. 
Figure 13. Thailand-U.S. Total Bilateral Trade after the 2006 Coup 
(2007–2014)250  
 
The prevailing arguments for why total Thailand-U.S. trade grew steadily is the 
historical legacy of the alliance, the importance of Thailand as a U.S. trading partner, and 
the Thai economy depending heavily on its steadfast trading partners for economic 
growth.251 This argument holds weight, considering the Office of the U.S. Trade 
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Representative boasting of the importance of Thailand-U.S. economic ties dating back to 
1833.252 Yet, this is not to say that the Thai economy was not impacted by the coup. U.S. 
President Bush suspended all negotiations for a Thailand-U.S. FTA following the coup, 
and no new negotiations have occurred since.253 The coup created political uncertainty that 
led to a decline in Thai GDP when Thai government-supported policies caused Thailand’s 
annual GDP growth to decline from 4.97 percent in 2006 to 0.98 percent in 2014.254 
Likewise, prior to the coup, Thai GDP growth from 2001 to 2006 averaged approximately 
5.37 percent. After the coup, the Thai GDP growth from 2007 to 2014 averaged only 3.29 
percent.  
Figure 13 also shows a decline in the two countries’ trade in 2009 and 2013 but the 
reasons are not attributable to the coup. In 2009, Thailand’s overall global exports 
collapsed in the wake of the financial crisis, dropping by 14 percent.255 This fallout in 
Thailand global exports likewise affected Thailand-U.S. trade, where their bilateral trade 
declined to $26 billion in 2009 from $32.6 billion in 2008. The slight decline in 2013 to 
$38 billion from the steady trade increases in the previous three years was likely largely 
due to Yingluck’s rice subsidies scandal.256 In 2012, Yingluck’s government announced a 
rice-subsidy plan that would purchase rice at around 50 percent above market value from 
Thai farmers and stockpile it prior to selling the rice on open markets.257 By early 2014, 
Thailand’s public debt rose to 46 percent of GDP from 41 percent of GDP in 2011. While 
this did not significantly impact Thailand-U.S. trade, it still caused a decline in total trade 
by 0.05 percent from $40 billion in 2012 to $38 billion in 2013. This arguably affected the 
U.S. trade deficit with Thailand, which rose by 5.93 percent from -$14.5 billion in 2006 to 
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-$15.4 billion in 2014. In comparison, Thailand had a 2014 trade deficit with China of -
$8.1 billion.258 However, once Prayut took power in 2014, he ended the rice subsidy plan, 
which enabled the Thai economy and Thailand-U.S. bilateral trade to grow: Thailand’s 
exports to the United States in April 2014 were at $2.2 million but gradually increased by 
15 percent to $2.5 million in December 2014.259  
As for Sino-Thai trade relations, they too, maintained their upward trend. In 
December 2011, for instance, Bangkok and Beijing agreed for the Bank of Thailand and 
the People’s Bank of China to conduct a three-year currency swap worth 70 billion 
renminbi.260 In October 2013, incumbent Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Thailand 
concluded in him and Yingluck praising their economic partnership and desire to achieve 
a bilateral trade goal of $100 billion in 2015, which would continue to be guided by their 
Five-Year Development Plan on Trade and Economic Cooperation.261 This reflects the 
growing Sino-Thai investment relations at the time. 
2. Thailand-U.S. Foreign Direct Investment: 2007–2014 
U.S. FDI in Thailand from 2007 to 2014 varied greatly as reported in data collected 
from the USBEA and displayed in Figure 14.262 FDI in 2006 was $10.6 billion and 
modestly declined to $10.2 billion in 2007, the year after the coup. It continued its 
downward trend to $9.1 billion in 2008, in line with the Global Financial Crisis, before 
rebounding slightly to $9.4 billion in 2009. By 2010, U.S. FDI increased 37 percent to 
$12.9 billion but gradually declined to $11.8 billion in 2011, $10.7 billion in 2012, and 
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$9.9 billion in 2013. Yet in 2014, U.S. FDI into Thailand soared to $18.1 billion, the highest 
level since the turn of the 21st century. In comparing the Thaksin era to the post-2006 coup 
period, we see continued volatility after the 2006 coup but an overall upward trend line 
noted in red on the chart.  
Figure 14. Thailand-U.S. Foreign Direct Investment after the 2006 Coup 
(2006–2014)263 
 
These sharp increases and decreases in U.S. FDI into Thailand are attributed to 
Thailand’s shifting political landscape. Thailand politics became volatile and increasingly 
polarized after Thaksin announced a House dissolution on February 24, 2006 and called 
for a snap election on April 2, 2006 in attempts to deescalate the oppositional backlash and 
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political crisis resulting from selling his family-owned Shin Corporation to Temasek.264 
U.S. investors became concerned about the possible implications of a power vacuum in 
Thailand on U.S. investments and firms with the U.S. ASEAN Business Council 
specifically citing fears among U.S. investors that “a new government may reverse some 
of the previous government’s investment policies.”265 This concern and fear prompted 
some U.S. firms to suspend local projects in Thailand and shift investments to Malaysia 
instead, hence the 3.7 percent drop in U.S. FDI to Thailand from $10.6 billion in 2006 to 
$10.2 billion in 2007.266  
U.S. FDI to Thailand continued its downward trend to $9.1 billion in 2008, a 10.8 
percent decrease from $10.2 billion in 2007. However, by 2009, FDI rose slightly by 3.3 
percent to $9.4 billion in response to Thailand and the United States’ efforts at 
strengthening their economic ties in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis that 
started in December 2007. Former U.S. Ambassador Eric G. John explains that the United 
States sought to increase bilateral cooperation with Thailand on trade and investment as a 
means to boost economic growth and suggested that the two countries “should cooperate 
on eliminating trade barriers to promote export growth for both sides during the economic 
difficulty.”267 
                                                 
264 Thaksin was accused as a “sell out” to the Thai nation and when his family sold a stake of their 
Shin Corp telecommunications business to the Singaporean company, Temasek, for 73 billion baht 
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The following year in 2010, U.S. FDI to Thailand surged 37 percent to $12.9 
billion, which is attributable to the Kingdom’s 2009 economic reform policies aimed at 
attracting foreign investment and prompted by then Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and 
his economic ministers, who were anxious about the U.S. economic meltdown and foreign 
investment declines.268 Yet, despite the 37 percent FDI increase, 2010 also marked the year 
commencing the gradual decline of U.S. FDI to Thailand that fell 23 percent from $12.9 
billion in 2010 to $9.9 billion in 2013.  
Political unrest and natural disaster in Thailand were the factors for declining U.S. 
FDI. Thailand entered another period of political crisis in May 2010 when the mass 
political protest from March to May 2010 in Bangkok led by Thaksin’s supporters resulted 
in violent clashes with the Thai security forces.269 At least 90 people died with 2,000 more 
wounded, rising concerns yet again that the possibility of civil war will negatively affect 
FDI.270 By 2011, Thailand’s economy was further tested when the Kingdom was hit with 
the worse flood in decades, thereby leading analysts to speculate that “a lack of adequate 
infrastructure to handling flooding … would lead to a long-term loss of foreign 
investment.”271 Indeed, U.S. FDI to Thailand continued to contract from $12.9 billion in 
2010 to $11.8 billion in 2011, then $10.7 billion in 2012, and $9.9 billion in 2013 when 
political demonstrations led by the anti-Thaksin opposition Democrat Party erupted in 
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Bangkok.272 Nonetheless, U.S. FDI to Thailand skyrocketed 82 percent from $9.9 billion 
in 2013 to $18.1 billion in 2014. This was likely due to Thailand’s Board of Investment’s 
announcement in 2014 of a new strategy to promote FDI over a seven-year period from 
2015 to 2022 by developing, among many things, ten Special Economic Zones to offer 
additional tax and non-tax benefits to investors.273   
3. U.S. Development Assistance to Projects in Thailand: 2007–2014 
Finally, U.S. development assistance via USAID averaged a low $1.2 million from 
2006 to 2008 before slightly increasing in 2009 to $3.8 million and then fluctuating 
dramatically from 2010 to 2014 (Figure 15). FDI surged to $17.7 million in 2010, but fell 
significantly to $2.6 million in 2011, then increased substantially to $12.4 million in 2012, 
before a slight drop to $9 million in 2013, and modest decline to $8.4 million in 2014. 
Compared to Thailand-U.S. economic ties measured in bilateral trade and FDI, U.S. 
development assistance was more unstable but, overall, was trending upward as noted in 
the purple vertical line in Figure 15. Development assistance to Thailand under the Thaksin 
Administration, on the other hand, was trending downward as noted by the red line also in 
Figure 15. 
From 2006 to 2008, U.S. development assistance via USAID and USTDA 
stagnated due to U.S. law mandating sanctions because of the 2006 coup. 274Therefore, the 
USTDA, for one, had to analyze the status of each project in Thailand and effectively adjust 
funding to certain projects while suspending the rest to balance USTDA interest of 
executing projects already initiated against adhering to the provision. When Washington 
restored economic and development assistance to Thailand in February 2008, development 
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aid through USAID was restored, but only some for USTDA, which increased the amount 
of U.S. development assistance to $3.8 million in 2009.275   
Figure 15. U.S. Development Assistance to Projects in Thailand after the 
2006 Coup (2006–2014)276 
 
Still, development assistance through USAID and USTDA increased exponentially 
by 365 percent in 2010 to $17.7 million from $3.8 million in 2009 due to joint-Thailand-
U.S. efforts at preventing HIV/AIDS, combating terrorism, and maintaining peace and 
stability in Thailand.277 Of this $17.7 million, USTDA provided $534,000 to Thailand to 
continue preexisting USTDA assistance in the Kingdom’s state-owned oil and gas 
                                                 
275 Chanlett-Avery et al., Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report No. RL32593; U.S. 
Trade and Development Agency, FY2011 Agency Strategic Plan and Appropriations Memos, FY2005-
FY2010. 
276 USAID (U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–
September 30, 2017); USTDA, FY2011 Agency Strategic Plan and Appropriations Memos, FY2005-
FY2010. Displayed in constant dollars. 
277 “Foreign Assistance in Thailand,” Foreign Assistance, accessed November 26, 2019, 
https://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/Thailand; National AIDS Prevention and Alleviation 
Committee, UNGASS Country Progress Report Thailand (Bangkok, Thailand: National AIDS Prevention 
and Alleviation Committee, 2009), http://data.unaids.org/pub/report/2010/
thailand_2010_country_progress_report_en.pdf. 
93 
company, PTT.278 The goal was to identify specifications and designs for the Kingdom’s 
first liquefied natural gas (LNG) receiving terminal at Map Ta Phut, which has since been 
hailed as a USTDA “success story.” The USTDA 2010 Annual Report boasted that, at the 
time of publication, in an effort to provide critical technologies and services to the terminal, 
at least 22 U.S. companies from 13 states had signed contracts with the USTDA and 
Thailand. Unfortunately, U.S. development assistance to Thailand dropped significantly in 
2011 to $2.6 million, but rebounded to $12.4 million in 2012.279  
The uptick in U.S. development assistance to Thailand in 2012 was in response to 
the flooding in Thailand that started in July 2011. The United States, in November 2011, 
announced over $10 million in additional assistance and civic aid.280 China also provided 
development assistance to Thailand to the tune of $1 million to overcome the flooding 
disaster, thus highlighting growing Sino-Thai economic-development ties.281 USTDA 
assistance, on the other hand, went toward modernizing Thailand’s rail sector and 
maintaining the regional office in Bangkok.282 As for the declining trend in 2013 at $9 
million and in 2014 at $8.4 million, those figures reflected USAID’s determination to divert 
funding toward fewer, higher performing sectors in Thailand as opposed to maximizing the 
number of sectors assisted.283  
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4. Conclusion: Thailand-U.S. Economic Relations between Coups
Economic ties in the years between the coup of September 19, 2006, and the coup 
of May 22, 2014, were markedly different from the years under the Thaksin administration 
but not necessarily in expected ways. Despite political instability and frequent regime 
changes, Thailand-U.S. bilateral trade increased to its second-highest point to date at $39 
billion in 2014, as did U.S. FDI to Thailand at $40 billion in 2012. FDI faced more turbulent 
fluctuations than did bilateral trade but enjoyed similar upward trends. U.S. development 
assistance through USAID and USTDA, on the other hand, was initially curtailed by the 
2006 coup, with some funding suspended to Thailand.  
The drivers of these changes are both domestic occurrences in Thailand and 
international developments outside the Kingdom—two factors other than the coup.  For 
instance, the 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis led to declines in Thailand’s global 
exports, which temporarily curtailed Thailand-U.S. bilateral trade. Thailand’s political 
crisis and civil unrest, too, negatively affected U.S. FDI to the Kingdom. Natural disasters 
in Thailand and joint-projects with the United States, such as preventing HIV/AIDS and 
combating terrorism, however, raised U.S. development assistance to Thailand despite U.S. 
law sanctioning some assistance. Considering these factors, Thailand-U.S. economic 
relations appear ripe for further volatility following the 2014 coup that was the latest and 
fourth-most defining coup in Thai.284   
C. THAILAND-U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS: AFTER THE 2014 COUP
(2014–2019)
In the years since the May 2014 coup, Thailand-U.S. economic relations improved
dramatically in the area of bilateral trade, but they have yet to see the robustness they once 
enjoyed in FDI. U.S. development assistance to Thailand was most affected by the coup as 
it fell 91 percent from $8.4 million in 2014 to $724,620 in 2018. For the first time, U.S. 
FDI to Thailand began trending downward in the years after the 2014 coup (purple line in 
Figure 16) compared to overall upward trend in the years predating this coup (red line in 
284 Chris Baker, “The 2014 Thai Coup and Some Roots of Authoritarianism,” Journal of 
Contemporary Asia 46, no. 3 (2016): 388–404, https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2016.1150500. 
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Figure 16). Similarly, U.S. development assistance began an overall downward trend from 
2014 to 2018. This dearth of development assistance, which the U.S. government controls, 
can perhaps be attributed to the 2014 coup and the actions of the authoritarian Prayut who 
retained his self-appointed premiership for five years after said coup. However, Prayut’s 
meeting with President Trump in October 2017 to discuss the state of Thailand-U.S. 
relations confirms that the United States is not above aiding authoritarian regimes, which 
it does so regularly around the world based on factors deemed more important than 
democratization. 
Their meeting, which was the first between a U.S. president and Thai prime 
minister since 2012, saw Trump and Prayut speaking highly of the enduring Thailand-U.S. 
alliance, acknowledging the increased significance of Thailand-U.S. trade relations, and 
underscoring the importance of strengthening bilateral economic ties.285 Their focus is 
perplexing, given that bilateral trade is not broken. The most recent data on the World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) indicate that U.S. imports to Thailand held relatively 
steady, registering 6.44 percent in 2014 and 6.24 percent in 2016, while, Thai exports to 
the United States increased marginally from 10.53 percent in 2014 to 11.41 percent in 2016. 
However, while total trade increased, U.S. FDI in Thailand and development aid to the 
Kingdom both contracted significantly.  
1. Thailand-U.S. Total Bilateral Trade: 2014–2018 
Unsurprisingly, given the negative impact of the coup and ongoing instability and 
uncertainty on the economy, after the 2014 coup, the Thai economy grew at its slowest rate 
in three years, at only 0.7 percent GDP annually.286 Despite this, as shown in Figure 16, 
Thailand-U.S. total bilateral trade continued to very gradually increase from $39 billion in 
2014, to $40 billion in 2015 and 2016, a 2.56 percent rise over the three years.287 The same 
report reveals that total trade reached $42.1 billion in 2017 and $44.3 billion in 2018, the 
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last year for which figures are available. This translates to a 13 percent growth in total 
bilateral trade between the two countries over five years.  
Figure 16. Thailand-U.S. Total Bilateral Trade after the 2014 Coup 
(2014–2018)288 
 
Indeed, Thailand-U.S. bilateral trade has trended upward since 2001. In the first 
year of the Thaksin era, it stood at $21 billion and realized $30.4 billion in 2006, a 44 
percent increase. From 2007 to 2014, their bilateral trade grew from $31.1 billion to $39 
billion, a 25 percent increase. From 2001 to 2018, then, bilateral trade increased 
significantly by 111 percent.   
Meanwhile, Sino-Thai trade relations under the Prayut Administration also 
continue to grow. This, perhaps, is attributable to Prayut engaging with Chinese officials 
to diversify its economic relationships, stimulate economic growth to help stabilize 
domestic politics, and offset losses from development assistance and economic assistance 
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for military supplies from its American ally.289 On December 23, 2014, during Prayut’s 
meeting with President Xi Jinping, Prayut expressed appreciation for China’s agricultural 
imports to Thailand, which he deemed conducive to their countries’ bilateral trade 
development.290 Not only were Thailand’s imports comprised 16.9 percent from Chinese 
goods in 2014, but China’s share grew to 21.6 percent in 2016.291 The World Bank also 
reports that 6.24 percent of Thailand’s imports came from the United States in 2016. Sino-
Thai trade relations thus improved during Prayut’s tenure to where China is now Thailand’s 
largest import-export partner at $79 billion total trade, compared to the United States at 
$43.3 billion in total trade.292 This shift in positions came in 2018.293  
Nevertheless, Thailand-U.S. trade still increased at the same time with increases in 
Sino-Thai trade. U.S. goods exports to Thailand in 2018 were at $12.6 billion, a $1.6 billion 
and 14.5 percent increase from 2017 and, overall, a 59.5 percent increase from $7.9 million 
in 2006 and 6.7 percent increase from $11.8 billion in 2014.294 The U.S. Trade 
Representative also reports U.S. goods imports from Thailand totaled $31.9 billion in 2018, 
a 2.4 percent increase from 2017, and overall a 41.7 percent increase from $22.5 billion in 
2006 and a 17.3 percent increase from $27.2 billion in 2014.  
The U.S. deficit with Thailand persists, growing by 26 percent from -$15.4 billion 
in 2014 to -$19.4 billion in 2018.295 Based on the first nine months of 2019, where the 
deficit-to-date stands at -$14.9 billion, it is likely that the annual deficit will again increase 
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and place greater strains on Thailand-U.S. trade relations under the Trump administration. 
A U.S. Trade Representative’s press release in July 2019 stated that Thailand and the 
United States have initiated talks under their Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
on the status of their trade relationship and the importance of Thailand addressing a U.S. 
trade deficit, among other related issues.296 In October 2019, new concerns emerged that 
Thailand-U.S. trade would decline, given President Trump suspending $1.3 billion in trade 
preferences for Thailand over concerns about workers’ rights.297 Critics regard this 
suspension as a catalyst to worsening U.S.-Thailand relations.  
2. Thailand-U.S. Foreign Direct Investment: 2014–2018 
In the wake of the 2014 coup, U.S. FDI in Thailand, as indicated in the data obtained 
from USBEA and illustrated in Figure 17, held relatively steady, averaging $17.3 between 
2014–18, but experienced a slight decline in 2017.298 It dropped slightly from $18.1 billion 
in 2014 to $17.9 billion in 2015, and rebounded to $18 billion in 2016, only to decline to 
$15 billion in 2017. In 2018, FDI increased to $17.6 billion. The cause for these minor 
fluctuations in U.S. FDI into Thailand from 2014 to 2018, however, had to do with more 
than just the state of Thai political instability resulting from the 2014 coup.299 The 
differences in FDI numbers were also attributable to changes in Thailand’s foreign 
investment rules.300 
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Figure 17. Thailand-U.S. Foreign Direct Investment after the 2014 Coup 
(2014–2018)301 
What is most remarkable is the sharp rise in U.S. FDI into Thailand between 2013 
and 2014. After averaging $8 billion during the Thaksin years of 2001–06 and $10.5 billion 
from 2007–13 after the 2006 coup, 2014 brought an 82 percent gain in FDI to $18.1 billion, 
which it basically retained for the next four years barring the slight drip to $15 billion in 
2017.302 An anticipated change in Thailand’s investment policies helps explain this surge. 
The Thai government revised its foreign investment rules in January 2015. Toward 
the end of 2014, U.S. companies, supported by the U.S. government, and along with other 
foreign investors and companies, rushed to file investment applications to receive better 
tax and other benefits under the existing system.303 In 2015, Thailand reduced benefits for 
investors, including cutting the number of industries qualifying for tax benefits by 20 
percent, mainly in labor-intensive sectors in the midst of rising labor costs and growing 
301 Data shows U.S. direct investment position abroad on a historical-cost basis. USBEA, “Balance of 
Payments and Direct Investment Position Data” data available through 2018. 
302 USBEA, “Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data.”  
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worker shortages.304 As noted above, U.S. FDI in Thailand has not varied much since the 
initial surge in 2014 that locked in previous, more-favorable conditions.  
Despite Thailand’s less-favorable investment policies implemented in 2015, in 
2016, the United States published a statement acknowledging Thailand as an “upper 
middle-income country with pro-investment policies … [where] hundreds of U.S. 
companies have invested in Thailand successfully.”305 This statement was timely and much 
needed by Thailand, given that, in the first six months of 2016, overall FDI in Thailand fell 
more than 90 percent.306 The drop was due to uncertainty regarding Thai politics and 
economics in the wake of the death of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, Thailand’s longest 
reigning king, who was known for his pro-West policies. The U.S. statement came at a 
time when Thailand desperately needed its ally’s support. The U.S. government and 
businesses likely were also aware that Thailand had become the largest economy in 
ASEAN, second only to Indonesia.307 
Yet, in 2017, Thailand saw U.S. FDI fall to $15 billion from $18 billion in 2015.308 
This mild decline may have been a result of what James Zhan described as a worldwide 
“underlying FDI trend [that] has shown anemic growth since the global financial crisis and 
has been on a downward trajectory since 2013.”309 Zhan qualifies this assessment in stating 
that Southeast Asia remains the main growth engine for FDI and continues to attract foreign 
investors, particularly in Indonesia and Thailand. Indeed, Thailand became the third-fastest 
growing recipient of FDI from the United States in 2018. U.S. FDI in Thailand increased 
17.3 percent from $15 billion in 2017 to $17.6 billion in 2018.310  
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In sum, from 2014 to 2018, the United States invested an average of $17 billion to 
Thailand, miles ahead of its FDI there from 2001–2013 that averaged $9.4 billion. Lastly, 
despite there not being data available on 2019 U.S. FDI in Thailand at the time of this 
report, the Investing in ASEAN Report for 2019 to 2020 speaks to Thailand’s ongoing push 
to attract even more FDI, especially with it being the ASEAN Chair for 2019.311 The report 
looks to the United States to be one of the growing investors.  
3. U.S. Development Assistance to Projects in Thailand: 2014–2019 
The 2014 coup gravely affected U.S. development assistance to Thailand from 2014 
to 2018 where the amount of funding began a periodic decline with downward trends (see 
Figure 18 and blue line representing the trend).312 Development assistance through USAID 
peaked in 2016 at $5.1 million, a 54 percent increase from $3.3 million in 2015. This was 
due to USAID extending disaster and risk reduction support to Thailand in preparation for 
flooding and other disasters.313 By 2017, U.S. development assistance declined by 31 
percent to $3.5 million although the U.S. Department of State did provide funding in 2017 
for technical assistance to the USTDA regional office in Bangkok.314 Technical assistance, 
as defined by USTDA, “offers assessments, recommendations and technical support to 
meet industry requirements and to seek implementation financing.”315 So while the 
economic assistance does not go directly toward development projects, it still aids in the 
support and planning portion of such projects, thereby indicting the importance 
Washington still places on its relationship with its ally. Similarly, the USTDA 2018 Annual 
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Report stated that the U.S. Department of State also provided aid at $724,620 for the same 
reasons in 2017.  
Figure 18. U.S. Development Assistance to Projects in Thailand after the 
2014 Coup (2014–2019)316 
 
Nevertheless, the United States was not keen to continue providing development 
assistance in the years immediately following the 2014 coup. Unlike the 2006 coup, where 
the junta soon returned control to civilian leaders, Prayut consolidated power until his 
election in 2019. As a result, Washington adhered to U.S. law and did not provide 
development assistance through the USTDA from 2014 to 2016.317 Yet, development aid 
returned in 2017, even before elections were called for 2019. This change may be the result 
of a shift in policies between the Obama and Trump administrations, where the latter has 
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fewer qualms working with authoritarian governments.318 In contrast, rather than cutting 
development assistance after the coup, China offered over $3 billion in aid and loans to 
Thailand and other regional countries to improve infrastructure.319 
Still, it was not until August 12, 2019, and after Thailand’s March 2019 elections 
that the USTDA finally issued a press release indicating that it will reopen its program in 
Thailand. 320 The goal was to support “the development of priority infrastructure projects 
in the energy, transportation, and telecommunications sectors, and helping to foster new 
commercial partnerships between the United States and Thailand.” Additionally, the 
USTDA awarded a grant—but with no disclosed monetary amount—to Thailand’s Blue 
Solar Company, a renewable energy enterprise, to assist in the development of a solar 
photovoltaic (PV) power plant containing an integrated energy storage system in the 
northwest province of Suphan Buri. The USTDA’s decision to formally reopen its 
programs to Thailand signals renewed efforts at strengthening Thailand-U.S. economic 
relations.321 The USTDA’s decision to resume economic development support to Thailand 
is also interpreted as Washington’s move to counter Beijing’s influence in Southeast 
Asia.322  
4. Conclusion: Thailand-U.S. Economic Relations after the 2014 Coup 
The state of Thailand-U.S. economic relations under the Prayut administration is 
worse compared to that of previous administrations in all measurable aspects. In terms of 
total bilateral trade, relations continued to strength between 2014 and 2019. U.S. FDI to 
Thailand, however, soared from $9.9 billion in 2013 to $18.1 billion in 2014 and remained 
within this high average minus the slight decline to $15 billion in 2017. There remains 
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promise of even greater U.S. FDI in Thailand, considering the Kingdom being the ASEAN 
Chair for 2019, which may help elevate the Thai government and economy.  
Finally, although U.S. development assistance to Thailand through USTDA was 
negatively impacted most of 2014–17, by 2017, the U.S. government was finding other 
ways to deliver assistance. Its announcement in August 2019 of the revitalization of U.S. 
aid programs to Thailand hints at future development projects and funding to the Kingdom, 
especially under the current U.S. administration, which puts less emphasis on regime type, 
and with the resumption of Thailand elections. All else equal, while the economic ties 
between the two countries were initially negatively affected by the 2014 coup, 
contemporary affairs—even with Prayut limiting democratic expression and institutions—
suggest an ongoing strengthening of Thailand-U.S. economic relations.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter assessed and analyzed economic relations organized around three 
different periods: 2001–06, 2006–14, and 2014–19. During the Thaksin years from 2001 
to 2006, Thailand-U.S. total bilateral trade gradually increased, U.S. FDI into Thailand 
experienced declines in 2003 and 2004 but trended upward otherwise, and U.S. 
development assistance fluctuated significantly. After the 2006 coup, bilateral trade 
expanded considerably, and FDI peaked at $12.9 in 2010 before beginning its gradual 
decline until dramatically increasing to $18.1 billion in 2014. In contrast, U.S. development 
assistance was negatively impacted by the 2006 coup, with funding to Thailand suspended 
for the two years following the coup. Finally, after the 2014 coup until 2019, total bilateral 
trade continued to increase, U.S. FDI was relatively stable, and U.S. development 
assistance declined substantially but aid through USTDA was restored informally in 2017 




IV. THAILAND-U.S. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
Compared to Thailand-U.S. military and economic relations, Thailand-U.S. 
diplomatic relations were more negatively affected by the 2006 and 2014 coups.323  
Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations during the Thaksin Administrative period (2001–06) 
were strong but stagnated in the years after the 2006 coup (2006–14) due to five different 
Thai prime ministers subsequently leading a troubled country, each without a clear foreign 
policy. U.S. sanctions and criticisms of Thailand following the 2014 coup negatively 
affected bilateral ties, which were further exacerbated by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-
cha retaining his premiership after leading the coup d’état and then government for five 
years, as opposed to promptly transferring control of the Kingdom to civilian leaders or 
holding elections. Additionally, U.S. sanctions on Thailand compelled Prayut to cultivate 
diplomatic ties with other foreign leaders in order to grow the Thai economy and legitimize 
his rule over the Kingdom, thereby complicating Thailand-U.S. diplomacy even more. 
However, the October 2, 2017, diplomatic visit between President Donald Trump and 
Prayut at the White House signaled a normalization of Thailand-U.S. diplomatic ties.324 
While overall Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations have stabilized since the 2006 coup, 
contemporary ties are not as vigorous and strong as they were during the Thaksin years 
where Thailand’s democracy and Thaksin’s support for the U.S. global war on terrorism—
that ultimately earned Thailand the Major Non-NATO ally status—helped strengthened 
the alliance.  
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An analysis of Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations, admittedly, is slightly difficult 
compared to that of military and economic relations given the lack of quantitative 
measurements. For example, military and economic ties can be tangibly measured based 
on, for example, the number of participants in and nature of military exercises, level of 
equipment sales and financing, trade balances, foreign direct investments, and foreign 
assistance. Diplomacy, on the other hand, lacks such concrete data. The status of Thailand-
U.S. diplomatic relations is assessed, instead, on the frequency and nature of official high-
level visits between the two countries and official press releases and statements made about 
each other.  
The number of official high-level visits in each period are indicative of Thailand-
U.S. diplomatic relations. From 2001 to 2006, Thaksin made three diplomatic, working 
visits to the White House, in 2001, 2003, and 2005, whereas President Bush in the same 
span made one to Thailand in 2003.325 There were half as many high-level visits between 
Thailand and U.S. state leaders during 2007–2014. Bush visited Thailand again in 2008, 
and President Obama visited the Kingdom in 2012 to meet former Prime Minister Yingluck 
Shinawatra.326 Prayut’s 2017 visit to the White House remains the sole diplomatic visit 
between Thailand and U.S. leaders from 2014 to 2019. This chapter proceeds by assessing 
in more detail the state of Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations prior to the 2006 coup, then 
analyzing the state of the relations after the 2006 and 2014 coups, respectively. 
A. THAILAND-U.S. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: THE THAKSIN YEARS 
(2001–2006) 
This section assesses the state of Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations under the 
Thaksin Shinawatra period based on an analysis of the frequency of high-level diplomatic 
visits, the nature of the visits and official statements published, and the extent of support 
the two countries extended one another following each visit. It finds that Thailand-U.S. 
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diplomatic relations, by the end of Thaksin’s rule, had strengthened considerably—through 
four high-level diplomatic visits—from their initial disconcerting point that seemed 
postured for decline. This initial concern stems from Thaksin’s critics arguing that 
Washington was dissatisfied with Thaksin criticizing Western media shortly after 
ascending to office and his unenthusiastic support of the U.S. global war on terrorism.327 
Critics, moreover, claimed that the Bush Administration did not accord Thaksin’s 
diplomatic visit in December 2001 with the same level as it did the leaders of Malaysia and 
Indonesia during their visits. This could be interpreted as Washington giving less 
precedence to its first Asian ally. Yet, Thailand-U.S. diplomacy under the Thaksin 
Administration was, on the whole satisfactory, and signaled continuity from the previous 
Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai Administration (1997–2001). Moreover, not only had 
Thailand-U.S. diplomacy strengthened by the end of Thaksin’s rule, it seemed positioned 
for even greater growth considering, for instance, Thailand-U.S. negotiations of a Free 
Trade Agreement and enhanced military engagements. 
This section is divided into three parts with the first providing a background of 
Thaksin’s initial months in office (February 2001–September 2001) to assess the state of 
the initial Thailand-U.S. diplomatic ties under a new Thai government. It argues that 
Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations seemed postured for decline because of Thaksin’s anti-
Western demeanor and favoring of Asian values and diplomatic ties with Asian states. The 
second part describes the evolution of Thailand-U.S. diplomacy from its initial moderate 
point to a strengthened one starting with Thaksin’s support of the U.S. global war on 
terrorism, which signaled improved relations that advanced diplomatic ties. Lastly, it 
concludes with an explanation of the strengthened and well-rounded state of Thailand-U.S. 
diplomacy by the end of the Thaksin years.    
1. Thailand’s First Democratically Elected Prime Minister of the 21st 
Century 
Thaksin’s early months in office were disconcerting for the United States due to his 
seemingly anti-Western demeanor and preference for Asian values and the cultivation of 
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stronger diplomatic relations with other Asian countries, specifically, China. Thaksin’s 
electoral victory surprised several U.S. politicians who had placed their confidence in the 
election of Thaksin’s predecessor, former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai from the long-
standing Democrat Party.328 Thaksin’s ascension was a cause for alarm to many U.S. 
policymakers given his nationalist overtures, which mirrored those of Malaysian Prime 
Minister Dr. Mahathir Bin Mohamad, who was well-known for his 1980s “Look East 
Policy.”329 Mahathir launched this policy in February 1982 as an economic reform 
initiative to encourage Malaysians to emulate Japanese business management skills and 
work ethic—as opposed to mirroring Western work ethic—in order to grow Malaysia’s 
economy as remarkably as Japan did after World War II.330 In essence, Mahathir believed 
that Japanese economic growth was predicated on its superior morale, management 
capability, and labor ethics, which he viewed as a solid foundation for Asian self-reliance. 
Such a shift in Thailand via Thaksin’s echoing of Mahathir’s policy would likely weaken 
the Thailand-U.S. alliance.   
From the onset, Thaksin’s speech to the Thai National Assembly in February 2001 
echoed this Look East Policy. He announced a foreign policy of “proactive economic 
diplomacy… by expanding closer international cooperation and relations between ASEAN 
member countries and countries in East Asia, South Asia, and other regions.”331 While it 
would be premature to signal this as a direct distancing from the United States, Thaksin’s 
initial actions did not assuage concerns. Kavi Chongkittavorn proclaims that “when 
Thaksin came to power, he started…standing up to the United States [and was] the first 
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prime minister to have such a relationship with the United States.”332 However, it is 
necessary to note that notwithstanding Thaksin’s rhetoric, he was not significantly different 
in practice from his predecessors. Former Thai leaders, especially those from the Vietnam 
War era, valued a strong Thailand-U.S. military alliance and close economic and 
diplomatic relationships to defeat shared communist threats.333 Such leaders facilitated 
strong support for the Thailand-U.S. alliance by hosting large numbers of U.S. military 
personnel and equipment on Thai soil and deploying Thai military forces to fight alongside 
U.S. troops in South Vietnam in exchange for U.S. military and economic aid.334 The need 
for this alliance would resurface after the 9/11 attacks with Thaksin seeking U.S. economic 
assistance in exchange for the Kingdom’s support in the war on terrorism.  
Furthermore, Thaksin’s early actions on China were concerning for Washington 
policymakers. In April 2001, when China forced the United States to land a U.S. EP-3 spy 
plane on Hainan, China, Thaksin irked Washington when he refused to side with his U.S. 
ally and instead sought a mediator role in the conflict.335 In an interview addressing 
whether he was leaning toward China over the United States, Thaksin claimed neutrality 
by stating that Thailand and China enjoy long ancestral ties, while the United States 
remains an old and enduring ally.336 Specifically, as quoted in Gaye Christoffersen’s 
article, Thaksin remarked that “[e]conomically, China [is] also a big market and Thailand 
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must have a good relationship with her. As for the U.S., Thailand has been an old ally, and 
this relationship will continue.”337 It appeared Thaksin was hedging.  
Still, Washington became more disenchanted when, in the following month, 
Thaksin met with Chinese officials in Hong Kong and obtained $2 billion in Chinese 
economic aid for Thailand.338 Thaksin was adamant that China’s growing economy 
necessitated cultivating Sino-Thai ties, which could be viewed as bandwagoning with the 
rising power were it not for Thaksin also maintaining diplomatic relations with the United 
States in hopes of reaping strategic and economic benefits as well.339 Even so, Thaksin’s 
statements during his high-level diplomatic visit with Chinese State Council Premier Zhu 
Rongji in August 2001 still gave cause for alarm in the initial months into his premiership. 
Thaksin proclaimed that “as the current prime minister, I am most enthusiastic to further 
expand the Thailand-China relationship in all areas…. I do not see anything that will be an 
obstacle to Thailand-China relations [and] … in terms of economic cooperation and trade, 
Thailand and China can be mutually complementary.”340  
2. 9/11 and the U.S. War on Terrorism: Thailand’s Alignment with the 
United States 
Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations vacillated from concerning to potentially 
declining to eventually robust a few years after the 9/11 attacks. Ties strengthened when 
Thaksin eventually committed Thailand’s support to the U.S. global war on terrorism 
campaign. Despite Thaksin’s eventual support of the U.S. war campaign, he did not do so 
without initial hesitation and resistance. This was mainly due to Thaksin’s desire to not 
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provoke the large Muslim-Malay Thai citizens in Thailand’s southern provinces, his plans 
to strengthen ties with the Middle East, and his eagerness to move Thailand toward a more 
neutral foreign-policy posture.341  
On September 14, 2001—when the United States was reeling from the 9/11 attacks 
and needing reassurance—Thaksin announced Thailand’s “strictly neutral” policy toward 
the U.S. global war on terrorism.342 Thaksin’s Deputy Prime Minister Thammarak 
Isarangkul na Ayuthaya echoed Thaksin’s sentiments by explaining that Bangkok did not 
want to help perpetuate the war or become vulnerable to foreign terrorists.343 Yet, during 
Thaksin’s first of three diplomatic visit to the White House in December 14, 2001, he 
affirmed to President Bush that the two countries’ needed to strengthen their strategic and 
economic engagements and promised Bangkok’s support for the war on terrorism.344 
Following the meeting, the U.S. Office of the Press Secretary released a statement boasting 
a title of “Prime Minister of Thailand Reiterates Full Support to U.S.” to arguably highlight 
the significance of Thaksin’s remarks.345 Shortly thereafter, Thaksin offered five medical 
teams and the use of a Thai military engineering battalion to U.S. reconstruction efforts in 
Afghanistan.346 But, it took Thaksin two years to follow through with these commitments 
and go public about Thailand’s membership in the U.S.’ “coalition of the willing” for Iraq.  
In October 2001, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit 
Meeting in Shanghai, President Bush had announced the 9/11 attacks as “an attack on all 
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civilized countries.”347 While there, he met with and gained the committed support in the 
U.S. global war on terrorism from Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Japanese Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi. But it would take until the 2002 APEC meeting for Thailand 
to express similar support at such high-profile forums. In October 2002, Thailand 
supported the APEC Counterterrorism Declaration, just a few months after the Kingdom 
had signed an ASEAN-sponsored counterterrorism Declaration of Cooperation with the 
United States.348  
Yet, the next year, as the Bush Administration was making preparations to invade 
Iraq on March 20, 2003, Thaksin implored Washington to not publicly declare the 
Kingdom as a part of the “coalition of the willing.”349 This was unexpected, because 
Thaksin had already allowed the United States to stage U.S. warplanes heading to Iraq at 
the geostrategic U-tapao airbase and controversially permitting the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) to conduct torture-infused interrogations of suspected Al-Qaeda operatives 
in Thailand in early 2002.350 After CNN revealed Thailand as a silent partner in this 
rendition scheme, which may have violated international law, Thaksin neither confirmed 
nor denied the story.351 Also according to Chambers, Thaksin’s ambiguity was founded on 
the hope of avoiding criticism from the Thai-Muslim lobby in Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai 
(TRT) political party, which opposed any and all U.S. military actions against Muslim-
majority countries. Likewise, Thaksin feared provoking a terrorist attack on Thai soil, 
which would damage the economy’s critical tourism sector should he adopt a foreign policy 
that acquiesced too publicly to U.S. demands in the war on terrorism campaign.352 
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By early June 2003, these mixed signals and Thaksin’s unofficial visit to 
Washington had prompted the Bush Administration to question the sincerity of Thaksin’s 
diplomatic support for counterterrorism war efforts.353 The administration relied on 
Thailand as part of a forward-positioning defense strategy where U.S. forces could 
preposition their armaments on Thai soil for rapid force-deployment purposes, making 
access to the U-tapao airbase strategically important.354 Washington hoped that Bangkok, 
moreover, would become a key intelligence-sharing ally during the war.  
Thaksin eventually accepted that other countries—including Asian nations such as 
the self-proclaimed pacifist Japan and neighboring India and China, neither of which are 
U.S. allies—supported the U.S.-led campaign.355 Combined with backlash from Thai elites 
that Thaksin’s neutrality on the war would jeopardize the Thailand-U.S. alliance, Thaksin 
felt compelled to officially announce Thailand’s support in the war on terrorism.356 In 
doing so, he set Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations on the path to strengthen considerably. 
Thaksin’s decision to finally support the U.S. war on terrorism is also attributable 
to his national interest in the gains Thailand would make strategically, economically, and 
politically by helping its American ally. For one, the United States would train Thai 
military forces and provide access to U.S. military equipment.357 In mid-2003, Thaksin 
revealed that his government needed to rid Thailand of elements of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group that was operating in Thailand, albeit to a limited 
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extent.358  He later officially committed to the U.S. “coalition of the willing in Iraq” by 
deploying 443 Thai troops to Iraq for a year—starting in September 2003—to assist in the 
country’s rebuilding efforts.359 In return, Bush designated Thailand as a Major Non-NATO 
Ally, thereby giving Thailand greater access to used U.S. military equipment and sales and 
significantly boosting its diplomatic status.360 By June 2004, Thaksin and Bush 
commenced negotiations for a Thailand-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. With Thailand now 
a strong, visible supporter of the U.S. war on terrorism, the Bush Administration was 
largely mute about growing human rights abuses in Thailand, including Thaksin’s “war on 
drugs” campaign against illegal trafficking of narcotics, resulting in mass extrajudicial 
killings in 2003,.361 When Thailand acceded to Washington’s request to exempt U.S. 
citizens in Thailand from prosecution in the International Criminal Court, Thailand-U.S. 
diplomacy was further strengthened. These events showcase that, despite early concerns 
that Thaksin was distancing Thailand from the United States, he valued the resources, 
status, and leniency gained through Thailand-U.S. cooperation. Thus, after the 9/11 attacks, 
Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations improved significantly and removed concerns about a 
weakening alliance. 
3. Conclusion: Thailand-U.S. Diplomatic Relations during the Thaksin 
Years 
Thailand-U.S. diplomacy during the Thaksin years began at a moderate and slightly 
uncertain level in early 2001 but progressed to an impressive, mutually beneficial, and 
close alliance by the time of Thaksin’s ousting in September 2006. In fact, prior to the 
coup, during Bush and Thaksin’s final diplomatic meeting on September 19, 2005, the two 
reflected on their diplomatic ties and hailed their countries’ alliance as a “special and 
                                                 
358 Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia 
to China’s Rise. 
359 Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia 
to China’s Rise; Prangtip Daoruend and Heather Abbott, “An Alliance Gone Bad,” Center for Public 
Integrity, November 20, 2017, https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/an-alliance-gone-bad/. 
360 Chanlett-Avery et al., Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report No. RL32593; 
Chambers, “Thailand-U.S. Relations after 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” 
361 “Thailand’s ‘War on Drugs’,” Human Rights Watch, March 12, 2008, https://www.hrw.org/news/
2008/03/12/thailands-war-drugs#; Daoruend and Abbott, “An Alliance Gone Bad.” 
115 
enduring bond.”362 Bush bestowing the Major Non-NATO Ally title on Thailand in 
October 2003 contributed significantly to moving the two countries’ diplomatic trajectory 
toward stronger levels. The United States had gained flexibility in how it conducted its 
global war on terrorism, and Thaksin had gained less U.S. scrutiny on his heavy-handed 
approach to governance. For one, Thaksin’s authorization of over 3,000 extrajudicial 
killings in his “war on drugs” campaign and the deaths of 85 Malay-Muslim Thai peaceful 
protestors who were suffocated in Army trucks during the 2004 Tak Bai incident evoked 
staunch condemnation from the United Nations Human Rights Committee and Human 
Rights Watch.363 Yet, in spite of these egregious acts, the United States publicly responded 
with, “we have discussed this matter with the Thai and expressed our concerns.”364 This 
underscores the point that in times of crisis and mutually benefiting and strategic needs, 
such as that of the war on terrorism, the United States is willing to set aside certain pillars 
of democracy in favor of national interest.365  
B. THAILAND-U.S. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: AFTER THE 2006 COUP 
(2006–2014) 
Compared to Thailand-U.S. military and economic relations after the coup, the two 
countries’ diplomatic relations from 2006 to 2014 were affected substantially and 
negatively. Specifically, Thailand-U.S. diplomatic ties after the coup can be considered 
utilitarian—to further economic and strategic objectives—but diplomacy, as measured by 
the number and nature of diplomatic visits and official statements between Thailand and 
the United States, did not progress. The 2006 coup, likewise, complicated Thailand-U.S. 
relations, since it compelled the United States to vocalize its disappointment toward the 
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formerly democratic Thailand, as well as required Washington to impose sanctions in 
accordance with U.S. law.366  
Overall, the most visible ramification of the coup on Thailand-U.S. diplomacy was 
the dearth of official high-level diplomatic visits between Thailand and U.S. state leaders 
to each other’s country. Compared to the Thaksin years where there were four diplomatic 
visits (Thaksin in 2001, 2003, and 2005; Bush in 2003), only two U.S. presidents visited 
Thailand between the September 19, 2006, coup and May 22, 2014, coup: Bush’s visit in 
2008 and Obama’s visit in 2012.367 Both were criticized as too late in closing the chasm 
that the coup created between Thailand and the United States, a gap which was exacerbated 
by China’s growing influence in the region.368 Worse, as the Albright Stonebridge Group 
(ASG) chaired by Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright reported, no Thai prime ministers 
visited the White House from late-2006 to mid-2014, despite a return to elections in 
2007.369 ASG notes that the majority of visits between Bangkok and Washington during 
this time were between their respective policymakers and military leaders, not by the state 
leaders. As the subsequent analysis, organized by Thai prime minister, will show, these 
meetings—with the exception of one with Obama and Yingluck in 2012—culminated in 
greater challenges to Thailand-U.S. diplomacy from 2006 to 2014 due to the lack of 
consistent, high-level visits.  
1. Surayud Chulanont, October 2006 to January 2008 
Former Royal Thai Army Commander Surayud Chulanont was appointed as the 
interim prime minister of Thailand on October 1, 2006.370 During his 15-month tenure as 
prime minister, Thailand-U.S. diplomacy waxed and waned with the United States blurring 
the line between political and military relations. On the one hand, U.S. Department of State 
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Deputy Spokesman Tom Casey promptly expressed on behalf of the Bush Administration 
his extreme disappointment with the 2006 coup, urged a quick restoration of democracy 
via election, and warned of U.S. repercussions.371 On the other hand, U.S. officials were 
aware of the strategic importance of the Thailand-U.S. military alliance and cooperation 
through COBRA GOLD and the International Military and Education Training programs, 
but, nevertheless, had to enforce sanctions to these programs in accordance with U.S. 
law.372 They were also cautious not to overly criticize Thailand lest doing so should drive 
a deep wedge between these long-term allies.   U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce, the first 
foreign diplomat to meet Surayud shortly after he became prime minister, was keen on 
highlighting the optimistic conversation the two had in October 2006.373 When asked about 
the meeting, Boyce stated that he felt assured of Surayud’s intentions to swiftly return 
Thailand to a democratically elected government and, in the meantime, protect civil 
liberties. Yet, Washington still struggled to balance its political and strategic interests.  
Over time, U.S. officials’ visits and economic assistance to Thailand dwindled.374 
For instance, one may think that former President George H.W. Bush’s visit to Thailand in 
December 2006 at the behest of his son—then President George W. Bush—may be 
indicative of the United States’ attempt at reinvigorating Thailand-U.S. diplomacy, such 
was not the case. Granted, Bush Sr. visited Thailand to pledge U.S. continued support for 
the tsunami relief aid following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami attack.375 This visit echoed 
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s and Florida Governor Jeb Bush’s visits to Thailand in 
January 2005 for the same purpose.376 Yet, it was not until 2008, two years after the coup, 
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that the United States reinstated economic assistance and military aid to Thailand, signaling 
efforts to improve Thailand-U.S. interwoven diplomatic and strategic ties.377  
2. Samak Sundaravej, January 2008 to September 2008, and Somchai 
Wongsawat, September 2008 to December 2008 
Neither the governments of Prime Ministers Samak Sundaravej nor Somchai 
Wongsawat were long lived, and nor did they contribute to restoring Thailand-U.S. 
diplomatic ties. Rather, such ties ebbed and flowed between stagnation and decline from 
January 2008 to December 2008. This is largely attributable to the lack of continuity in 
Thailand’s prime ministers and their need to focus on consolidating power and governing 
in the wake of ongoing unrest. Samak was the democratically elected prime minister from 
the December 2007 Thai election, who ran under the People’s Power Party banner, the 
successor to Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai political party, which had been banned by the courts. 
Samak was widely regarded as Thaksin’s “puppet,” a term that he resented, despite being 
unabashed in vocalizing his close ties to the deposed prime minister.378 Somchai is 
Thaksin’s brother-in-law. Thaksin chose Somchai as his successor when the Thai 
Constitutional Court forced Samak to resign in September 2008 due to a constitutional 
technicality after hosting a televised cooking show for which he received payment.379 
Somchai, too, was forced to resign after a violent clash in October 2008 between the anti-
Thaksin, urban middle-class royalist People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), aka Yellow 
Shirts, and the pro-Thaksin, predominantly rural and poor working-class United Front for 
Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), aka Red Shirts, resulted in one casualty and 
widespread property damage. 
In comparing Thailand-U.S. diplomacy during these two governments, there seems 
to have been more of a relationship under the Samak Administration than the Somchai 
Administration, since the latter was so short-lived and reflected nepotism. U.S. officials’ 
visits to Thailand during the Samak administration were strategically conducted following 
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his democratic election to indicate Washington’s support of a democratic Thailand. But the 
visits appeared to be more of a political formality than genuine, concrete efforts at restoring 
ties and supporting Thailand during its time of need.  
Soon after Samak was elected to office, U.S. Ambassador Eric G. John assumed 
duties as the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand in February 2008. Upon his arrival to the 
Kingdom, he announced the U.S. Secretary of State’s decision to re-instate military 
assistance to Thailand, which indicates the strategic importance of Thailand-U.S. military 
relations over that of sustained diplomatic visits and dialogue.380 A few weeks later, 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Christopher R. Hill, arrived in 
Thailand and delivered an encouraging speech at Chulalongkorn University, one of 
Thailand’s oldest and most prestigious educational institutions. Hill stated: 
We value our relationship with Thailand. We want to do more. As you 
know, the Prime Minister had a good discussion on the phone with our 
President when he took over, when he took office. We look forward to really 
working with Thailand—with the understanding that we work with the 
government here, we also work with educational institutions, we work with 
economic [sic], with companies commercially. We work really across the 
board. We want to make sure this relationship with Thailand is very broad 
and very deep.381 
On June 1, 2008, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates’ visit with Samak was 
reaffirmation that “the military-to-military relationship between the U.S. and Thailand is 
based on shared democratic principles.”382 In addition to expressing interest in expanding 
Thailand-U.S. relations, Gates added that the United States has “no better ally in Asia,” but 
not before remarking that the United States “wants to see democratically elected 
governments, and…will convey that message.”383 When President Bush visited Samak in 
August 2008, he, too, championed Thailand’s return to democracy and proclaimed that the 
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“United States and Thailand are working to expand freedom with good governance.”384 
Although all U.S. officials who visited Thailand boasted the alliance and expressed desires 
to strengthen ties, it appears that none mentioned concrete actions to further the relationship 
aside from reinstating military aid. Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations, then, continued 
falling to the wayside. Additionally, Bush’s 2008 remarks about “America [look]ing to 
Thailand as a leader in the region and a partner around the world” were simply aspirational, 
since “it would take more than one election to restore democracy, liberty and law [that] 
had been under attack since 2001.”385   
3. Abhisit Vejjajiva, December 2008 to August 2011 
Abhisit Vejjajiva was appointed by the Thai Constitutional Court as Thailand’s 
prime minister on December 17, 2008. Despite his seemingly pro-Western credentials of 
being an Oxford alumnus and enjoying close relations with the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, 
Abhisit and the United States’ newly elected Obama administration were unable to 
rejuvenate Thailand-U.S. diplomatic ties. During Abhisit’s term in office, Thailand-U.S. 
diplomacy continued stagnating. Abhisit’s administrative makeup and initial efforts by the 
Obama administration showed potential for restoring Thailand-U.S. diplomacy. Abhisit’s 
foreign minister, Kasit Piromya, and Finance Minister Korn Chatikavanij were judged as 
“pro-American,” given their understanding of the alliance and favorable views toward the 
United States.386 Not counting Abhisit’s defense minister and deputy premier, 34 of his 36 
cabinet members were civilians, and, therefore, it was reasonable to infer that Abhisit’s 
administration would be disposed toward democracy and civilian rule of law, two long-
term diplomatic platforms of the United States. For its part, the Obama administration 
pledged to focus U.S. attention and policymaking on Asia and away from the Middle East. 
To support this, Obama’s secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, made Asia her first visit abroad 
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within a month of taking office. This was the first time a U.S. Secretary of State selected 
Asia as the first destination abroad since Secretary Rusk visited Thailand in 1961.387 
But this optimistic view and initial efforts of Thailand-U.S. diplomacy failed to 
produce tangible results. When Kasit retired as ambassador to the United States in 2005, 
he joined the pro-establishment, anti-Thaksin PAD. This and Thaksin’s continuing efforts 
to influence Thai politics from exile, compelled Kasit to focus foreign policy more on 
Thaksin than the United States, let alone Thailand-U.S. diplomacy. As for the United 
States, Clinton’s inaugural trip to Asia in February 2009 was to China, Indonesia, Japan, 
and South Korea—skipping over Thailand, a treaty and MMNA ally.388 When she visited 
Thailand in July 2009, it was to attend the Asian Regional Forum and not to engage in a 
bilateral Thailand-U.S. working meeting.389 Similarly, Abhisit’s 2009 visit to the United 
States was primarily to attend the UN General Assembly meeting where he only later 
engaged with U.S. legislators and business leaders, not President Obama. Only Kasit 
visited the United States for bilateral talks aimed at strengthening cooperation.390 As for 
Obama, he did not visit Thailand while traveling to Indonesia in 2010.391 For their part, 
Chinese officials’ actions to enhance Sino-Thai diplomacy starkly contrasted with those of 
Washington. Within months of Abhisit assuming premiership, Beijing canceled Thaksin’s 
scheduled talk at Hong Kong’s press club to signal China’s support for Thailand’s new 
government.392  
                                                 
387 Zawacki, Thailand: Shifting Ground between the U.S. and a Rising China. 
388 Zawacki, Thailand: Shifting Ground between the U.S. and a Rising China. 
389 Dean Yates and Arshad Mohammed, “U.S. Signs ASEAN Treaty, Boosts Engagement,” Reuters, 
July 21, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-usa/u-s-signs-asean-treaty-boosts-engagement-
idUSTRE56L11920090722. 
390 “Foreign Minister Completes His Trip to the United States,” Royal Thai Embassy in Singapore, 
2010, https://www.thaiembassy.sg/press_media/news-highlights/foreign-minister-completes-his-trip-to-the-
united-states. 
391 U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Thailand, “A Look Back at U.S. Presidential Visits to Thailand.”  
392 Zawacki, Thailand: Shifting Ground between the U.S. and a Rising China. 
122 
4. Yingluck Shinawatra, August 2011 to May 2014 
Yingluck, a democratically elected prime minister, fared no better at increasing 
Thailand-U.S. diplomatic ties since her foreign policies toward the United States were 
mediocre and quite ineffective.393 Initially, however, there was potential. Under Yingluck’s 
administration, Thailand seemed postured to play a greater role in Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” 
strategy, since, compared to her two immediate predecessors, she was elected as prime 
minister and not appointed. Moreover, Washington’s intention to reinvigorate Thailand-
U.S. diplomatic ties after her election was apparent in Obama’s statements in Bangkok 
after his reelection in 2012: 
Asia is my first foreign trip since our election in the United States, and 
Thailand is my first stop. And this is no accident…. As I said many times, 
the United States is and always will be a Pacific nation…. And the 
cornerstone of our strategy is our strong and enduring treaty alliances, 
which includes our alliance with Thailand.394 
 
In addition to Obama’s remarks, the United States and Thailand revitalized their bilateral 
ties with the signing of the 2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance 
that envisaged Thailand supporting a U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific and becoming a 
regional leader within ASEAN.395  
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But critics argued that this was too late.396 Obama’s 2012 visit to Thailand was the 
first from a U.S. president since Bush’s visit with Samak in 2008. The bedrock of Thailand-
U.S. diplomacy between 2008 and 2012 lay in the two countries’ economic and military 
exchanges. By 2011, Yingluck exacerbated matters further with a catch-all foreign policy 
toward all international partners aimed at achieving Thai state interests.397 Yingluck sought 
to “strengthen cooperation and strategic partnerships with countries, groups of countries 
and international organizations that play important roles in global affairs.”398 This blanket 
foreign policy did little to restore the historically special Thailand-U.S. diplomatic ties, 
which, by the time of her tenure, were lagging behind Sino-Thai diplomacy. Some analysts 
contend that Yingluck was also incompetent, seeing as she appointed the inexperienced 
Surapong Tovichakchaikul as the Kingdom’s foreign minister.399 This decision, they argue, 
suggests a lack of care toward foreign affairs and not a specific intent to weaken Thailand-
U.S. relations.400 
The Yingluck government’s foreign-affairs performance teetered between success 
and failure. In 2012, when the United States requested permission for NASA to use the U-
tapao airbase for a climate study, Yingluck dwelled on the issue before declining, based on 
opposition in and out of the parliament.401 Her close contact with her brother, Thaksin, 
further compromised continuity in Thai foreign policy.402 Yingluck’s foreign policy 
intensified existing imbalances between Thailand’s relations with the United States, China, 
and Japan. While mainland Southeast Asian states began tilting toward China, and 
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maritime states began seeking U.S. security guarantees during the emerging South China 
Sea crisis, Thailand’s posture toward the United States under Yingluck remained conflicted 
and confused.403   
5. Conclusion: Thailand-U.S. Diplomatic Relations after the 2006 Coup 
Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations between September 2006 and May 2014 
declined from their positive starting point prior to the 2006 coup. This decline stems largely 
from the five different prime ministers ruling Thailand during this period who together 
lacked consistent and clear foreign policy to guide their engagement with foreign powers. 
Moreover, Bush’s visit with Samak in 2008 was more indicative of a formality than a 
genuine effort to launch concrete policy initiatives. Obama’s visit with Yingluck in 2012, 
while not strictly done for formality purposes, did not significantly strength the alliance, 
notwithstanding the signing of the 2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense 
Alliance. Instead, Obama’s visit was part of the United States’ overall “Pivot to Asia” 
foreign policy aimed at countering China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific, as well as reasserting 
the United States as a key leader in Asia.404 Finally, while Thailand-U.S. diplomatic ties 
declined relative to the Thaksin years, it is necessary to clarify that they merely stagnated 
at a low impasse after the 2006 coup. The extent of the two states’ diplomacy arguably can 
be predicated on the state of Thailand-U.S. economic and security relations, since, on the 
whole, both continued to deepen.  
C. THAILAND-U.S. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: AFTER THE 2014 COUP 
(2014–2019) 
In the immediate years following the 2014 coup, Thailand-U.S. diplomatic ties 
were on the decline before stagnating at another low impasse. Specifically, from 2014 to 
2017, Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations did not reach the strong and cooperative levels 
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seen during the Thaksin-Bush years. However, the diplomatic ties between the two allies 
were on the mend following Prayut’s meeting with Trump in October 2017. A significant 
contributing factor to the initial decline in Thailand-U.S. diplomacy had to do with Prayut’s 
tight hold on power as the self-appointed prime minister from May 2014 until Thailand’s 
election in March 2019, which returned him to the premiership.  With elections delayed, 
the United States maintained sanctions per U.S. law, and diplomatic relations suffered 
under the Obama administration as a result. Thus, Trump’s invitation for Prayut to visit the 
White House in 2017 signified the first normalization of Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations 
since the 2014 coup. That visit, as important as it was, was not the only reason for 
improvements in Thailand-U.S. diplomatic ties.405 More likely, a combination of this high-
level visit and an announcement of holding Thailand elections in 2019—however delayed 
they repeatedly were since 2014—helped to stabilize Thailand-U.S. relations.  
1. Thailand-U.S. Diplomacy from May 2014 to October 2017  
 Thailand-U.S. diplomacy from May 2014 to October 2017 continued to falter. 
Prayut did not take well to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s comments that “there is no 
justification for this coup.... This act will have negative implications for the Thailand-U.S. 
relationship, [and] especially our relationship with the Thai military.”406 Notably, Prayut 
was unabashed in rebuking the United States’ condemnation of his coup, criticizing U.S.-
imposed trade sanctions on Thailand and the downsized U.S. participation in the joint-
military Cobra Gold exercise.407 His rebuke included the argument that military coups and 
martial law restore political stability and help protect Thai democracy and that there is no 
single type of democracy. Some argued that, having returned Thailand to military 
authoritarian rule where elections were continually postponed, Prayut’s premiership 
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reflected a “Thai-style democracy” governed by a royal-military alliance with a heavily 
conservative political agenda.408  
This style of “democracy” under Prayut worried U.S. officials who vehemently 
urged their Thai counterparts to rescind martial law and hold a free and fair election for a 
prime minister. A month after the coup, Scot Marciel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 
to the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, testified before the U.S. House Committee: 
Our interests include the preservation of peace and democracy in Thailand, 
as well as the continuation of our important partnership with Thailand over 
the long-term…. [But] the coup and post-coup repression have made it 
impossible for our relationship with Thailand to go on with ‘business as 
usual.’409 
In January 2015, Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, delivered a speech at Chulalongkorn University’s Institute of Security and 
International Studies in Bangkok that struck a nerve with Prayut. Russel criticized the 
military government’s lack of inclusiveness in their “political process [that] doesn’t seem 
to represent all elements of Thai society.”410 Prayut responded days later with an insistence 
that Thai democracy continued to prosper and that the 2014 coup reflected a unique case 
in which the military had to seize power in order to restore democracy after Yingluck’s 
undemocratic government.411 Prayut argued: 
Thai democracy will never die, because I’m a soldier with a democratic 
heart. I have taken over the power because I want democracy to live on 
[and] we are building democracy every day… I did not seize power to give 
money away to this or that person or take it as my own property.412 
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For about a year, Russel’s and Prayut’s competing remarks further complicated 
Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations, with Prayut denying Russel’s contention that Prayut’s 
decision to lead the 2014 coup was “politically driven.”413 Yet, by December 2015, Russel 
and Prayut changed their positions with Russel declaring to the Thai Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs that he had a “very warm reception from Prime Minister Prayut.”414 Russel 
explained his newfound understanding: 
He created an opportunity—and I valued that—for me to engage and share 
directly with him both our hopes, our goals, and our concerns, both with 
regards to the political situation in Thailand and the prospect for growing 
U.S.-Thai cooperation. Now there are a number of areas in which we may 
not come to agreement. One thing that we do agree on is the importance of 
the Thai people charting a path to a stable and secure future. That path leads 
to civilian-led, democratic government. 
 
The U.S. is a friend of Thailand. We stand with the Thai people. We stand 
with the Thai nation. We want to see Thailand unified, stable, secure, 
prosperous, and influential, because Thailand has a very important role to 
play in both [the] region and on the international stage.415 
This change in attitude reflected some of Marciel’s initial testimony in June 2015: 
At the same time, mindful of our long-term strategic interests, we remain 
committed to maintaining our enduring friendship with the Thai people and 
nation, including the military. The challenge facing the United States is to 
make clear our support for a rapid return to democracy and fundamental 
freedoms, while also working to ensure we are able to maintain and 
strengthen this important friendship and our security alliance over the long 
term.416 
However, despite Thailand and the United States’ efforts to maintain their alliance, 
Thailand-U.S. diplomacy was still strained from 2014 to 2017 because of domestic politics 
in both Thailand and the United States. In Thailand, because Prayut consolidated power 
and kept postponing elections until 2019, ostensibly because of the late Thai King 
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Bhumibol Adulyadej’s death in October 2016, Thailand remained under soft-authoritarian 
control.417 This complicated how Washington could engage its Thai ally, since the 2014 
coup “put the U.S. in a dilemma between security goals and principles.”418 Essentially, it 
would be harder for the United States to use the alliance—let alone praise Thailand-U.S. 
diplomatic ties—as a means to further U.S. strategic purposes the longer Thailand 
remained under authoritarian rule. As for the United States, domestic politics compounded 
Thailand-U.S. diplomacy.419 Washington invited Prayut to attend the ASEAN-U.S. 
Summit in February 2016 to discuss the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative, 
but this invitation did little to improve diplomatic relations when Prayut claimed to support 
the TPP but was reluctant to join. When President Trump ascended to office in 2017, he 
promptly withdrew the United States from the TPP. Initial efforts at restoring Thailand-
U.S. diplomacy, then, were gone.  
Finally, consider scholars’ observations that “the erratic Prayut… took U.S. 
admonitions seriously and even personally,” which strained Thailand-U.S. diplomatic 
relations from the onset.420 Not only did the heavy Western castigation of the coup anger 
Prayut and lead him to rebuke U.S. criticism, it also led Prayut’s government to seek closer 
ties with other authoritarian regimes, like China, to help legitimize his regime and 
government. Significantly, throughout the Kingdom’s political unrest and periods of 
authoritarianism between 2006 and 2019, China did not criticize Thailand’s junta.421  
Between 2014 and 2016, most diplomatic visits between Thailand and the United 
States ceased, while visits between Thailand and China, comparatively, continued 
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unabated.422 It is questionable, though, that Prayut chose to cultivate stronger ties with 
China at the expense of the United States.423 Rather, Prayut may have courted diplomatic 
ties with other state leaders, such as China, because U.S. sanctions constrained the 
Kingdom’s access to military equipment and foreign assistance.  While the conditions for 
a more cooperative Sino-Thai relationship existed well before Prayut came to power, 
Prayut broke new ground, signing two Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), one for a 
key rail project and another on agricultural trade products.424 Sino-Thai relations under the 
junta, then, were about furthering an already well-established relationship, as opposed to 
deliberately cultivating such ties over that of the Thailand-U.S. alliance.425 Thus, Prayut is 
not bandwagoning with China, but is hedging between China and the United States with 
some prioritization of Beijing over Washington, because the latter was slow to recognize 
the Prayut regime’s legitimacy and issued sanctions limiting U.S. economic aid to 
Thailand.426 Nonetheless, Prayut’s courtship with Beijing still negatively strained 
Thailand-U.S. diplomacy.427 
2. Thailand-U.S. Diplomacy under the Trump Administration, 2017–
2019 
 In 2017, Prayut achieved something he was unable to during the Obama 
Administration: a visit to the White House to meet with the U.S. President, signaling the 
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normalization of Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations. During Trump and Prayut’s meeting, 
both sang praises about Thailand-U.S. relations, with President Trump declaring that he 
was hopeful about their “very strong relationship.”428 While the outcome of this meeting 
did not guarantee regular diplomatic meetings or a restoration of diplomatic ties to previous 
heights, the meeting still marked an improvement in diplomatic relations over the past 
decade.  
The diplomatic relationship between Thailand and the United States has stabilized 
since Prayut’s visit with Trump in 2017, with more efforts made by U.S. officials to 
increase ties. As reported in the DOD News, on February 7, 2018, Marine Corps General 
Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), visited his 
Thai counterpart, Army General Tarnchaiyan Srisuwan, along with Defense Minister 
Prawait Wongsuwan and Prime Minister Prayut, in Bangkok, Thailand.429 This meeting 
marked the first visit by a CJCS to Thailand since 2012, with the 2014 coup having led to 
cancellation of several high-level engagements between U.S. and Thailand forces. DoD 
News highlighted the significance of Dunford’s speech, in which he praised the strong 
military-to-military relations between the two countries and stated U.S. intent to deepen 
strategic ties. While military in nature, the stature of the participants carried diplomatic 
significance as well and indicated growing efforts to further Thailand-U.S. diplomatic 
dialogue. 
Yet, part of Dunford’s speech was ambiguous. He proclaimed that the most 
important aspect of the Thailand-U.S. alliance is that the relationship is based on the 
countries’ mutual contributions to “a rules-based international order for more than 70 
years,” which includes diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation and norms430 
However, considering Thailand’s two successful coups in 2006 and 2014, the absence of 
democratic elections from 2014 to 2019, and seemingly arbitrary and strict use of lese 
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majeste laws, it should stand to reason that Thailand-U.S. relations were anything but 
strong.431 Not to mention that, at the time of Dunford’s speech, Thailand had yet to hold 
new elections. It is likely, then, that Dunford’s overtures stemmed from Prayut and 
Trump’s 2017 diplomatic meeting, which signaled the normalization of Thailand-U.S. 
relations without direct mention of democracy. Dunford’s remarks were similar to 
statements made after Thailand returned to democratic governance following the 2006 
coup, yet came without renewed elections being realized. His comments reflect the Trump 
administration’s willingness to engage with Thailand on multiple levels.      
The Trump Administration made additional attempts to revitalize Thailand-U.S. 
diplomacy a year later. On August 1, 2019, five months after Thailand held its first election 
since the 2014 coup, and just two months after the election results saw Prayut retain his 
premiership, U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo arrived in Bangkok and made 
statements that echoed Dunford’s speech.432 During his visit with Thai Foreign Minister 
Don Pramudwinai, Pompeo described a thriving Thailand-U.S. military relationship and 
announced an agreement with Don to maintain strong security ties.433 Notably, Pompeo, 
the top U.S. diplomat, expanded on matters of foreign affairs and urged Don to dispute 
Chinese coercion in the South China Sea. While Don did not respond to the point made 
about China, he noted that “the ties of friendship between our two countries has been time-
tested.  The issues we discussed, which I’ll mention very briefly, have been very healthy, 
making good progress in just all areas: people-to-people connectivity, education, 
government-to-government.”434 Highlighting further the improvement in diplomatic ties, 
Don sang praises about enhancing bilateral relations under Pompeo’s stewardship and 
expressed joy and pride at hosting Pompeo during the visit. This timely remark arrived at 
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the precipice of major headlines reporting a distancing of Thailand-U.S. relations and 
strengthening of Thai-Sino strategic cooperation.435 Dunford’s, Pompeo’s, and Don’s 
remarks, then, showcase that a return to positive Thailand-U.S. diplomatic exchanges is 
possible upon symbolic meetings between state leaders and completion of democratic 
elections. 
3. Conclusion: Thailand-U.S. Diplomatic Relations under the Prayut 
Years 
Diplomatic ties between Thailand and the United States under the Prayut 
Administration declined and stagnated at a low impasse in the first three years, starting 
with state officials from both sides criticizing one another publicly before making progress 
in 2017. Domestic politics within Thailand and the United States also contributed to the 
2014–17 decline in Thailand-U.S. diplomacy, despite initial efforts by Washington to mend 
the relationship as seen in the 2016 ASEAN-US Summit invitation. Yet, by October 2017, 
Thailand-U.S. diplomacy was on the mend with Prayut’s visit with Trump marking a 
normalization of diplomatic relations. Finally, to the extent that Prayut cultivated a stronger 
diplomatic relationship with other state leaders, namely China’s leaders, his decisions were 
strategically crafted. Prayut does not appear to have courted strong Sino-Thai diplomacy 
with the intent of fully abandoning Thailand-U.S. diplomatic ties.436 Rather, he has 
engaged more with China to help legitimize his self-appointed rule over Thailand as prime 
minister, since a leader’s legitimacy can be shored up by both another sovereign state’s 
acknowledgment and through performance, such as delivering stability and economic 
growth.437 Moreover, U.S. sanctions limited what Thailand could obtain militarily and, 
Prayut reasonably needed to obtain resources from other major international partners. His 
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2017 visit with Trump finally opened the door for further diplomatic visits, such as those 
by Dunford and Pompeo, to Thailand. It can be argued, then, that contemporary Thailand-
U.S. diplomacy, while not as strong as before the 2006 coup, is again progressing forward.   
D. CONCLUSION 
 Thailand-U.S. diplomacy receded after the 2006 coup compared to where it was at 
the end of the Thaksin era, but has since stabilized under the Trump Administration’s 
comfort with authoritarianism and Thailand’s return to elections in 2019. Specifically, 
Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations were initially speculated to decline in the first few 
months under the Thaksin Administration (2001–2006). It took Thaksin’s eventual support 
of the U.S. global war on terrorism to set Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations on a path of 
greater enhancement and cooperation, ultimately elevating the two allies’ diplomacy to a 
robust and strengthened one. The 2006 coup brought a rapid series of five prime ministers, 
each without a coherent foreign policy, to lead Thailand from 2006 to 2014. This 
confounded Thailand-U.S. diplomatic ties. Despite Obama’s effort to strengthen Thailand-
U.S. relations with his 2012 visit and the signing of the 2012 Joint Vision Statement with 
Yingluck, Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations remained stagnated at a low level.  
After the 2014 coup, diplomacy between Thailand and the United States was again 
rocky, with Washington criticizing the coup, Prayut criticizing U.S. interference, and 
Prayut strengthening ties with China in an effort to legitimize his rule of Thailand and 
obtain resources.438 Domestic political problems in Thailand and the United States further 
curtailed diplomatic relations from 2014 to 2017, despite guarded efforts by both side to 
make amends. Here, Prayut’s indecisiveness at whether to commit to the TPP when 
proposed by Obama during his term, and Trump’s decision to later withdraw from the TPP, 
caused a momentary window of opportunity to restore ties. Still, by October 2017, 
Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations were on the mend with Trump’s invitation for Prayut 
to meet at the White House, signaling the normalization of diplomatic ties. While no 
guarantees were made to conduct continuing, consistent official meetings, this 2017 visit 
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marked the return of Thailand-U.S. high-level diplomatic visit between state leaders and 





This thesis sought to assess and explain the evolution in Thailand-U.S. relations 
since the 2006 coup and found that Thailand-U.S. relations have declined from their strong 
robustness prior to the coup but not as significantly as is commonly purported and not 
equally across all sectors. Adherence to U.S. laws, frequent leadership changes in Thailand, 
and hedging best explain these shifts. This thesis reached this conclusion by examining 
military, economic, and diplomatic activity over three periods. First, it described the state 
of Thailand-U.S. relations prior to the 2006 coup under Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra’s government (2001–06) to establish a baseline understanding of the bilateral 
ties. Second, it identified trends and analyzed a set of influential factors to explain the 
reasons for changes to Thailand-U.S. relations between the 2006 and 2014 coups. Third, it 
traced activities and analyzed similar contributing factors to explain the reasons for the 
relationship’s decline and restoration since the 2014 coup. These influential factors 
included Thailand’s relationship with China in this era of great power competition, the 
ramifications of U.S. reactions to the 2006 and 2014 coups in Thailand, and the impact of 
Thai foreign policies and Thai political actors who adopted them.  
In reaching these findings, this thesis makes a timely contribution to understanding 
the current state of Thailand-U.S. affairs and likely scenarios going forward. Thailand is 
distinguished as the United States’ oldest treaty ally in Asia, as well as continuing to be a 
key security ally whose domestic stability and growth are important to maintaining regional 
peace.439 It would, therefore, be exceptionally alarming, particularly in this era of great 
power competition, should the Kingdom distance itself from the United States and pivot 
strongly toward a regional, rising great power and U.S. adversary, namely China. Most 
poignantly, the ramifications of the 2006 and 2014 Thai coups and U.S. responses to each 
coup, as well as the foreign policies and actions of Thai state leaders, challenged the 
stability and strength of the Thailand-U.S. alliance. Dissecting the extent to which the 
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Thailand-U.S. alliance was negatively affected as a result of the coups, then, was necessary 
to better understand the nature of Thailand-U.S. relations and advise policymakers on how 
best to manage this critical relationship. 
A. THE IMPACT OF THE 2006 AND 2014 COUPS 
Through an aggregate analysis of quantitative and qualitative data, this thesis found 
that since the 2006 coup, Thailand-U.S. relations overall have declined. Namely, they are 
not as robust and strong compared to the state of the relationship during former Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s tenure (2001–06). In each of the three analyzed sectors of 
the Thailand-U.S. alliance, Thailand-U.S. military and economic ties have strengthened in 
certain areas while declined in others.  Diplomatic ties correspondingly have rebounded to 
a present state of normalization from periods of alternatingly low stagnation and decline 
between the 2006 coup and 2017.  
1. Baseline Period: The Thaksin Administrative Years (2001–06) 
Overall Thailand-U.S. relations under the Thaksin Administration (2001–06) had 
deepened by the end of Thaksin’s tenure, despite Thaksin’s rhetoric about the Kingdom 
pivoting to Asia. Thailand-U.S. military relations improved dramatically with increases in 
U.S. financing for military equipment and the International Military and Education 
Training (IMET) programs and sales in military equipment to Thailand. COBRA GOLD 
evolved to become a multinational and multiservice military exercise with training 
scenarios responsive to emerging threat environments. While the number of U.S. 
participants in COBRA GOLD fluctuated widely each year, those fluctuations are most 
attributable to U.S. war campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and are not suggestive of a 
decline in Thailand-U.S. military ties.  
Thailand-U.S. economic and diplomatic ties also strengthened considerably by the 
end of Thaksin’s time in office. Economic relations in that period may seem mixed due to 
fluctuations in U.S. development assistance to Thailand, which trended downward because 
of Thaksin’s extrajudicial war-on-drugs campaign that violated human rights. But, on 
balance, Thailand-U.S. economic relations were strong and stable given the sustained 
increases in total trade and FDI. As for Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations, while foreign 
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assistance was arguably curtailed due to Thaksin’s war on drugs campaign, the Bush 
Administration was largely muted about the campaign—expressing only conventional 
disapproval of human rights violation with no overt criticism and condemnation. The Bush 
Administration was indebted to Thaksin’s support of the U.S. war on terrorism campaign. 
On balance, then, diplomatic ties were vigorous and healthy with official working visits 
between the two state leaders conducted on a reciprocal, frequent basis. Therefore, the 
positive state of Thailand-U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic ties represent a growing, 
strong alliance. Had there been no coup in 2006, it is arguable that the Thailand-U.S. 
alliance would have continued on its positive, upward trajectory.   
2. After the 2006 Coup (2007–14) 
Thailand-U.S. relations after the 2006 coup (2007–14), on the whole, were mixed 
with initial periods of decline that stabilized at a low impasse by the time of Prime Minister 
Yingluck Shinawatra’s government (2011–14) and remained somewhat stable until her 
ousting via coup on May 22, 2014. Compared to the Thaksin Administration period, 
however, Thailand-U.S. relations exhibited an overall decline. An analysis of military ties 
revealed two distinct trends where, positively, the nature of COBRA GOLD expanded and 
U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) with Thailand increased, but, negatively, U.S. funding 
to foreign military financing (FMF) and IMET were suspended because of the coup. FMF 
and IMET funding was restored once Thailand became a democracy again upon holding 
elections in 2007. Overall, the differences within sectors of Thailand-U.S. military relations 
indicate some fluctuations but, on balance, were stable.  
Analysis of Thailand-U.S. economic ties also paints a mixed picture with Thailand-
U.S. diplomacy negatively affected most by the coup. Despite political instability and 
frequent regime and leadership changes in the first five years after the coup, Thailand-U.S. 
bilateral trade increased to its second-highest point to date at $39 billion in 2014, as did 
U.S. FDI to Thailand at $40 billion in 2012. FDI fluctuated more turbulently than bilateral 
trade, but both showed similar upward trends, whereas U.S. development assistance 
through USAID and USTDA was initially curtailed by the coup, with some funding to 
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Thailand suspended altogether. On balance, Thailand-U.S. economic ties were somewhat 
affected by the coup but grew overall.  
The same cannot be said for Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations, which were 
substantially impacted by the coup and continued instability. Compared to the frequent and 
robust diplomatic visits during the Thaksin years, Thailand-U.S. state leaders held just two 
meetings from 2007 to 2014, and both were from a U.S. President to Thailand: Bush in 
2008 and Obama in 2012. Bush’s visit came after the Thai junta transferred control of the 
government to a civilian leader via elections in 2007, and Obama’s visit came after 
Yingluck had been elected to office in 2011, replacing Abhisit who had been appointed. 
But, Obama’s objective was to strengthened the alliance in accordance with U.S. “Pivot to 
Asia” foreign policy initiatives, not for the sake of the alliance, per se. Neither visit resulted 
in follow-up meetings focused at restoring the Thailand-U.S. alliance.  
Thus, Thailand-U.S. relations were overall impacted by the 2006 coup to some 
extent in each of the three sectors and slightly declined from the strong baseline established 
during the Thaksin years, despite some strengthening in engagements through COBRA 
GOLD, trade, and foreign investments. Had the 2014 coup not occur, it is likely that greater 
efforts would have be made to further restore the alliance, given that Thailand had the same 
democratically elected leader from 2011–14. 
3. After the 2014 Coup (2014–19) 
Thailand-U.S. relations after the 2014 coup declined from both the baseline period 
(2001–06) and post-2006 coup period (2007–14). This sustained decline, felt most 
intensely in the military and diplomatic sectors, was due to incumbent Prime Minister 
Prayut Chan-o-cha, the 2014 coup leader, retaining his premiership and placing Thailand 
under authoritarian control for five years. However, after the Prayut-Trump diplomatic 
meeting in October 2017, some aspects of Thailand-U.S. relations have normalized while 
greater effort has been made to enhance the alliance. Thus, on balance, Thailand-U.S. 
relations after the 2014 coup initially declined overall but have since stabilized with some 
restoration after this 2017 official high-level visit. 
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Thailand-U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic ties within the alliance context 
were mixed, with some sectors and subsector indicators increasing, some stabilizing, and 
others declining from 2014 to 2019 relative to 2001–14. Militarily, COBRA GOLD U.S. 
participation levels plummeted while Thailand participation numbers remained stable. This 
was the first period in nearly two decades where the number of U.S. forces were generally 
on par with each other. Qualitatively, however, the exercise enjoyed greater complexity 
and interoperability, partly promulgated by U.S. efforts at countering China’s rise in the 
Indo-Pacific region. U.S. financing for military equipment and funding to IMET were 
significantly affected by the coup with funding outright suspended after 2014. But, FMS 
were positive with a slightly upward trend as Thailand continued purchasing foreign 
military equipment from the United States.  
Economically, overall Thailand-U.S. relations improved throughout the Prayut 
years with some periods of stability but trending upward, nonetheless. Bilateral trade 
continued its steady upward trajectory. Having more than doubled between 2013 and 2014, 
FDI has held relatively stable at this enhanced level since 2014 with the exception of a one-
year temporary dip in 2017. U.S. development assistance, in contrast, declined significantly 
from previous years.  
Finally, Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations were most affected by the 2014 coup 
with Prayut’s visit with Trump in 2017 marking the only meeting between the two 
countries’ top leaders since the 2014 coup. Nevertheless, the meeting produced positive 
dialogue with both leaders expressing their intent to increase Thailand-U.S. relations. 
Therefore, while Thailand-U.S. relations, on balance, have substantially declined after the 
2014 coup, the 2017 meeting repositioned the contemporary alliance on an upward 
trajectory by normalizing the ties.  
B. TESTING HYPOTHESES 
This thesis submitted three potential factors that may have influenced the evolution 
of Thailand-U.S. relations since the 2006 coup: Thailand bandwagoning in the current era 
of great power competition, the ramifications of U.S. reactions to the 2006 and 2014 coups, 
and Thai foreign policies and the Thai political actors who adopt them. Three hypotheses 
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grew out of these three factors and current international relations theory: bandwagoning, 
U.S. foreign policies, and Thai domestic politics, including ambiguous Thai foreign 
policies.   
The bandwagoning hypothesis proposed that Thailand is bandwagoning with a 
rising China in the hopes of sharing conquered spoils. This hypothesis was disproven, given 
that Thailand did not align with China against the United States. Rather, Thailand is 
hedging between the two countries to reap profits from relations with both. The second 
hypothesis posited that the United States’ relatively harsh condemnations of Thailand and 
its imposed sanctions following the 2006 and 2014 coups would not lead to a decline in 
Thailand-U.S. relations because the security alliance and historically strong ties would 
foster stability. This, too, was proven false, since U.S. criticism and sanctions did lead to 
overall declines in Thailand-U.S. relations after the 2006 and 2014 coups, most notably in 
the military and diplomatic realms. The final hypothesis postulated that Thai domestic 
politics would shift toward more ambiguous Thai foreign policies since the 2006 coup may 
have contributed to a decline in Thailand-U.S. relations. This is also proven false. 
1. Hypothesis 1: Bandwagoning 
The first hypothesis, that Thailand is bandwagoning with a rising China in the hope 
of sharing conquered spoils, was disproven. This hypothesis is based on a consideration of 
China as a revisionist state and Thailand’s desire to advance its strategic capabilities and 
grow and diversify its economy further after becoming an upper-middle-income economy 
in 2011 through greater engagements with a rapidly growing China economy.440  
Three criteria would need to be met to suggest Thailand was bandwagoning with 
its large northern neighbor. First, Thailand would be bandwagoning with China against the 
United States if Thailand-U.S. relations declined—as measured across the security, 
economic, and diplomatic realms—while Sino-Thai relations improved. Second, Thailand 
would not be bandwagoning with China if Thailand-U.S. and Sino-Thai relations remained 
near constant or improved in-tandem. Instead, with these outcomes, Thailand would be 
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hedging to better Thailand’s gains by pursuing constructive relations with two states that 
are at odds with each other.441 Lastly, Thailand would not be bandwagoning with China if 
Thailand-U.S. relations improved while Thai-Sino relations declined. 
Based on the aforementioned criteria, Thailand, again, is not bandwagoning with 
China. Although Thailand now has a greater total trade balance with China, engages in 
frequent diplomatic visits with Chinese state leaders, and enters into memorandums of 
understanding, these are not necessarily indicators of Thailand bangwagoning with China 
against the United States. Thailand trades with China because it has the region’s largest 
and fastest growing economy and Thailand wants to share in the gains. Furthermore, Thai 
state leaders, such as Prayut, engaged with their Chinese counterparts to cultivate domestic 
political legitimacy after their American ally enacted sanctions that inhibited greater 
Thailand-U.S. engagement. Finally, while Thailand is pursuing greater Sino-Thai military 
ties, this pursuit, too, is likely a result of Thailand needing to find a partner to help 
modernize and grow its armed forces due to U.S. sanctions following the coups.442  
2. Hypothesis 2: U.S. Foreign Policy and Thailand’s Reaction  
Like the first, the second hypothesis was also proven false. It posited that the United 
States’ relatively harsh condemnations of Thailand and the U.S. imposed sanctions 
following the 2006 and 2014 coups, and Thai domestic politics (namely, the political 
leaders’ actions), would not lead to a decline in Thailand-U.S. relations since the 2006 
coup. The reasoning was that Thailand-U.S. military and economic relations and 
engagements would continue largely unabated, regardless of U.S. sanctions, due to 
longstanding Thailand-U.S. ties built on a formidable strategic cooperation evident in a 
robust Thailand-U.S. partnership during the Cold War and Thailand’s support of U.S. 
military campaigns in the global war on terrorism. While strategic cooperation showed 
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continuity and was relied upon by both sides, Thailand-U.S. relations did, on the whole, 
decline because of U.S. sanctions following the coup. 
Four outcomes would reflect the extent to which the second hypothesis stands: 
First, Thailand-U.S. relations would not decline, especially in security cooperation as 
measured in the COBRA GOLD exercise, FMS, FMF, EDA, and IMET programs. Second, 
Thailand-U.S. relations would continue largely unabated, despite punitive U.S. foreign 
policies and denunciations. Third, Thailand-U.S. relations would not weaken if, regardless 
of the Thai political leaders’ bashings of U.S. policies, Thailand-U.S. security cooperation 
continued. Lastly, the contrary stands: that Thailand-U.S. relations would decline if Thai 
political leaders seek to constructively engage U.S. competitors—specifically, China—and 
there is an increase in the latter’s security cooperation with Thailand.  
Given these four criteria, Thailand-U.S. relations have indeed declined. The U.S. 
response to the 2006 coup brought minimal impact to COBRA GOLD and only briefly 
affected funding to the FMS, FMF, EDA, and IMET programs. After the 2014 coup, 
COBRA GOLD numbers of U.S. participants dropped significantly but the sophistication 
of exercises grew and FMS remained largely unaffected. Yet, since the 2014 coup, funding 
to FMF and IMET are still gravely affected. Since 2014, the United States has suspended 
$3.5 million in FMF and $85,000 in IMET funding to Thailand.443 Thai state leaders—
specifically, Prayut—have rejected U.S. criticism of the coup. For instance, Prayut was 
unabashed in rebuking the United States’ condemnation, criticizing U.S.-imposed trade 
sanctions on Thailand and the downsized U.S. participation in the joint-military Cobra 
Gold exercise.444 While COBRA GOLD and FMS did not end despite Prayut’s harsh 
retribution, Thailand-U.S. military relations were still, on balance, negatively affected by 
the 2014 coup.  
Finally, a point of clarification must be made about the last criteria that judges 
Thailand-U.S. relations as having declined if Thai political leaders sought to constructively 
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engage China and there was an increase in Sino-Thai security cooperation. Again, Thai 
state leaders felt it necessary to engage China to gain domestic political legitimacy as 
afforded through diplomatic visits with other states’ leaders. For Prayut, then, it was 
important that throughout the Kingdom’s earlier periods of political unrest and this recent 
period of authoritarianism, China did not criticize Thailand’s junta.445 It would be 
misleading to claim that Sino-Thai security cooperation is increasing with the aim to 
surpass and supplant Thailand-U.S. security ties. Indeed, Thailand benefits from hedging 
between China and the United States.  
3. Hypothesis 3: Thai Domestic Politics and Ambiguous Thai Foreign 
Policies 
The third hypothesis postulated that a shift toward more ambiguous Thai foreign 
policies—that is, hedging—since the 2006 coup may have contributed to a decline in 
Thailand-U.S. relations, which is partly incorrect. This ambiguity reflects Thai 
policymakers’ willingness to court both a democratic United States and an authoritarian 
China, despite Thailand being a U.S. treaty ally. The hypothesis also submitted that Thai 
political leaders’ negative perceptions toward the United States interfering in Thai politics 
has also led to a decline in Thailand-U.S. relations. This hypothesis would hold true if 
Thailand-U.S. relations suffered in the wake of the coups and after Thai state leaders 
cultivated stronger Sino-Thai security, economic, and diplomatic relations. It would be 
disproven should Thailand-U.S. relations remained constant or improve while Sino-Thai 
relations remained the same.  
Overall, Thailand-U.S. relations have indeed declined from their strong baseline 
point during the Thaksin Administrative years. However, it is necessary to clarify that 
while Thailand-U.S. relations have declined, the retreat is not a result of Thailand’s 
hedging policies. Indeed, the United States and Thailand have generally sought to maintain 
their security ties as much as U.S. law will allow. Thai state leaders have courted China to 
engage in the Thailand-U.S. led COBRA GOLD military exercise, highlighting again Thai 
leaders’ hedging policies aimed at increasing gains through engagements with both great 
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powers. This is reflected in, for instance, the former COBRA GOLD Deputy Director and 
Thai Major General Wittaya Wachirakul’s peculiar statement about China’s first-ever role 
as a participant in COBRA GOLD 2014’s HA/DR exercise.446 When asked about the 
decision to include China as a participant, Wittaya disclosed that Beijing and Bangkok held 
talks in 2013 about the possibility of the former becoming a participant, which Wittaya 
stated “would be a good way to reduce tension…in the region.”447 His words created alarm 
in the U.S. government when coupled with China’s full participatory status in COBRA 
GOLD 2015 and reports of Thailand and China strengthening military ties.448 Still, the 
strengthening in Sino-Thai military ties were not intended to depreciate Thailand-U.S. 
military ties as the latter engagement grew more sophisticated through COBRA GOLD and 
FMS. 
  Similarly, since the 2006 coup, Sino-Thai economic relations have grown as Thai 
leaders engaged more with China, as well as Beijing officials offering more assistance to 
Thailand. But this, too, is reflective of Thai state leaders needing to trade with China, the 
region’s growing economic powerhouse. In December 2011, for example, Bangkok and 
Beijing agreed for the Bank of Thailand and the People’s Bank of China to conduct a three-
year currency swap worth 70 billion renminbi ($10 billion).449 In October 2013, incumbent 
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Thailand concluded with him and Yingluck praising 
their economic partnership and expressing a desire to achieve a bilateral trade goal of $100 
billion in 2015, which would continue to be guided by their Five-Year Development Plan 
on Trade and Economic Cooperation.450  
Yet, increased Sino-Thai economic ties were not intended to curtail Thailand-U.S. 
economic relations, as Thailand’s hedging policies included engaging both countries. By 
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2018, during the Prayut period, Sino-Thai trade relations improved to where China is now 
Thailand’s largest import-export partner at $79 billion total trade, compared to the United 
States at $43.3 billion in total trade.451 Still, the value of Thailand-U.S. trade more than 
doubled between 2001–18 through a generally steady increase each year. Even more 
impressive, FDI from the United States into Thailand between 2001–18 tripled in value.  
Finally, while Thailand-U.S. diplomatic relations waxed and waned since the 2006 
coup before approaching normalization with the 2017 Prayut-Trump meeting, Thai state 
leaders continually courted greater diplomatic engagements with their Chinese 
counterparts prior to and after the 2006 coup. But again, such cultivation of Sino-Thai 
diplomatic relations was necessary from Thai state leaders’ perspectives since their 
American ally had publically criticized their flailing democracy, thereby questioning the 
legitimacy of Thai prime ministers.  
C. THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS  
This thesis furthers the literature on theories of international relations as well as 
regional and security studies in Southeast Asia. Much of the current literature on Southeast 
Asian countries debates whether the countries primarily adopt a realist, liberalist, or 
constructivist approach toward foreign affairs with the predominant choices being 
bandwagoning, balancing, and hedging. This thesis demonstrated that Thailand, like many 
of its Southeast Asian counterparts, chooses to hedge between the United States and China, 
rather than outright balance with its U.S. ally against a rising China or bandwagon with its 
Chinese neighbor against its American ally. As such, this thesis supports others who argue 
Thailand’s hedging policies may result in more ambiguous interpretations of Thai state 
leaders’ actions, if only interpreted from the predominant realist perspective.   
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D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICIES AND 
PRACTITIONERS 
This thesis demonstrated that Thailand-U.S. relations since the 2006 coup have, in 
aggregate, declined relative to their baseline period (2001–06), with the exception of 
continuity in FMS, the survival of COBRA GOLD, and significant growth in trade and 
FDI. Notwithstanding the 2017 Trump-Prayut visit returning Thailand-U.S. relations to a 
relatively normalized and cordial level with some projections of future engagements being 
positive, it is premature to argue that Thailand-U.S. relations will continue its return to an 
optimistic, upward trajectory. History has shown the Kingdom’s preference to hedge, and 
this should caution U.S. policymakers when speculating how its ally may behave in this 
era of great power competition against China. Thailand’s military, which despite elections 
in March 2019, continues to enjoy significant power, and political unrest is likely to 
continue. The Thai military would be unwise to perceive a single meeting with an 
unpopular U.S. president as a “green light” to continue its prominent role in politics. The 
coups should still serve as a reminder and lesson to America of how best to deal with its 
strategically savvy ally.  
Nevertheless, Thailand has historically proven to be an invaluable player in U.S. 
strategic goals and military campaigns. The United States must, therefore, not forget that 
historic ties are only in its favor and that it should continue advocating for its oldest friend 
in Asia to uphold democratic values while being mindful of the Kingdom’s political 
history. Finally, considering both Thailand’s title as one of the founding ASEAN member 
nations and the influence the country can exert within the Southeast Asian region, it would 
benefit Washington to cultivate closer diplomatic relations with Bangkok lest risk the 
Kingdom falling further under the shadows and sway of China.     
E. CONCLUSION 
In sum, this thesis found that Thailand-U.S. relations overall have declined since 
the 2006 and 2014 coups but are still highly valued by both countries and are actually 
stronger in some areas, such as the sophistication, albeit not troop numbers, of COBRA 
GOLD, FMS, trade, and FDI. As such, generalized summaries do not do this complex 
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relationship justice. This conclusion was reached through an aggregate analysis of 
quantitative and qualitative data spanning 2001–2019, with the 2001–05 Thaksin 
Administration period serving as a baseline for comparison. It also considered how Sino-
Thai military, economic, and diplomatic relations have evolved in the context of Thailand-
U.S. relations, concluding that Thailand has been hedging in all three sectors between these 
two large powers—one a long-term ally, the other a recent foe but now a rising power—in 
reaction to U.S. sanctions and criticism following Thailand’s two 21st century coups d’etat. 
To expand on these findings, this thesis recommends that future research include 
an in-depth analysis and examination of Sino-Thai relations compared to Thailand-U.S. 
relations. Other research might also dive deep into an explanation of Sino-Thai relations 
across economic, military, and diplomatic sectors. Should future research seek to focus 
strictly on Thailand-U.S. relations, this researcher recommends further explanatory 
analysis of why such trends occur within Thailand-U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic 
relations. Ultimately, a clear, data-driven, and nuanced understanding of Thailand-U.S. 
relations remains necessary, especially in an era of great power competition, because, if 
the United States should allow this historic alliance to suffer, Washington would lose 
significant strategic access in the Indo-Pacific.   
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